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1. BACKGROUND AND STATE OF PLAY 
Direct payments have been one of the main1 support instruments to the agricultural sector 
in the EU since the early 1990s, but their nature has changed significantly over the years. 
With the 1992 reform, they were introduced as coupled payments, linked to production 
based on area or animals and compensating farmers for cuts in price support. From 2003, 
direct payments were gradually decoupled from farmers’ production decisions. In order 
to decide the rate of payment each farmer was eligible for, previous support receipts 
(linked to either the individual farmers’ or the regions’ production history) were used as 
reference. The introduction of direct payments helped to steer the CAP towards 
consistent market oriented reforms for the past two decades.  
The design of the payments, de-coupled from production, has encouraged farmers to 
become more market oriented, thereby enhancing the competitiveness of the agricultural 
sector. The income support function of direct payments has contributed to ensure the 
longer term economic viability, and a smooth structural adjustment of the farming sector. 
This is particularly important given the relatively low level of income in the agricultural 
sector2, which on average remains below 50 % of the average salary in the total economy 
in the EU-27 (see Figure 1 below).  
Figure 1: Evolution of agricultural income as a % of ave. income in the economy3 
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1  In budget year 2009, direct payments amounted to EUR 39 billion, which is 84 % of the EAGF 
expenditure for that year (with 50 % phasing in EU-10 and 30 % in EU-2). 
2  The analysis in this Impact Assessment focuses on farms and the agricultural sector as unit of analysis, 
not on agricultural households. The reason for this is that the objectives of the CAP (see chapter 3 of 
the main IA report) are linked to the operation, competitiveness and performance of the sector/farm as 
an economic unit and not the economic survival of a household. Analysis in other sectors of the 
economy would also not consider the incomes of spouse or children gained in other sectors in order to 
measure the economic viability of a certain activity. Furthermore, there is little available data on 
incomes at the farm household level that could be used for analysis. 
3 The figures in the graph reflect the agricultural entrepreneurial income/AWU as a percentage of wages 
and salaries/AWU in the total economy. Note that these figures should be interpreted with care owing 
to conceptual differences between the measurement of farmer’s income from agricultural activities and 
average wages in the economy, and that, due to the lack of reliable data on full-time equivalent labour 
statistics for the total economy for some Member States, only some of them have been considered to 
calculate the averages (EU-15*: EL, ES, FR, IT, NL, AT, PT; EU-10*: CZ, EE, HU, PL, SK; EU-25* 
= EU-15* + EU-10* countries). 
 9 
Source: DG AGRI, Eurostat 
With the structural adjustment of EU agriculture ongoing, there remains today structural 
diversity across Member States and regions in income developments owing to a variety 
of factors, some historical others linked to natural and economic conditions (such as 
climatic conditions and differences in the functioning of land, labour and capital 
markets). 
In addition to its role as income support for farmers, direct payments play a crucial role 
in the delivery of basic public goods through sustainable land management, due to the 
link between direct payments and the fulfilment of cross compliance4 requirements. This 
link is crucial, as there is evidence5 of undersupply of most important public goods, for 
which certain forms of land management are particularly beneficial (such as extensive 
livestock and mixed systems). The public goods concerned are mostly environmental and 
relate for example to maintaining agricultural landscapes, farm-land biodiversity, water 
availability, soil functionality, climate stability and air quality. Direct payments also 
contribute to public goods which are not related to the environment, such as rural vitality.  
The support provided by direct payments, especially by enabling the continuation of 
farming in more economically marginal areas, is a precondition for being able to provide 
more specific public goods throughout the EU territory, e.g. through rural development 
measures. Therefore, the two elements, income support and basic public goods, are 
complementary objectives of the direct payments.  
2. ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES 
2.1. Role of direct payment in supporting agricultural income 
Over the previous fifteen years, agricultural income in the EU-15, measured as real factor 
income per full-time worker (annual working unit, or AWU), have shown very modest 
developments6 (see Figure 2). On the other hand, agricultural income in the EU-12 has 
increased considerably over the last decade, supported by the gradual phasing in of direct 
payments following EU accession. The medium-term outlook for EU agricultural income 
under a constant policy assumption displays a similar pattern, with EU-15 exhibiting 
only a moderate increase, but the EU-12 is expected to grow at a faster pace driven by 
                                                 
4 Cross compliance links the payments to the respect of basic rules related to environment, health and 
animal welfare. For instance, GAEC (Good Agricultural and Environmental Conditions) obligations 
are related to preserving landscape features, permanent grassland conservation, water courses and soil 
conservation. Farmers’ direct payments are reduced when cross compliance obligations are not 
fulfilled. 
5 See "The Provision of Public Goods Through Agriculture in the European Union", Report for DG 
AGRI, Cooper, T., Hart, K. and Baldock, D. (2009) Contract No 30-CE-0233091/00-28, Institute for 
European Environmental Policy, London. 
6 See "Developments in the income situation of the EU agricultural sector", December 2010, DG AGRI-
FADN, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rica/pdf/hc0301_income.pdf 
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the full phasing in of direct payments, as well as a higher value of production and 
assumed decline in farm labour7.  
Recent developments have also shown (or served as a reminder) that agricultural income 
is highly volatile. During the period 1993-2010, the annual variation of farm income 
exceeded the preceding three year averages by more than 30 % in about 54 % of 
agricultural holdings. Figure 2 also highlights that income volatility has been exacerbated 
by the recent commodity price boom, economic crisis and subsequent economic 
recovery.  
Figure 2: EU developments in agricultural income (income per AWU in real terms) 
 
 
Source: DG AGRI, Eurostat  
Income variability is mostly due to the volatility of input and output prices as well as 
changes in production levels (e.g. due to yield variability). Income variability is 
particularly critical for small farms, since when income is generally low, small changes 
can have a relatively large impact. In addition, the farm sector has shown a steady 
deterioration in its terms of trade since 1996, driven by the diverging dynamics of input 
and output prices (cf. Figure 3 below). This divergence between output and input prices 
constitutes the main factor behind the drop in income at sector level. 
                                                 
7  The outlook for agricultural income is presented in Annex 1 on the Situation and prospects for EU 
agriculture and rural areas. 
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Figure 3: Recent evolution of agricultural input and output prices 
(index 1996 = 100, in real prices)
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Source: Eurostat 
While the EU agricultural sector has displayed a rapid increase in farm size and a 
significant improvement of productivity, many farms still depend heavily on direct 
payments due to the low profitability of agricultural activities. Direct payments 
represented on average 29 % of agricultural income in the period 2007-2009 (with total 
subsidies coming close to 40 % of agricultural income). This needs to be seen against the 
background of important variations in agricultural income across Member States, regions 
and sectors, with sectors such as pig and poultry, milk and horticulture having on average 
higher income levels than grazing livestock or field crops. The share of direct payments 
in agricultural income in the different Member States is shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: Share of direct payments (expenditure) in agricultural factor income (avg. 
2007-2009)8: 
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Source: DG AGRI, Eurostat 
As an evaluation of the income effects of direct support9 has underlined, direct payments 
have proven to be an effective tool for enhancing the income of farmers and have made a 
                                                 
8  During this period direct payments in EU12 are not yet fully phased-in. 
9  See "Evaluation of income effects of direct support", May 2011, Agrosynergie for the European 
Commission, DG AGRI, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/eval/reports/income/index_en.htm 
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positive and robust contribution to the stability of these incomes (see sub-annex 3A for a 
summary of the evaluation report). It has also been shown that direct payments 
contribute to keeping sustainable farming in place throughout the EU territory, as well as 
providing a basis for the provision of public goods through agriculture5. However, there 
remain a number of concerns as regards their distribution, targeting and environmental 
performance. In particular, considerations have to be made with respect to a more 
equitable distribution between Member States and between farmers as well as a 
strengthened role in the provision of income support and public goods.  
Distributional concerns stem from the current dissimilar distribution of support between 
individual farms and Member States. The latter issue is especially emphasized in the 
inter-institutional and public debate (as presented below) and by many of the new 
Member States (EU-12) that feel disadvantaged compared to EU-15 countries, because 
their average levels of direct payments per hectare are lower. Targeting relates to the idea 
of better linking payments to farmers to specific objectives related to the provision of 
public goods (e.g. the fulfilment of environmental objectives), or better adjusting income 
support to the need of different farms or areas. Furthermore, it is often felt that the 
increased policy emphasis on green growth, environmental and climate change issues 
could be better reflected in the design of direct payments. 
2.2. Distribution between Member States 
Figure 5 below illustrates the significant differences between Member States as regards 
the average direct payments per hectare and per beneficiary based on the current 
distribution. 
Figure 5: Average direct payments per beneficiary and per hectare in each Member 
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Note: simplified calculation of average direct payments based on the national envelopes of Member States 
after full phasing-in of direct payments in the EU-12 and the number of potentially eligible hectares 
communicated by MS in the Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS) for 2008 claim year.  
In the previous reforms, the decoupling of direct payments linked to historical support 
values was considered to be the most neutral design of support in terms of impact on 
farms’ asset values. Using historical production as a basis for defining payment levels 
had the advantage that it reflected, to some extent, the conditions for agricultural 
 13 
production in a specific region. It was therefore politically realistic at the time to allow 
for the link between decoupled payment levels and historical support levels, especially 
since not all sectors were reformed at the same time. Today, as adjustments in all sectors 
have taken place and as twelve more Member States have joined the European Union 
with a substantially different production and support history, differences in support levels 
based on historical references cannot be justified on a long term. Even more so because 
farm structures and production pattern have of course changed since the reference 
periods. Moreover, direct payments based on historical production patterns do not reflect 
the fact that important environmental public goods tend to be provided by farms with 
lower yields. Those farms also tend to be more economically vulnerable and so in need 
of greater support. 
However, the current level of direct payments is not just reflecting past production of the 
supported sectors, but also to a significant degree differences in the economic situation of 
Member States (see Figure 6 below). It is indeed important to remember that agricultural 
producers face very different economic and natural conditions across the EU.  
Figure 6: Average direct payments per hectare after full phasing in each Member 
State and GDP per capita (2007-2009 average) 
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Source: DG AGRI (IACS statistics) and Eurostat (GDP/capita)  
Note: ha = potentially eligible area from IACS statistics as communicated by MS, LU = 280 EUR/ha and 
67 500 PPS/capita; MT = 802 EUR/ha and 18 800 PPS/capita. PPS = Purchasing Power Standard 
2.3. Distribution between farmers within Member States 
At present there are several models of implementation of the Single Payment Scheme 
(SPS) in Member States: 
• The SPS can be implemented on the basis of a historical model or a regional model or 
a combination of both (so-called 'hybrid' model). In the historical model, farmers were 
given payment entitlements based on their eligible hectares and payments received in 
a reference period (2000-2002). The regional model is based on a uniform value of 
payment entitlements within a region based on average references of support at 
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regional level, while the hybrid model is a combination that can be either static or 
dynamic in time.  
As regards the yearly activation of entitlements, it can only be done on the basis of an 
equivalent number of eligible agricultural land. 
Since its implementation, SPS has evolved a lot including progressive decoupling in 
several sectors (cotton, olive oil, fruits and vegetables, etc.) and extending the eligible 
agricultural land to all types of agricultural lands that are at least maintained in good 
agricultural and environmental conditions.  
• As a temporary derogation to the SPS, due to the absence of historical references, EU-
12 Member States were allowed to apply a simplified model without entitlements 
called Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS). In SAPS, the payment level is uniform 
over the entire Member State and calculated by dividing the direct payment envelope 
by the base area or, where it is bigger, the claimed area maintained in good 
agricultural conditions in 2003.  
Sub-annex 3B of this note provides an overview of the implementation of direct 
payments in the EU-27. The variety of models of implementation and the discretion left 
to the Member States was deemed necessary at the time of the 2003 reform in order to 
better take into account Member State specificities in view of achieving the common 
goal of full decoupling and better market-orientation. However, with time, those 
differences are becoming less and less justified. For instance, certain eligible agricultural 
areas have been granted entitlements in regional models whereas not in historical models 
(e.g. fruit and vegetables). In addition, the use of past individual references to grant 
direct payments to farmers in Member States with historical models and the resulting 
wide range of the values of entitlements is also becoming hard to justify.  
In addition, the flexibility left to the Member States in the choice of their direct payment 
model (historic, regional, hybrid), which was crucial for achieving almost full decoupling 
within few years , has led to large variations in the level of aid per hectare received by the 
farmers, depending on the region they are located in. For instance, in the Member States 
applying the historical model and also, to a lower extent, in Member States applying the 
regional model, using individual past references of production for determining the 
entitlements led to a lower level of direct payments10 in areas with natural handicaps that 
are less productive while income needs and provision of public goods in these areas are 
important.  
2.4. Distribution between smaller and larger farms 
The extreme ends of the distribution curve of direct payments per beneficiary (smallest 
and largest beneficiaries) are also often mentioned as problematic whereas it is the mere 
result of the support policy (area-based payment) and the structure of the farm sector. 
Indeed according to CATS11 data for financial year 2009, around 80 % of the 
                                                 
10  Note that this statement refers only to direct payments while the total level of aids under the CAP 
(including support to LFA under Pillar II) can be higher in areas with natural handicaps. 
11  The Clearance Audit Trail System (CATS) manages the computerized data on payments under the 
CAP. 
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beneficiaries received EUR 5 000 or less representing around 20 % of the total amount of 
direct payments and around 0.5% of the beneficiaries received EUR 100 000 or more 
representing 16 % of the total amount of direct payments (see Figure 7). 
The high level of aid received by some beneficiaries (despite the modulation mechanism 
introduced in the 2003 reform) is seen as too high to be justified as income support as it 
can be reasonably assumed that large farms benefit from economies of scale and 
therefore their income support needs may not be proportional to the farm size. At the 
same time, small farmers who can make a very important contribution to the vitality of 
many rural areas and may have higher needs for income support often face a 
disproportionately high administrative burden for access to support in relation to the 
payment amount they receive. 
Figure 7: Distribution of direct payments between beneficiaries in EU-15 and in 
EU-12: 
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Source: CATS data (2009 financial year corresponding mainly to claim year 2008), DG AGRI calculation 
2.5. Age structure in the farming sector 
The farming community is ageing. Farm holders under 40 years of age make up only 
14% of the population of farmers in the EU-27 and hold 20% of the potentially eligible 
area. The CAP has recognized this situation as a problem and addresses it in various 
ways, most importantly through the rural development measure “Setting-up of young 
farmers” and through the possibility to address young farmers indirectly under the SPS 
when allocating payment entitlements (provisions for farmers commencing their 
agricultural activity between the reference period and the first year of the SPS and later 
on by using the national reserve). However, as these approaches are not applied across 
the board in the EU-27, there is no generalised approach to improving the age structure 
in the farming community. 
2.6. Non genuine farmers 
Further criticism (e.g. from the European Court of Auditors) has focussed on the fact that 
some beneficiaries of direct support seem to carry out no or only very limited agricultural 
activity which should not entitle them to be supported as 'active farmers'. This is a 
consequence of decoupling where production activity is not a condition to be eligible to 
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the aid. This problem was already addressed in the Health Check of the CAP where 
optional rules for excluding persons whose principal business/activity is non-agricultural 
from receiving aid have been included in the legal framework. However, it can be argued 
that these rules have not adequately contributed to solving the problem as no Member 
State has made used of them. 
2.7. Full decoupling in the context of regional or sectoral specificities 
Full decoupling has allowed obtaining more market orientation of EU agriculture while 
providing farmers a basic income support and thus a certain level of stability. However 
for some sectors and regions, the possibility to maintain some direct payments coupled to 
production was deemed necessary for economic, social and/or environmental reasons. 
Indeed, for instance, the maintenance of coupled support in the livestock sector, which 
could have been at risk of disappearing in some regions in case of full decoupling, 
contributed also to the maintenance of agricultural activity in these areas.  
2.8. Environmental performance of direct payments 
As the current amount and distribution of direct payments is based on historical criteria 
and references of production, they tend to be concentrated in the most productive regions 
(mostly in the historic model but the same applies, albeit to a lower extent, in the 
regional model) without being adjusted to environmental and climate-related objectives 
beyond the link to basic standards of cross compliance. 
The way entitlements have been allocated when decoupling was put in place did not 
envisage a specific targeting e.g. to farms that operate in more environmentally valuable 
areas. However, production adjustments following decoupling have generally been in the 
direction of less intensive production with related environmental benefits. Furthermore, 
one may argue that the decrease in permanent grassland area has been mitigated12 by the 
granting of coupled aids for livestock13 (beef, sheep and goat) and by the requirements of 
cross compliance which concern permanent grassland (minimum management 
requirements for permanent pasture and maintenance of the ratio of permanent pasture – 
see Article 6 of R. 73/2009). 
The link of direct payments to cross compliance (together with farm advisory services) 
has increased the awareness14 of farmers about existing environmental standards and 
about good environmental and agricultural practices such as preservation of landscape 
features, crop rotation, etc. Although not designed directly to that purpose, cross 
compliance has contributed to climate change mitigation (by reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions and by increasing carbon sequestration in soils) at farm level in the EU. 
                                                 
12  Reflecting environmental land use needs into EU policy: preserving and enhancing the environmental 
benefits of “land services”: soil sealing, biodiversity corridors, intensification / marginalisation of land 
use and permanent grassland. Final report to the European Commission, DG Environment on Contract 
ENV.B.1/ETU/2008/0030. IEEP and Alterra (2010). 
13  Evaluation of direct aids in the beef and veal sectors, October 2010 
14  Evaluation of the application of cross compliance as foreseen under Regulation 1782/2003 (July 
2007) 
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However, the cross compliance system is still often perceived by farmers as an additional 
administrative burden15. In addition, some of the actions or good management practices 
required from farmers under cross compliance system (above the regulatory 
requirements) may have a certain cost which is not specifically compensated, given that 
it is considered to fall below the ‘baseline’. This does not contribute to the acceptability 
of the actions by farmers. 
For a detailed analysis of environmental aspects see Annex 2 of the Impact Assessment 
on "Greening of the CAP". 
2.9. Simplification aspects 
The CAP Health Check brought some simplification at Member State and farm levels in 
the management of the direct support scheme in particular for the SPS (transfer rules, 
types of entitlements, etc.) and cross compliance. See detailed information in Annex 8 of 
the Impact Assessment on 'Simplification of the CAP'. 
Maintaining the current well established rules would be easy for the Member States 
applying SPS. However, the coexistence of different SPS models (historic, regional, 
hybrid) which makes the policy framework more complex at EU level would also persist. 
Member States applying SAPS will have in any case to set up a new system of 
entitlements when shifting to SPS (planned for 2014 at the latest), implying significant 
administrative burden for the national authorities as well as for farmers. Farmers would 
however also benefit from the flexibility offered by entitlements, i.e. the possibility to 
sell, lend or activate the entitlement on different hectares.  
Complexity in the current policy framework stems also from the fact that supports for 
coupled production and supports to agri-environmental measures of Pillar II may be paid 
via Article 68 of Council Regulation 73/2009. This creates 'grey zones' of support and 
additional administrative burden in particular for Member States due to the necessity of 
defining consistent rules which do not lead to duplication of payment for the same 
operation. 
In addition, there is a clear case for simplification of CAP rules for the smallest 
beneficiaries whose level of red tape compared to the level of their subsidies is rather 
disproportionate. 
2.10. Results of consultation process as regards direct payments 
The Public Consultation, by which the Commission Services solicited input from 
interested parties on the broad policy options presented in the Communication on the 
CAP towards 202016 (referred to as the 'Communication' from here onwards), revealed 
that direct payments constitute an area of great concern for many stakeholders. There 
was little consensus on exactly what the impacts of redistributing direct payments would 
be, and many contributions related strongly to the geographic area/region/Member State 
the respondents originated from. Still, many argued for a more equitable distribution of 
                                                 
15  See Annex 8 of the Impact Assessment on 'Simplification of the CAP' 
16  Communication on the CAP towards 2020: meeting the food, natural resources and territorial 
challenges of the future, COM(2010) 672/5 
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payments, and stressed the importance of a transition which is smooth and takes into 
consideration short- and long term effects.  
The introduction of capping to direct payments received mainly negative reactions, with 
references made to competitiveness, the functioning of markets and farmers' incomes. 
Targeting payments towards small farmers was more welcomed; although a few 
organizations feared that structural adjustment might be hindered, affecting the long-term 
competitiveness of EU agriculture. There seems to be agreement on the fact that those 
receiving payments should ideally be active farmers, but how this should be defined is a 
concern for many responding parties.  
Many organisations emphasized the need for continued support to less favoured areas, 
and stressed its importance for agricultural production as well as for viable and 
economically sustainable rural areas. Some respondents pointed towards various benefits 
of keeping these payments in Pillar II.  
Greening Pillar I was mentioned by many as an appropriate way to reach better 
environmental quality, increasing the delivery of public goods and creating opportunities 
for sustainable agriculture. Meanwhile, a substantial number of respondents (many of 
whom farmers) were against greening Pillar I, or concerned with the effects it would 
have on the competitiveness of EU farmers. Some respondents were also concerned that 
the proposed Pillar I measures may not be as efficient or cost-effective as targeted 
measures in Pillar II. 
3. OBJECTIVES AND POLICY OPTIONS 
The previous chapter has highlighted that, while the role of direct payments as a basic 
income support and as a propagator of public goods remains important for EU 
agriculture, the environment and the vitality of rural areas in general, there is room to 
improve the equitability and targeting of this policy instrument. 
In line with the objectives of the CAP of contributing to a viable, market oriented food 
production throughout the EU, ensuring the sustainable management of natural resources 
and the provision of environmental public goods, and contributing to the balanced 
territorial development and thriving rural areas (as elaborated in chapter 3 of the main 
Impact Assessment report), and based on the various elements identified during the 
public debate on the future of the CAP and the stakeholder consultation on the 
Communication as well as the additional issues described in the previous chapter, the 
following objectives for reforming the direct payment scheme can be established: 
• A more equitable distribution of decoupled payments among Member States and 
among farmers in order to enhance direct payments effectiveness in supporting 
farmers' income and contributing to the provision of basic public goods; 
• Better targeting of direct payments to the provision of public goods by: 
• providing incentives for simple, well-identified agri-environmental actions which 
have positive effects on the environment and climate change mitigation and 
adaptation and are applicable across the whole of EU territory; 
• simplifying/streamlining cross compliance requirements without watering down 
the system itself; 
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• Better targeting of direct payments to needs for income support by: 
• Supporting the maintenance of sustainable agriculture in areas with specific 
natural constraints and in areas where particular types of farming are considered 
particularly important for economic and/or social reasons;  
• Improving the definition of who should be considered an "active farmer"; 
• Better taking into account the diversity of EU agriculture, notably through 
addressing the needs of small scale farmers and taking into account possible 
economies of scale of large farms. 
In order to assess how these objectives can be achieved, the following chapters look at 
options for the development of direct payments in all areas identified as challenges in 
chapter 2 and assess their impacts. In chapter 11, at the end of this annex, the options in 
the different areas are assembled into the three policy scenarios analysed in the Impact 
Assessment, "adjustment", "integration" and "re-focus". 
4. REDISTRIBUTION OF DIRECT PAYMENTS 
The future distribution of direct payments should better reflect the dual role of direct 
payments for income support and provision of public goods by ensuring a better fit 
between these policy objectives and the budgetary means available. At the same time, the 
current distribution will need to be taken into account to avoid major disruptions. Several 
options for redistribution of direct payments envelopes between Member States can be 
foreseen: 
– An “EU flat rate”: direct payments are distributed on the total potentially eligible 
hectares across Member States; 
– A pragmatic approach: limited adjustment of the existing distribution in order to 
avoid major disruptions to current DP levels, while setting an EU wide minimum 
level of per ha payment based on a share of the EU average. 
– The use of objective criteria: the EU flat rate is adjusted by objective criteria 
based on economic, physical and/or or environmental indicators. 
– A combination of a pragmatic approach and objective criteria. 
These options are elaborated in details in section 4.1and their impacts at micro level are 
presented in the subsequent sections. It should be noted that the simulations do not 
address the issue of the length and modalities of a possible transition to the new 
distribution which will also depend on the final level of redistribution involved. The 
calibration of the transition period would not only be of importance for the Member 
States which would see their national direct payments envelope decreasing but also for 
the Member States which will benefit from an increase. Indeed, the sometimes important 
gains on direct payments per hectare in the following options could not only drive up 
land prices but also prove to be an impediment to structural changes as they could 
prevent farmers from restructuring, growing and improving the profitability of their 
farms.  
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The starting point of simulations is the current level of direct payments per hectare, 
which is calculated by dividing the total direct payment envelope for each Member State 
(with phasing in completed for EU12 and modulation taken into account at the level of 
2013) with the total potentially eligible area17 for SPS/SAPS as declared by farmers and 
communicated by MS to the Commission in the frame of the IACS (claim year 2008).  
All simulations on the redistribution of direct payments assume the budget set out in the 
proposal for the Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF)18 for direct payments. 
Results of the different options are presented in comparison to the existing national 
envelopes based on the current distribution of direct payments. 
4.1. Redistribution between Member States  
EU flat rate 
One option arising from the public debate would be to move away from historical 
references towards an EU wide 'flat rate' (or 'EU average') with the same level of aid per 
hectare to all farmers in the EU (option called EU flat rate in the rest of the annex). For 
the EU-27 the average level of direct payments, i.e. the EU flat rate would be 
EUR 267/ha of potentially eligible area (PEA). 
Figure 8 illustrates the level of direct payment in each Member State in terms of €/ha in 
the Status Quo after the Health Check of the CAP is fully implemented, in contrast to the 
EU flat rate. It is apparent that existing levels of direct payments in MT, BE, NL, IT, EL, 
CY, DK and SI are considerably higher, while payments in LV, EE, LT, PT, RO, SK, BG 
and PL (i.e. mostly new Member States) are considerably lower. 
                                                 
17  In Member States using historic model, the agricultural area that is eligible to SPS is higher than the 
number of entitlements. Thus, all the potentially eligible areas registered in IACS have been taken into 
account for the calculation presented in the impact assessment. 
18  Communication "A budget for Europe 2020" – Part I and Part II, 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/documents/fin_fwk1420/MFF_COM-2011-
500_Part_I_en.pdf, http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/documents/fin_fwk1420/MFF_COM-
2011-500_Part_II_en.pdf 
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Figure 8: Redistribution between MS - EU flat rate 
DP: Status Quo and flat rate 
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Source: DG AGRI   
Accordingly, this option would produce significant losses for MT, BE, NL, IT, CY and 
DK, and substantial gains for LV, EE, LT, PT and RO. In absolute terms, the biggest 
winners would be RO, PL and ES, while the biggest losers would be IT, DE and FR. The 
total amount redistributed would reach EUR 4,394 million.  
However, as explained in the Communication, a flat rate payment across the EU would 
fail to reflect differences in the economic and environmental situation in the Member 
States, since a given level of payment does not have the same effect on income and each 
hectare does not equally contribute to the provision of environmental public goods. 
Moreover, the change from current levels of support to the flat rate could be very 
disruptive in certain cases as indicated above. 
Finally, it has to be kept in mind that land is distributed unevenly between farms: in the 
EU-25 almost 90 % of the land is concentrated in 20 % of the holdings19. Therefore a 
move to an EU flat rate with an even rate of direct payments per hectare would not solve 
the problem of an uneven distribution of direct payments between farms as this is based 
on the structural reality of farming in the EU. 
Pragmatic approach 
Another option mentioned in the Communication is to adopt a pragmatic approach, by 
providing for instance that all Member States get at least 80% of the EU average per 
                                                 
19  Annex F of the Health Check, I. Impact of a change towards flatter rates of direct payments, Dec. 2007 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rica/pdf/hc0301_impact_flatter.pdf 
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hectare. The impact of this option (referred to as 'Min80%' in the rest of the annex) is 
displayed in Figure 9 below. 
Figure 9: Redistribution between MS - Pragmatic approach with minimum 80% of 
EU average 
 DP: Min 80% of EU-average
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Source: DG AGRI   
In the Status Quo distribution, eight Member States are below the 80 % threshold, while 
eleven Member States are above the EU average. The cost of lifting the per hectare 
payments of these Member States to 80 % of the EU average (i.e. EUR 213/ha) would be 
covered on a proportional basis by the eleven Member States that are above the EU 
average. This would require a reduction of their envelopes, while the envelopes of those 
Member States who fall between 80 % and 100 % of the EU average would remain 
unchanged. 
This option would allow addressing the situation of Member States which are 
significantly below the EU average while mitigating the impact of redistribution on those 
above the EU average. In absolute terms, the biggest winners would be RO, LV and LT, 
and the biggest losers FR, DE and IT. The total amount redistributed would come to 
EUR 847 million. 
It could also be envisaged to provide that Member States that currently have direct 
payments below the level of 90% of the average will close 1/3 of the gap between their 
current level and the 90% level (option called "MFF distribution key" in the rest of the 
annex as it is the distribution used in the proposal for the MFF), as shown in Figure 10. 
This option would provide less convergence for the Member States below 90% of the EU 
average. Consequently, the cost of convergence to be borne by Member States above the 
EU average would also be more limited. In absolute terms, the biggest winners would be 
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again RO, PL and ES, while the biggest losers would be IT, DE and FR. The total 
amount redistributed would come to EUR 738 million. 
Figure 10: Redistribution between MS - Pragmatic approach with MFF distribution 
key  
 DP: MFF distribution key
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Source: DG AGRI   
Alternatively, it may be envisaged to provide that all Member States get at least 80% and 
that no Member State gets more than 120% of the flat rate (option called "Tunnel80%-
120%" in the rest of the annex), as shown in Figure 11. 
This option would provide a more substantial convergence around the flat rate. However, 
the cost of convergence would be borne by a more limited number of Member States that 
would face significant reductions in their envelopes. In absolute terms, the biggest 
winners would be again RO, LV and LT, while the biggest losers would be IT, EL and 
the NL. The total amount redistributed would come to EUR 847 million. 
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Figure 11: Redistribution between MS - Pragmatic approach with minimum 80% - 
maximum 120% of EU average  
 DP: Min 80% max. 120% of EU-average
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Source: DG AGRI   
Use of objective criteria 
Another option would be to base the distribution on objective criteria that reflect the dual 
role of direct payments in providing income support and public goods and would thus 
ensure a more equitable and efficient use of budgetary resources.  
Possible objective criteria are very diverse in nature and may provide a very different 
outcome in terms of redistribution of direct payments on account of the specific 
economic and environmental situation of each country. The difficulties with reaching 
agreement on such objective criteria should not be underestimated. A selection of the 
criteria which have been most discussed in the institutional and public debate is given 
below: 
• For general economic criteria, PPS (purchasing power standard) and GDP/cap: 
an index is used for the adjustment in relation to the EU average with the 
Member States with higher GDP/capita (expressed in PPS) receiving higher 
direct payments/ha. These criteria would reflect disparities in the costs of living 
between Member States. 
• For economic criteria related to agriculture, AWU (annual working unit) and 
GVA/AWU (gross value added per AWU): comparison to the EU average with 
the Member States with higher GVA/AWU receiving higher direct payments/ha. 
These criteria would reflect differences in productivity in the agricultural sectors 
of Member States. 
The result of a redistribution based on a combination of general and agricultural 
economic criteria is presented in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12: Redistribution between MS - Economic objective criteria 
 DP: Distribution with economic criteria
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Source: DG AGRI   
• For the environmental criteria, areas in less favoured areas (LFA), Natura 2000 
zones and permanent pasture: The index compares the share of the relevant area 
in the Member State's total utilised agricultural area (UAA) to the EU average. 
Thus Member States with a higher share of these types of areas get higher direct 
payments/ha (see Figure 13). These criteria would reflect disadvantages in 
particular areas or areas that are particularly important for the provision of public 
goods. 
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Figure 13: Redistribution between MS - Environmental objective criteria 
 DP: Distribution with environmental criteria
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Source: DG AGRI   
Another approach would be the combination of economic and environmental objective 
criteria to adjust the EU flat rate, based on the following formula (using a weight of 2/3 
for economic and 1/3 for environmental criteria):  
Flat rate x [2/3 x [(2/3 GDP/cap + 1/3 GVA/AWU)] + 1/3 (1/3 LFA + 1/3 Permanent 
grassland + 1/3 Natura 2000 area)].  
The results of using this formula to adjust the flat rate are shown in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14: Redistribution between MS - Economic and environmental objective 
criteria  
 DP: Distribution with objective criteria
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Source: DG AGRI   
The use of objective criteria giving more weight to economic criteria would accentuate 
the gap between EU-15 and EU-12 and EU-15 Member States (UK, ES and FR) would 
most improve their situation in absolute terms. With environmental criteria ES, UK and 
PT would profit most. With a combination of economic and environmental criteria ES, 
UK and IE would be the greatest winners while in addition to IT and EL also PL would 
be among the biggest losers. For the smaller Member States (MT and LU) an ad hoc 
solution would be most likely in any case when using objective criteria, given the 
extremity of the impact for these Member States.  
The main problem with this option is the fact that it would entail massive redistributions 
(e.g. with the latter formula combining economic and environmental objectives the total 
amount redistributed comes to EUR 4,516 million which could, however, vary depending 
on the exact weighting of the different objective criteria taken into account) which is 
likely to make it politically unacceptable for many Member States to agree to such a 
redistribution. 
Combination of a pragmatic approach with objective criteria 
Obviously, there are different ways to combine objective criteria. There are also different 
ways of combining objective criteria while taking into account the convergence objective 
and the current distribution, such as: 
• to ensure a minimum level of convergence (e.g. that all Member States get at 
least 90% of the EU average) while using objective criteria to define the level of 
Member States currently above the EU average (option called "Min90% with 
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objective criteria" in the rest of the annex) as shown in Figure 15. The total 
amount redistributed would be EUR 2,164 million. 
Figure 15: Redistribution between MS - Pragmatic approach (minimum 90%) with 
objective criteria 
 DP: Min. 90% - compensation with objective criteria 
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Source: DG AGRI   
• to apply the objective criteria to the difference between the current distribution 
and the EU average so as to ensure that all Member States that are above the flat 
rate will be reducing their direct payments but still remain above the flat rate and 
those that are below the flat rate will be increasing their direct payments but still 
remain below the flat rate (Figure 16). The total amount redistributed would be 
EUR 2,534 million. 
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Figure 16: Redistribution between MS - Objective criteria applied to difference 
between Status quo and EU average 
 DP: OC applied to difference from EU-avg.
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Source: DG AGRI   
4.2. Move toward flat rate within Member States or regions 
The impact from the redistribution among Member States is further compounded at the 
level of the farmer with the impact of redistribution within Member States. In this 
respect, the Communication foresees a uniform rate within each Member State or region, 
in line with the current regional SPS model. 
A region may be defined in accordance with objective and non-discriminatory criteria 
such as institutional or administrative structure and regional agricultural potential. Any 
further differentiation for instance based on production types within the region linked to 
current parameters could cause problems with respect to WTO compatibility. 
The move towards a uniform regional model, independently of the options chosen for 
redistributing the envelopes between Member States, would redistribute direct payments 
between farmers at least in those Member States which are currently applying an historic 
model. Indeed, within a region, entitlements would then be spread over all eligible 
hectares declared in a reference year, including eligible agricultural lands that are 
currently not covered by entitlements (so-called "naked land") at farmer's level and 
rebalancing the existing disparities between Member States according to the model of 
implementation of the SPS chosen.  
This implies that the amount of support received at farm level would change 
considerably compared to the current situation. Farms with a currently high payment 
level per ha would lose a considerable share of direct payments and farms with 
comparatively low payment levels would gain substantially. In terms of the impact on 
different farm types, field crop, mixed and milk farms would lose payments compared to 
the status quo while payments would increase in grazing livestock, wine and horticulture 
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farms. As a general matter, a uniform flat rate would reduce support in more productive 
regions and sectors in favour of more marginal regions. 
In addition, the move to a regional model in all Member States is likely to increase the 
rate of capitalisation of support in land prices. The flexibility for activating entitlements 
with additional eligible land is reduced due to the existence of only a very limited 
amount of “naked” land (i.e. eligible land without corresponding entitlements) and the 
absence of differences in the entitlement level in the regional model20. Thus, substantial 
changes in the payments per hectare, inherent in the "EU flat rate" option and, albeit to a 
lesser extent, in the other options, may have an impact on farms’ asset values (especially 
land) and affect the profitability of farms, which would in turn influence their access to 
credit and ability to address existing liabilities. 
Whatever the options, the distribution of support between individual farms would remain 
uneven despite a uniform regional flat rate, as the difference in support per farm would 
still be determined by the farm areas (number of eligible hectares which would determine 
the number of entitlements).  
4.3. Impacts on farm income 
The impact of redistribution of direct payments on farm income has been analysed using 
FADN data. For the impact assessment at farms' level it has been considered that the 
entire country is one single region. The following options (see section 4.1 above for 
details) have been assessed quantitatively in terms of the effects they could have on the 
income of farms: 
1) EU flat rate 
2) Min80% 
3) Min90% with objective criteria 
4) MFF distribution key 
Results are given in percentage of farm income defined as FNVA/AWU compared to a 
projected Status quo baseline in 2020. Detailed results of simulations of options based on 
FADN are presented in sub-annex 3C. 
4.3.1. Impact at EU level and at MS level 
As shown in Figure 17 and Table 1, whatever the option for redistribution, Member 
States benefiting from an increase of their national envelope for direct payments see their 
average farm income increasing. It is the case for EE, LT, LV, PT, RO and SK. The 
Member States with a current relatively high DP envelope compared to the EU average 
(BE, IT, DK, GR) see their average farm income decreasing. 
An 'EU flat rate' would lead to massive changes in farmers’ incomes in many Member 
States in both directions. The FADN analysis shows that there would be an increase of 
                                                 
20  See Study on the functioning of land markets in the EU Member States under the influence of 
measures applied under the CAP, CEPS, Swinnen, Ciaian & Kancs, November 2008 
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8.6 % of farm income in EU-12 and a decrease of 2.1 % in EU-15 compared to the 
baseline level in 2020. The most affected countries would be DK, GR, BE, SL, DE, IT 
and CY (between -8 and -5 %), while farm income in EE, LT, LV will benefit the most 
(by 45 %, 26 % and 53 % respectively) and also PT, RO and SK to a lower extent 
(between 13% and 16%). 
Results for the two alternative options of 'Min 80%' and 'Min90% with objective 
criteria' are quite similar with regard to the winners (mainly EE, LT, LV and to a lower 
extent PT, RO, SK) and losers whereby impacts are slightly higher in the 'Min90% with 
objective criteria' option. With the 'MFF distribution key' the gains for the Member 
States profiting most from redistribution are substantially reduced as only a part of the 
difference between their current level of direct payments and 90% of the EU average is 
covered. 
Figure 17: Redistribution - Impact on farm income per EU aggregates 
Impact on farm income
Change in FNVA compared to  the status quo in 2020
-10,0%
-5,0%
0,0%
5,0%
10,0%
EU flat rate Min 80% MFF distribution key Min 90% and objective
criteria
EU-15
EU-12
EU-27
 
Source: DG AGRI, FADN   
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Table 1: Redistribution - Impact on farm income per MS 
Base 1 2 3 4
Status quo    
€ per AWU
EU flat rate Min 80% MFF
90% and 
objective 
criteria
 Belgium 62.429 -7% -1% -1% -3%
 Bulgaria 9.465 6% 0% 0% 1%
 Cyprus 15.251 -6% -1% -1% -4%
 Czech Republic 23.473 2% 0% 0% 0%
 Denmark 72.352 -8% -1% -2% -5%
 Germany 44.864 -5% -2% -1% -3%
 Greece 15.597 -8% -1% -1% -4%
 Spain 28.953 4% 0% 1% 1%
 Estonia 22.281 45% 29% 12% 37%
 France 38.819 -4% -2% -1% -2%
 Hungary 27.898 -1% 0% 0% 0%
 Ireland 27.383 -1% 0% -1% -1%
 Italy 35.561 -5% -1% -1% -3%
 Lithuania 18.162 26% 15% 7% 21%
 Luxembourg 50.620 -1% 0% 0% 0%
 Latvia 12.912 53% 37% 15% 45%
 Malta 31.180 -4% 0% 0% -2%
 Netherlands 68.346 -4% 0% -1% -2%
 Austria 32.445 0% 0% 0% 0%
 Poland 12.893 6% 0% 1% 3%
 Portugal 11.077 13% 4% 3% 8%
 Romania 4.757 13% 5% 3% 9%
 Finland 28.483 4% 0% 0% 1%
 Sweden 43.966 6% 0% 0% 1%
 Slovakia 20.060 16% 2% 3% 9%
 Slovenia 7.849 -7% -2% -2% -4%
 United Kingdom 50.196 6% 0% 0% 2%
EU-27 23.751 0% 0% 0% 0%
Change in FNVA per AWU in comparison with the status quo 
in 2020
 
Source: DG AGRI, FADN   
4.3.2. Impact per type of farming at EU level 
The impact on income per type of farming is mainly driven by the move toward a flat 
rate (regional model). Table 2 shows that whatever the option of redistribution, grazing 
livestock farms (+9.7 % to +10.1 %) and to a lower extent wine farms (+3.1 % to +3.6 
%) and horticulture (+0.2 % to +0.3 %) would benefit the most compared to the baseline 
level. For grazing livestock farming, this is due to the fact that the subsidy level per 
hectare in this sector is generally rather low in the status quo and will increase with the 
move to a flat rate especially on the extensive farms with a large area. Wine farms would 
start receiving direct payments in all Member States whereas it was not the case in the 
status quo. The impact on farm income is limited, however, because the acreage of wine 
farms is low in comparison with their output and absolute income level. The same is true 
for horticulture farms. 
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Table 2: Redistribution - Impact per type of farming at EU level 
Base 1 2 3 4
Status quo   
€ per AWU
EU flat rate Min 80% MFF distribution key
Min 90% and 
objective criteria
Fieldcrops 25.162 -2,5% -2,9% -3,0% -2,8%
Horticulture 36.197 0,2% 0,3% 0,3% 0,2%
Wine 33.811 3,1% 3,5% 3,6% 3,3%
Other permanent crops 21.006 -1,3% -0,5% -0,5% -1,0%
Milk 29.899 -3,1% -2,4% -2,5% -2,6%
Other grazing livestock 20.688 9,9% 9,9% 10,1% 9,7%
Granivores 23.347 -0,8% -0,7% -0,6% -0,7%
Mixed 14.909 0,2% -0,9% -0,8% -0,2%
Change in FNVA per AWU in comparison with the status quo in 2020
 
Source: DG AGRI, FADN   
In the contrary, field crop farms (-2.5 % to -3 %) and milk farms (-2.4 % to -3.1 %) 
would see a significant decrease in their income. 
The income impact on farming system based mainly on grassland would considerably 
benefit (+11.1 % to +11.4%) from the move to a flat rate whatever the redistribution 
option as shown in table 3 below. 
Table 3: Redistribution - Impact on grassland based and non-grassland based farms 
1 2 3 4
EU flat rate Min 80% MFF distribution key
Min 90% and 
objective criteria
Farms with less than 80% grassland -1,8% -1,7% -1,7% -1,7%
Grassland based farms 11,5% 11,2% 11,2% 11,1%
Total -0,1% -0,1% -0,1% -0,1%
Change in FNVA per AWU in comparison with the status quo in 2020
Source: DG AGRI, FADN   
4.3.3. Impact in each Member State per farming type 
Table 4 to table 8 below display the double effect of the move toward a flat rate at 
regional or national level and the redistribution of direct payments between Member 
States. This effect is expected to be particularly important in Member States with an 
historical model. In those Member States entitlements have been allocated only to a share 
of eligible hectares that supported certain production in the reference periods. Thus, 
irrespective of the method to redistribute direct payments between Member States, 
moving to a distribution of entitlements to all eligible hectares will have strong negative 
impacts in particular on those sectors that benefited from the historical models, all the 
more so in Member States which currently have a high level of direct payments per 
hectare and which will be affected negatively by the redistribution of direct payments 
between Member States (e.g. FR). However the effects strongly depend on the main 
sectors of each Member State. 
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Table 4: Redistribution - Impact on fieldcrop farms per MS 
Base 1 2 3 4
Status quo    € 
per AWU
EU flat rate Min 80% MFF distribution key
Min 90% and 
objective criteria
H  Belgium Fieldcrops 74.095 -12% -3% -3% -6%
SAPS  Bulgaria Fieldcrops 18.008 8% 0% 1% 2%
SAPS  Cyprus Fieldcrops 24.953 -6% -1% -1% -3%
SAPS  Czech Republic Fieldcrops 29.237 0% -2% -2% -2%
R  Denmark Fieldcrops 76.312 -10% -2% -2% -6%
R  Germany Fieldcrops 51.648 -7% -2% -1% -3%
H  Greece Fieldcrops 16.689 -13% -5% -5% -9%
H  Spain Fieldcrops 33.945 5% 0% 1% 1%
SAPS  Estonia Fieldcrops 27.712 50% 32% 13% 41%
H  France Fieldcrops 45.497 -15% -12% -11% -13%
SAPS  Hungary Fieldcrops 44.248 1% 0% 0% 0%
H  Ireland Fieldcrops 69.740 -8% -8% -8% -8%
H  Italy Fieldcrops 33.203 -12% -5% -5% -8%
SAPS  Lithuania Fieldcrops 25.832 28% 16% 7% 22%
R  Luxembourg Fieldcrops - - - -
SAPS  Latvia Fieldcrops 19.576 55% 38% 15% 46%
R  Malta Fieldcrops 26.375 -1% 5% 4% 1%
H  Netherlands Fieldcrops 86.618 -2% 4% 4% 2%
H  Austria Fieldcrops 48.428 -6% -7% -7% -7%
SAPS  Poland Fieldcrops 14.727 6% -1% 0% 3%
H  Portugal Fieldcrops 11.596 -15% -21% -21% -18%
SAPS  Romania Fieldcrops 6.413 16% 6% 4% 11%
R  Finland Fieldcrops 41.321 7% -1% 0% 1%
R  Sweden Fieldcrops 54.587 9% 2% 3% 4%
SAPS  Slovakia Fieldcrops 27.471 13% 1% 1% 7%
R  Slovenia Fieldcrops 8.964 -12% -7% -7% -9%
H/R  United Kingdom Fieldcrops 69.717 -3% -8% -8% -6%
EU-27 Fieldcrops 25.162 -3% -3% -3% -3%
Change in FNVA per AWU in comparison with the status quo in 2020
Source: DG AGRI, FADN   
H =historic model R = regional/hybrid model H/R = historic or regional/hybrid model depending on 
regions 
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Table 5: Redistribution - Impact on mixed farms per MS 
Base 1 2 3 4
Status quo    € 
per AWU
EU flat rate Min 80% MFF distribution key
Min 90% and 
objective criteria
H  Belgium Mixed 67.743 -10% -3% -3% -6%
SAPS  Bulgaria Mixed 6.211 4% -2% -1% 0%
SAPS  Cyprus Mixed - - - -
SAPS  Czech Republic Mixed 22.034 3% 1% 1% 1%
R  Denmark Mixed 63.407 -11% -2% -2% -6%
R  Germany Mixed 38.262 -7% -2% -1% -3%
H  Greece Mixed 16.312 -5% 1% 1% -1%
H  Spain Mixed 41.130 7% 3% 3% 3%
SAPS  Estonia Mixed 21.914 50% 32% 13% 41%
H  France Mixed 34.760 -11% -8% -7% -8%
SAPS  Hungary Mixed 22.962 2% 0% 0% 0%
H  Ireland Mixed 34.353 -12% -12% -12% -12%
H  Italy Mixed 33.557 -7% 0% 0% -3%
SAPS  Lithuania Mixed 14.087 27% 16% 7% 21%
R  Luxembourg Mixed 39.551 2% 3% 3% 3%
SAPS  Latvia Mixed 10.043 56% 38% 15% 47%
R  Malta Mixed 15.631 -11% -6% -6% -9%
H  Netherlands Mixed 36.239 -14% -3% -4% -6%
H  Austria Mixed 34.827 -4% -4% -4% -4%
SAPS  Poland Mixed 8.251 9% -1% 1% 4%
H  Portugal Mixed 7.945 33% 15% 13% 24%
SAPS  Romania Mixed 2.708 12% 4% 2% 8%
R  Finland Mixed 23.265 7% 0% 0% 1%
R  Sweden Mixed 38.170 8% 1% 1% 2%
SAPS  Slovakia Mixed 15.805 17% 2% 3% 10%
R  Slovenia Mixed 5.486 -10% -3% -2% -5%
H/R  United Kingdom Mixed 44.028 -2% -10% -9% -7%
EU-27 Mixed 14.909 0% -1% -1% 0%
Change in FNVA per AWU in comparison with the status quo in 2020
Source: DG AGRI, FADN   
H =historic model R = regional/hybrid model H/R = historic or regional/hybrid model depending on 
regions 
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Table 6: Redistribution - Impact on other grazing livestock per MS 
Base 1 2 3 4
Status quo    € 
per AWU
EU flat rate Min 80% MFF distribution key
Min 90% and 
objective criteria
H  Belgium Other grazing livestock 51.878 -12% 0% -1% -5%
SAPS  Bulgaria Other grazing livestock 4.667 3% -2% -2% -1%
SAPS  Cyprus Other grazing livestock 17.463 -9% -1% -2% -6%
SAPS  Czech Republic Other grazing livestock 25.917 6% 2% 2% 2%
R  Denmark Other grazing livestock - - - -
R  Germany Other grazing livestock 34.138 -8% -3% -2% -4%
H  Greece Other grazing livestock 17.166 14% 29% 28% 22%
H  Spain Other grazing livestock 38.349 6% 1% 1% 2%
SAPS  Estonia Other grazing livestock 14.156 85% 54% 22% 70%
H  France Other grazing livestock 24.875 18% 22% 24% 22%
SAPS  Hungary Other grazing livestock 15.083 3% -2% -2% -2%
H  Ireland Other grazing livestock 15.674 6% 6% 6% 6%
H  Italy Other grazing livestock 39.671 -3% 6% 5% 2%
SAPS  Lithuania Other grazing livestock 10.849 38% 22% 10% 30%
R  Luxembourg Other grazing livestock 47.014 -4% -3% -3% -3%
SAPS  Latvia Other grazing livestock 14.536 61% 42% 16% 51%
R  Malta Other grazing livestock - - - -
H  Netherlands Other grazing livestock 29.716 -16% -3% -4% -7%
H  Austria Other grazing livestock 26.522 3% 2% 2% 2%
SAPS  Poland Other grazing livestock 18.304 5% 0% 1% 3%
H  Portugal Other grazing livestock 15.936 52% 31% 28% 41%
SAPS  Romania Other grazing livestock 4.342 12% 4% 2% 8%
R  Finland Other grazing livestock 15.922 10% 1% 2% 3%
R  Sweden Other grazing livestock 22.593 15% 1% 2% 4%
SAPS  Slovakia Other grazing livestock 19.273 20% 4% 5% 12%
R  Slovenia Other grazing livestock 4.557 -5% 6% 7% 2%
H/R  United Kingdom Other grazing livestock 27.909 65% 41% 43% 49%
EU-27 Other grazing livestock 20.688 10% 10% 10% 10%
Change in FNVA per AWU in comparison with the status quo in 2020
 
Source: DG AGRI, FADN   
H =historic model R = regional/hybrid model H/R = historic or regional/hybrid model depending on 
regions 
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Table 7: Redistribution - Impact on milk farms per MS 
Base 1 2 3 4
Status quo    € 
per AWU
EU flat rate Min 80% MFF distribution key
Min 90% and 
objective criteria
H  Belgium Milk 70.337 -10% -3% -3% -6%
SAPS  Bulgaria Milk 6.932 2% -1% -1% -1%
SAPS  Cyprus Milk - - - -
SAPS  Czech Republic Milk 21.372 3% 1% 1% 1%
R  Denmark Milk 90.265 -7% -1% -1% -4%
R  Germany Milk 52.719 -5% -2% -2% -3%
H  Greece Milk - - - -
H  Spain Milk 45.890 -8% -9% -9% -9%
SAPS  Estonia Milk 22.276 35% 23% 10% 29%
H  France Milk 30.748 -5% -2% -1% -3%
SAPS  Hungary Milk 24.211 1% 0% 0% 0%
H  Ireland Milk 52.797 -3% -3% -3% -3%
H  Italy Milk 54.609 -10% -6% -7% -8%
SAPS  Lithuania Milk 15.025 23% 13% 6% 18%
R  Luxembourg Milk 56.929 -1% 0% 0% -1%
SAPS  Latvia Milk 10.924 54% 37% 14% 45%
R  Malta Milk 49.620 -19% -16% -16% -17%
H  Netherlands Milk 83.731 -12% -5% -6% -7%
H  Austria Milk 29.663 3% 3% 3% 3%
SAPS  Poland Milk 16.393 6% 0% 1% 3%
H  Portugal Milk 16.343 -28% -31% -31% -29%
SAPS  Romania Milk 4.892 7% 2% 1% 5%
R  Finland Milk 20.712 4% 0% 0% 0%
R  Sweden Milk 35.930 0% -5% -5% -4%
SAPS  Slovakia Milk 17.121 17% 3% 4% 10%
R  Slovenia Milk 10.224 -13% -9% -9% -11%
H/R  United Kingdom Milk 56.545 -1% -5% -5% -4%
EU-27 Milk 29.899 -3% -2% -3% -3%
Change in FNVA per AWU in comparison with the status quo in 2020
 
Source: DG AGRI, FADN   
H =historic model R = regional/hybrid model H/R = historic or regional/hybrid model depending on 
regions 
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Table 8: Redistribution - Impact on wine farms per MS 
Base 1 2 3 4
Status quo    € 
per AWU
EU flat rate Min 80% MFF distribution key
Min 90% and 
objective criteria
SAPS  Bulgaria Wine 4.013 5% -1% 0% 1%
SAPS  Cyprus Wine - - - -
SAPS  Czech Republic Wine 17.627 1% 0% 0% 0%
R  Germany Wine 44.546 0% 0% 0% 0%
H  Greece Wine 16.097 -2% 6% 5% 2%
H  Spain Wine 25.603 5% 2% 3% 3%
H  France Wine 53.567 3% 3% 4% 3%
SAPS  Hungary Wine 934 -6% -11% -11% -11%
H  Italy Wine 34.649 3% 5% 5% 4%
R  Luxembourg Wine 48.572 2% 2% 2% 2%
R  Malta Wine - - - -
H  Austria Wine 31.508 2% 1% 1% 1%
H  Portugal Wine 8.455 14% 10% 10% 12%
SAPS  Romania Wine 9.764 3% 1% 1% 2%
SAPS  Slovakia Wine - - - -
R  Slovenia Wine 18.321 4% 5% 5% 5%
EU-27 Wine 33.811 3% 4% 4% 3%
Change in FNVA per AWU in comparison with the status quo in 2020
 
Source: DG AGRI, FADN   
H =historic model R = regional/hybrid model H/R = historic or regional/hybrid model depending on 
regions 
4.3.4. Impact per LFA/non LFA zones  
The impact on income of farms located in less favoured areas (see Figure 18) is mainly 
driven by the move toward a flat rate (regional model)21. Simulations show that farm 
incomes increase in both mountainous and not mountainous LFA and decrease 
elsewhere. Indeed, past references of production which served as a basis to calculate the 
value of entitlements are quite low in less favoured areas and in particular in mountain 
areas where farm size is smaller. The move to a flat rate in each Member States would 
lead logically to a redistribution of direct payments towards those areas. 
                                                 
21  It has to be noted that the income increase in mountain areas is higher for the options "Min80%", 
"Min90% with objective criteria" and "MFF distribution key" (around 7%) than for the "EU flat rate" 
(around 4.5%). This is due to the fact the "EU flat rate" redistribution option favours Member States 
where the share of mountain LFA is lower than average. 
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Figure 18: Redistribution - Impact per LFA/non LFA zones 
Impact on farm income
Change in FNVA compared to  the status quo in 2020
-10,0%
-5,0%
0,0%
5,0%
10,0%
EU flat rate Min 80% MFF distribution key Min 90% and objective
criteria
 not in less-favoured areas
 in less-favoured not mountain areas
 in less-favoured mountain areas
 
Source: DG AGRI, FADN   
4.4. Production and price impacts of move toward flat rate at regional, 
Member States and EU levels 
A recent study22 based on the partial equilibrium CAPRI model together with a specific 
tailed farm group component called CAPRI farm type (CAPRI FT) analyzes the impact 
of a flat rate for direct payments at regional (NUTS 1), Member State and EU levels 
(with the level of redistribution and potential impacts increasing in moving to an EU flat 
rate). 
The study shows relatively small production and price impacts. In the EU flat rate 
scenario, which is the most price responsive, the maximum price increase was for cereals 
by 1.5 % for the EU-15 and 2.9 % for the EU-10. The small magnitude of the impact is 
also due to the role of entitlements in limiting land use expansion while allowing for 
some substitution between grassland and arable land.  
Given the small price and production changes, income effects were mainly driven by the 
redistribution of decoupled payments and to a lesser extent by land use changes. 
4.5. Environmental and climate change impacts  
According to the assessment done on FADN data, grazing livestock farms and more 
generally grassland based types of farming and farms located in LFA would benefit from 
the move to a flat rate whatever the redistribution option. This would be a favourable 
outcome for the maintenance of permanent grasslands and the environmental benefits 
they provide23, as well as for the continuation of farming in areas with a high risk of land 
abandonment, which is in turn positive for biodiversity.  
                                                 
22  Farm level policy scenario analysis, Final report, 15 March 2011 (IPTS contract no 151582-2009 A08-
DE) 
23  See annex 2 on Greening of the CAP and its sub-annexes on "the environmental benefits of permanent 
grassland" and on "climate change mitigation and adaptation in EU agriculture under the CAP towards 
2020 – outline and assessment of policy options to countervail pending hotspots" 
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As regards the distribution of direct payments envelopes between Member States, only 
the "Min90% with objective criteria" option considers objective criteria of 
environmental nature in the distribution of support between Member States, which would 
adjust the payments better to the objective of supporting the delivery of basic public 
goods in those areas where continuation of farming may be at stake. However, exact 
effects would depend strongly on the implementation, e.g. the distribution of direct 
payments between regions in Member States. If no additional environmental 
performance criteria were linked to direct payments (or at least to a part of the direct 
payments), the targeting of additional amounts to environmentally sensitive regions 
could be suboptimal. 
4.6. International impacts  
The redistribution of direct payments between Member States and farmers would not 
affect the classification of EU support at WTO provided that any direct effect on 
production level is avoided.  
4.7. Administrative impacts  
In case the new direct payments system is limited to a uniform regional rate, whatever 
the options for redistribution, the policy framework would be very much simplified 
because of the existence of one single model: the SPS regional one.  
In the first year of implementation of the new system, there would be administrative 
burden associated with the redistribution (possibly new distribution of entitlements 
and/or recalculation of their value) and possibly transition (defining steps for progressive 
modifications in following years for each farmer). For those Member States currently 
applying SAPS, the administrative burden associated with the transition to regional SPS 
would be significant in the first year and is related to the establishment and allocation of 
entitlements. 
5. ADDITIONAL INCOME SUPPORT IN AREAS WITH SPECIFIC NATURAL CONSTRAINTS 
The Communication foresees that in order to promote the sustainable development of 
agriculture in areas with specific natural constraints, the new CAP could provide an 
additional income support to farmers in such areas in the form of a decoupled area-based 
payment as a complement to the support given under the Pillar II. This has been 
confirmed during the consultation process where the respondents have largely expressed 
that all parts of the EU, including areas with natural handicaps (NHA24), shall be part of 
future growth and development. 
As past references of production are used for determining the value of the entitlements 
there is, on average, a lower level of aid in areas with natural handicaps that are less 
productive while income needs and provision of public goods in these areas are 
important.  
However, a new payment for farms in areas with natural constraints in Pillar I should not 
be a duplication of the current NHA scheme in rural development. Indeed, the main 
                                                 
24  NHA is often also called LFA (less favoured areas) 
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purpose of the new Pillar I scheme for areas with specific natural constraints would be to 
allow Member States to achieve a more equitable distribution of income throughout their 
agricultural area by targeting a part of income support to farmers whose farming activity 
and the income derived from it is permanently limited by natural constraints.  
While NHA support under the Pillar II (see sub-annex 3D for the current state of play) is 
only granted to a small percentage of farmers in these areas, the new Pillar I scheme for 
NHA would be compulsory for Member States and generalised to all farmers located in 
those areas. In addition, as the risk of land abandonment is extremely diversified 
throughout the EU and may be of particular relevance in mountain areas, the possibility 
to mobilise support from different sources will allow Member States to better calibrate 
the support needed to address this challenge. 
An exercise of new delimitation of certain LFA/NHA zones is ongoing. However, the 
assessment of the potential impacts of the scheme in this Impact Assessment exercise has 
been based on current LFA/NHA delimitation, not pre-judging the new delimitation 
mechanisms of LFA/NHA to be used in the future. A qualitative assessment of the main 
changes between current and future LFA/NHA is done in section 5.2. 
It has been shown previously (see section 4.1) that the move to a regional flat rate would 
already benefit to farms located in LFA/NHA whatever the option of redistribution of 
direct payments envelopes between Member States. In order to capture the effect of 
additional income support in NHA through a Pillar I scheme, the assessment in the 
current section is based on the redistribution option "MFF distribution key".  
The 2 following two options for implementing additional support in NHA have been 
assessed: 
1) EUR 100 for each hectare located in the current LFA;  
2) EUR 50 for each hectare located in mountain areas and 
EUR 25 for each hectare located in other LFA areas.  
The level of payments for those options have been established taking into account the 
current maximum level of LFA/NHA payment in Pillar II (maximum is EUR 250/ha in 
mountain areas and EUR 150/ha in other areas and minimum is EUR 25/ha).  
In both options, a maximum of 5% of the national direct payments envelope redistributed 
as in "MFF distribution key" is dedicated to payments to specific natural constraints in 
Pillar I which means that if the sum of payments is above 5% of the national direct 
payments envelope the rate per hectare is reduced accordingly. 
In addition, in view of assessing the impacts of the redistribution options in a kind of 
sensitivity analysis, option 2 above has been applied on two others distribution scenarios 
of direct payments: 
3) Status Quo 2020 
4) Min 90% with objective criteria 
All comparisons are done with the redistribution option "MFF distribution key". Details 
of simulations are in sub-annex 3C. 
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5.1. Impacts on farm income 
5.1.1. Impact in LFA/non LFA zones 
As shown in Figure 19, farms located in LFA/NHA see their income increasing with 
options 1 (+1.1 % in mountains, +1.6 % in other LFA) and 2 (+1.9 % in mountains, +1% 
in other LFA) and also with option 4 (+0.4 % in mountains, +1.5 % in other LFA). They 
are better-off with the "MFF distribution key" or the "Min 90% with objective 
criteria" redistribution options than with the Status quo 2020. Also the increase in 
income for mountains is higher in option 2 (compared to option 1) as the rate per hectare 
in mountains is higher than for other LFA. 
Figure 19: Additional income support in areas with specific natural constraints - 
Impact in LFA/non LFA zones 
Impact on farm income
Change in FNVA compared to  the base in 2020
-5%
-3%
-1%
1%
3%
5%
Max 5% of DP;  Max €
100 in  LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50
in mountain LFA; €
25 in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50
in mountain LFA; €
25 in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50
in mountain LFA; €
25 in other LFA
 not in less-favoured areas
 in less-favoured not mountain areas
 in less-favoured mountain areas
 
Source: DG AGRI, FADN   
It is important to mention that the limitation to 5 % of the national DP envelope 
dedicated to payments to specific natural constraints in Pillar I leads to a rather small 
redistribution effect. However, for some Member States depending on their share of 
agricultural land in LFA/NHA and of the 'new' envelope, 5 % of the envelope may not be 
enough to apply to full rates per hectare proposed for option 1 (EUR 100/ha) and option 
2 (EUR 50/ha in mountains and EUR 25/ha in other LFA) in all their LFA/NHA zones. 
In the simulations done with FADN data, rates of aid have been reduced accordingly but 
in practice, given the choice left to Member States of narrowing the areas covered by this 
payment, a solution may be to target zones inside LFA/NHA, where the needs for income 
support are the highest. Ongoing new delimitation of LFA/NHA may also have an 
impact. 
5.1.2. Impacts per farming type 
The analysis per farm type reveals that grazing livestock farms and more generally 
grassland based types of farming (including certain milk farms) would benefit from this 
new type of aid in addition of the positive effect of the redistribution ("MFF 
distribution key" or "Min 90% with objective criteria") and of the move toward a flat 
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rate (see Table 9 and Table 10). This is due to the high share of grassland based farms 
located in LFA/NHA and particularly in mountains. 
Table 9: Additional income support in areas with specific natural constraints - 
Impact per farm type 
Base Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4
MFF distribution 
key
MFF distribution 
key
MFF distribution 
key Status quo
Min 90% and 
objective criteria
Fieldcrops
Max 5% of DP;  
Max € 100 in  
LFA
Max 5% of DP;  
€ 50 in mountain 
LFA; € 25 in 
other LFA
Max 5% of DP;  
€ 50 in mountain 
LFA; € 25 in 
other LFA
Max 5% of DP;  
€ 50 in mountain 
LFA; € 25 in 
other LFA
Horticulture 36.293 0,0% 0,0% -0,3% -0,1%
Wine 35.023 -0,1% -0,1% -3,4% -0,4%
Other permanent crops 20.896 -0,1% 0,0% 0,5% -0,5%
Milk 29.141 0,3% 0,3% 2,8% 0,3%
Other grazing livestock 22.771 1,1% 1,2% -7,4% 0,9%
Granivores 23.210 -0,1% -0,1% 0,5% -0,2%
Mixed 14.789 0,0% 0,0% 0,7% 0,5%
 FNVA per AWU - comparison with the scenario based on the MFF 
distribution key in 2020
 
Source: DG AGRI, FADN   
Table 10: Additional income support in areas with specific natural constraints - 
Impacts on grassland based and non-grassland based farms 
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4
MFF distribution 
key
MFF distribution 
key Status quo
Min 90% and 
objective criteria
Max 5% of DP;  
Max € 100 in  LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 
50 in mountain 
LFA; € 25 in other 
LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 
50 in mountain 
LFA; € 25 in other 
LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 
50 in mountain 
LFA; € 25 in other 
LFA
Farms with less than 80% grassland -0,2% -0,2% 1,5% -0,2%
Grassland based farms 1,1% 1,2% -8,3% 1,2%
Total 0,0% 0,0% 0,1% 0,0%
FNVA per AWU - comparison with the scenario based on the MFF 
distribution key in 2020
 
Source: DG AGRI, FADN   
5.2. Impacts of new delimitation of LFA/NHA 
The exercise of new delimitation of LFA/NHA with biophysical criteria has only 
concerned the intermediate LFA/NHA (thus mountainous LFA will not change). Figure 
20 illustrates the outcome of the exercise at EU level. 
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Figure 20: Impacts of new delimitation of LFA/NHA  
  
The purely orange colour represents intermediate LFA which would leave the 
delimitation, purely blue areas represent areas which would be newly delimited. The 
results show that globally the size of the areas in LFA/NHA will not considerably change 
at EU level but particular situations may arise in some Member States where the changes 
may affect large zones. However at this stage it is not possible to assess those impacts 
quantitatively. 
5.3. Environmental and climate change impacts  
Farms located in LFA/NHA would benefit from both the additional income support to 
areas with specific natural constraints in Pillar I and the move to a flat rate whatever the 
redistribution option. This would be favourable for the continuation of farming in areas 
with a high risk of land abandonment, which is in turn positive for biodiversity. In 
addition, farms in LFA/NHA have generally a high share of permanent pasture. Keeping 
the distribution of direct payments as in Status quo 2020 would miss the opportunity of 
addressing the specific needs of LFA areas in Pillar I. 
In addition, the possibility to mobilise support from different sources (Pillar I and Pillar 
II) together with maintenance of lands in Good Agricultural and Environmental 
Conditions (GAEC) would allow Member States to better calibrate the support needed 
against risk of land abandonment. 
5.4. International impacts  
As a decoupled lump sum per hectare payment, support to areas with specific natural 
constraints in Pillar I would be WTO Green Box compatible. 
Mountain areas (no 
change) 
Current areas with 
specific handicaps 
Current intermediate areas 
with natural handicaps  
Areas newly delimited 
with biophysical criteria 
and finetuned 
   
Overlapping 
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5.5. Administrative impacts  
A new regulation scheme would require monitoring and controls to the new direct 
payment in Pillar I, in addition to the existing one in Pillar II. However the additional 
burden would be limited for national administrations if the implementation is based on 
the existing implementation and control system in place for the Pillar II NHA aid. A 
management through annual payments would be less administrative burdensome than 
through entitlements. 
6. CAPPING OF DIRECT PAYMENTS PER BENEFICIARY 
The issue of distribution of direct payments to the very large and the very small farms 
have both been mentioned in various ways in the public debate about the CAP and in the 
consultation process. Indeed, as direct payments are based on areas25, larger farms get 
more direct payments. One can consider that due to economies of scale, granting a level 
of support per hectare to large farms similar to that received by small farms is not 
necessarily justified. Introducing some sort of upper ceiling or limitation/reduction for 
direct payments received by large individual farms could thus be considered in order to 
improve the distribution of payments between farmers.  
Introducing a fixed ceiling on payments established at EU level can affect the capacity of 
large farms to employ and invest. Impacts on employment levels in large farm co-
operatives, often located in the EU12, could be substantial. 
With capping, the capacity of generating funds for other elements of direct payments, as 
well as the number of farms and Member States affected, depends on where the limits are 
set, in what form they are fixed and what is the distribution curve of direct payments 
between farms in the different Member States. As a general rule, the higher the limits, 
the fewer farms are affected and the effects become concentrated only on the few 
Member States with large farm structures. To illustrate the wide range of variations 
between Member States, see Figure 21 on the distribution curves of some selected 
Member States. 
                                                 
25  In fact DP are based on entitlements accompanied with a corresponding number of eligible hectares. 
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Figure 21: Distribution of beneficiaries across CATS categories (in % of the 
respective total number of beneficiaries) 
Distribution of beneficiaries (CATS 2008)
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Source: DG AGRI, CATS data, budget year 2008 
A payment cap set at Member States level could better reflect the structure of farms in a 
given Member States (for instance by taking a multiple of the average amount of direct 
payments per beneficiary). 
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The funding released by capping of direct payments should remain in the respective 
Member State where it could be spent on measures fostering innovation such as 
knowledge transfer, pilot projects or business development. Thus, capping money would 
reinforce the comprehensive efforts in favour of promoting innovation as envisaged for 
the Rural Development Policy. The selection of eligible measures and the approach 
towards implementation should be consistent with the provision laid down for Rural 
Development Programmes. 
In general, fixed limits for direct payments bear the danger of an artificial “splitting” of 
farms to circumvent limits. Various legal responses to these problems were addressed. 
Taking account of different farm structures and ownership arrangements (e.g. co-
operatives) would require adjustment to the definition of the "legal person" claiming the 
payment, which would in itself open the door to circumvention. Preventing any 
circumvention of the ceilings by the transfer of entitlements or the splitting of holdings 
would be difficult to implement, require a definition of splitting and would lay the 
burden of proof on Member State administrations. 
Another way of addressing these difficulties would be to attenuate the effect of fixed 
ceilings by gradually reducing the support level as overall payments to the individual 
farmer increase, while retaining some support even at high overall payment levels.  
A further possibility to mitigate the effects of capping in general on large farms with high 
employment levels is to foresee an increase of the threshold (or to put it differently, a 
decrease of the capped amount) for salaried labour intensity (e.g. by increasing the 
threshold for capping by wages actually paid or by a lump sum of e.g. 
EUR 15 000/AWU). Such mitigation could be foreseen both for a fixed or a progressive 
cap, as mentioned in the Communication on the future CAP. 
The concept of capping has been addressed in the impact assessment for the Health 
Check26. Whereas the options of fixed individual limits (e.g. no direct payment above 
EUR 200 000 or EUR 300 000) and progressive ceilings (e.g. payments per beneficiary 
above EUR 150 000 are reduced by 20 %, above EUR 200 000 by 40 %, and above 
EUR 250 000 by 75 %; no payment occurs above EUR 300 000 per beneficiary) remain 
unchanged, the assessment of capping concerning the CAP post-2013 needs to take into 
account the aforementioned options of redistribution of DP envelopes between Member 
States.  
To assess the effects of the above-mentioned elements, the following options were 
assessed: 
1a) Based on redistribution option "MFF distribution key", progressive capping 
with mitigation by 100% wages 
1b) Based on redistribution option "MFF distribution key", progressive capping 
with mitigation by 50% wages 
1c) Based on redistribution option "MFF distribution key", progressive capping 
with mitigation by EUR 15 000/AWU 
                                                 
26 See Impact assessment note of the Health Check on individual limits for direct payments, 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/healthcheck/ia_annex/c4_en.pdf 
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2) Based on redistribution option "MFF distribution key", fixed ceiling of EUR 
200 000 with mitigation by 100% wages 
3) Based on redistribution option "MFF distribution key", fixed ceiling of EUR 
300 000 with mitigation by 100% wages 
4) Based on redistribution option "Status quo 2020", progressive capping with 
mitigation by 100% wages (comparable to 1a) 
5) Based on redistribution option "Min 90% with objective criteria", 
progressive capping with mitigation by 100% wages (comparable to 1a) 
The quantitative impacts assessed are twofold: the amount generated by capping and the 
impact on farm income. 
6.1. Amounts resulting from capping 
6.1.1. Per Member State 
Table 11 displays the amounts resulting from capping in the different options as a 
percentage of full national DP envelope following redistribution at Member State and 
aggregate EU-27 level, and the amount resulting from capping in absolute value at the 
EU level.  
The results indicate that capping would release for the EU-27 between EUR 278 million 
for option 4 (capping with Status Quo redistribution) and EUR 835 million for option 1b 
(capping with MFF distribution key redistribution). This represents between 0.6% and 
1.9% of the total amount of direct payments at EU level which is quite low compared to 
the current amount resulting from modulation (around EUR 3 billions for budget year 
2013). This is due to the thresholds of capping which affect only a limited number of 
farms in comparison to the modulation as only farms with very high direct payment 
levels are concerned. As a consequence capping would really affect very few countries 
where large farms play a big role27: mainly BG and UK and to a lower extent HU, SK 
and RO while some Member States would not be affected at all like BE, CY, IE, LU, 
MT, AT, FI, SL, FR or almost not affected like PL, SE, PT.  
The different mitigation options influence the capping quite differently depending on the 
level of wages in the different Member States. Thus, mitigation by a lump sum of 
EUR 15 000/AWU is more favorable in BG, RO and SK and to a lower extent in LT and 
LV where it is assumed that the lump sum of EUR 15 000/AWU is quite high compared 
to the real wages. In the contrary, using 100 % wages is more favorable in DK, DE, and 
to a lower extent in UK where it is assumed that the wages are quite high. The use of 
50 % wages as a mitigation factor is increasing the capped amounts in all Member States 
compared to the two alternative mitigation factors.  
                                                 
27  The FADN is a sample survey. As the capping concerns only a very limited number of very large 
farms it cannot be always guaranteed that this type of large farms is well represented in all Member 
States. Thus, the figures provided should be considered as indicative. This could explain the fact that 
GR is among the Member States strongly affected. 
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Note, in this respect, that these amounts are calculated in a simulated 2020 situation 
while the application of capping during the transition period for convergence of direct 
payments may affect farms differently. 
Table 11: Amounts capped per Member State 
MFF distribution 
key
MFF distribution 
key
MFF distribution 
key
MFF distribution 
key
MFF distribution 
key Status quo
Min 90% and 
objective criteria
1a 1b 1c 2 3 4 5
Progressive 
capping with 
mitigation by 
100% wages
Progressive 
capping with 
mitigation by 
50% wages
Progressive 
capping with 
mitigation by 
15000€/AWU
fixed ceiling of 
200 thousands 
€ with mitigation 
by 100% wages
fixed ceiling of 
300 thousands 
€ with mitigation 
by 100% wages
1a with status 
quo
1a with Min 90% 
and objective 
criteria
 Belgium 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
 Bulgaria 9,8% 13,1% 1,9% 11,9% 5,4% 8,9% 10,4%
 Cyprus 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
 Czech Republic 0,4% 4,2% 0,5% 0,5% 0,1% 0,5% 0,4%
 Denmark 0,2% 0,6% 0,7% 0,2% 0,0% 0,2% 0,1%
 Germany 0,2% 1,7% 2,1% 0,3% 0,1% 0,1% 0,2%
 Greece 4,0% 4,1% 4,0% 4,7% 2,8% 0,0% 3,4%
 Spain 1,5% 1,6% 1,5% 1,7% 0,7% 0,3% 1,5%
 Estonia 0,0% 0,3% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,8%
 France 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
 Hungary 2,6% 5,9% 2,3% 2,9% 1,8% 2,3% 2,6%
 Ireland 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
 Italy 0,1% 0,3% 0,2% 0,1% 0,0% 2,3% 0,1%
 Lithuania 0,4% 0,7% 0,0% 0,5% 0,2% 0,2% 0,9%
 Luxembourg 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
 Latvia 0,0% 1,0% 0,1% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 1,8%
 Malta 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
 Netherlands 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,1% 0,0%
 Austria 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
 Poland 0,1% 0,5% 0,1% 0,1% 0,0% 0,1% 0,2%
 Portugal 0,1% 0,2% 0,1% 0,1% 0,0% 0,2% 0,2%
 Romania 2,9% 4,1% 1,0% 3,3% 1,7% 1,9% 4,2%
 Finland 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
 Sweden 0,0% 0,1% 0,1% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
 Slovakia 3,1% 9,0% 1,8% 3,7% 1,7% 2,4% 4,3%
 Slovenia 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
 United Kingdom 5,2% 5,4% 5,5% 5,7% 3,8% 0,1% 5,4%
EU-27 1,3% 1,9% 1,3% 1,5% 0,8% 0,6% 1,4%
Share of amounts capped in total pillar 1 payments (total before capping) - %
 
Source: DG AGRI, FADN 
6.1.2. Per farming type 
Table 12 shows which farming types are the most affected by capping. It expresses for 
each farming type the amounts resulting from capping in the different options as a 
percentage of total direct payment envelope at EU level (% in the table are comparable 
with each other).  
Unsurprisingly, field crop farms which receive the bulk of direct payment are affected by 
capping in all scenarios. 
Grazing livestock specialized farms which currently receive little subsidies compared to 
their large area will benefit from the move toward a flat rate at regional or national level 
and get a higher share of direct payments while labour will stay the same. Thus it is quite 
logical that these farms will be affected the most by capping in all options based on 
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'MFF distribution key' or 'Min 90% with objective criteria' but much less in the 
Status Quo.  
Table 12: Amounts capped per farming type 
 Share of amounts capped in total pillar 1 payments (total before capping) - % 
 
MFF 
distribution 
key 
MFF 
distribution 
key 
MFF 
distribution 
key 
MFF 
distribution 
key 
MFF 
distribution 
key 
Status quo 
Min 90% 
and 
objective 
criteria 
 1a 1b 1c 2 3 4 5 
 
Progressive 
capping 
with 
mitigation 
by 100% 
wages 
Progressive 
capping 
with 
mitigation 
by 50% 
wages 
Progressive 
capping with 
mitigation by 
15000€/AWU 
fixed ceiling 
of 200 
thousands 
€ with 
mitigation 
by 100% 
wages 
fixed ceiling 
of 300 
thousands 
€ with 
mitigation 
by 100% 
wages 
1a with 
status quo 
1a with Min 
90% and 
objective 
criteria 
(1) Fieldcrops 0,50% 0,98% 0,48% 0,59% 0,27% 0,43% 0,65% 
(2) Horticulture 0,00% 0,01% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,03% 0,00% 
(3) Wine 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
(4) Other permanent 
crops 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
(5) Milk 0,00% 0,02% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
(6) Other grazing 
livestock 0,77% 0,80% 0,78% 0,87% 0,53% 0,13% 0,76% 
(7) Granivores 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
(8) Mixed 0,03% 0,12% 0,06% 0,04% 0,02% 0,04% 0,04% 
All types 1,31% 1,93% 1,32% 1,49% 0,82% 0,64% 1,45% 
 Source: DG AGRI, FADN 
6.2. Impact of capping on income  
6.2.1. Per Member States 
Table 13 expresses at Member States level the impact of capping on farm income 
(FNVA/AWU). All options are compared to the farm income in a redistribution scenario 
"MFF distribution key" without capping. 
On average for the EU27 average income per unit of work would be little affected 
(between -0 % and -0.5 %), but there are important variations for some Member States 
depending on the options.  
In option 1b where the mitigation by labor is the lowest (50% wages), countries most 
affected would be SK and BG but also CZ, HU, RO which is not surprising at they have 
a high share of large farms, cooperatives, etc.  
Options 4 and 5 differ from option 1a because of the redistribution options used. In 
option 4, with the current distribution of direct payments between Member States (Status 
Quo), simulations show that some countries would lose much in terms of average income 
(EE, LV, LT, PT, RO, SK), but this is mainly due to the absence of redistribution of 
direct payments in that option (Status quo) and not to capping.  
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Table 13: Capping – Impacts on income per Member State 
Income 2020 
FNVA/AWU
IA scenario
MFF 
distribution 
key
MFF 
distribution 
key
MFF 
distribution 
key
MFF 
distribution 
key
MFF 
distribution 
key
MFF 
distribution 
key
Status quo
Min 90% and 
objective 
criteria
Capping scenario - 
number 0 1a 1b 1c 2 3 4 5
Capping scenario - 
description no capping
Progressive 
capping with 
mitigation by 
100%wages
Progressive 
capping with 
mitigation by 
50%wages
Progressive 
capping with 
mitigation by 
15000€/AWU
fixed ceiling of 
200 thousands 
€ with 
mitigation by 
100%wages
fixed ceiling of 
300 thousands 
€ with 
mitigation by 
100%wages
1a with status 
quo
1a with Min 
90% and 
objective 
criteria
 Belgium 61.583           0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 1,4% -2,1%
 Bulgaria 9.470             -3,8% -5,1% -0,7% -4,6% -2,1% -3,5% -3,1%
 Cyprus 15.064           0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 1,2% -2,8%
 Czech Republic 23.372           -0,2% -2,0% -0,2% -0,2% -0,1% 0,2% -0,2%
 Denmark 71.177           0,0% -0,2% -0,2% -0,1% 0,0% 1,6% -3,1%
 Germany 44.364           -0,1% -0,5% -0,6% -0,1% 0,0% 1,1% -1,4%
 Greece 15.413           -1,1% -1,1% -1,1% -1,3% -0,8% 1,2% -3,8%
 Spain 29.192           -0,3% -0,3% -0,3% -0,4% -0,2% -0,9% -0,1%
 Estonia 24.949           0,0% -0,1% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% -10,7% 22,0%
 France 38.466           0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,9% -1,1%
 Hungary 27.795           -1,0% -2,3% -0,9% -1,2% -0,7% -0,5% -1,0%
 Ireland 27.237           0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,5% -0,1%
 Italy 35.189           0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,7% -1,9%
 Lithuania 19.345           -0,1% -0,2% 0,0% -0,2% -0,1% -6,2% 12,7%
 Luxembourg 50.691           0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% -0,1% -0,3%
 Latvia 14.786           0,0% -0,4% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% -12,7% 25,3%
 Malta 31.121           0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,2% -1,7%
 Netherlands 67.857           0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,7% -0,8%
 Austria 32.384           0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,2% 0,0%
 Poland 12.991           0,0% -0,1% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% -0,8% 2,1%
 Portugal 11.357           0,0% -0,1% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% -2,5% 5,7%
 Romania 4.882             -0,9% -1,2% -0,3% -1,0% -0,5% -3,1% 4,4%
 Finland 28.456           0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,1% 0,6%
 Sweden 43.959           0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,9%
 Slovakia 20.563           -1,6% -4,9% -1,0% -2,0% -0,9% -3,7% 3,6%
 Slovenia 7.727             0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 1,6% -2,4%
 United Kingdom 50.363           -2,0% -2,1% -2,1% -2,2% -1,4% -0,4% -0,6%
 EU-27 23.717           -0,4% -0,5% -0,4% -0,4% -0,2% 0,0% -0,4%
% of change of 2020 income in comparison with scenario 0
 
Source: DG AGRI, FADN 
6.2.2. Per farming type 
Table 14 displays the impact on farm types. In all options, the most affected farming type 
as regards farm income would be grazing livestock. This has to be seen in the context of 
the redistribution of direct payments which leads to an increase in direct payments for 
this type of farms. 
In option 4, with the status quo, some farming types would lose much in terms of average 
income (wine, grazing livestock), but this is mainly due to the absence of redistribution 
of direct payments in that option (Status quo) than to capping.  
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Table 14: Capping – Impacts of income on farm types 
Income 2020 
FNVA/AWU
IA scenario
MFF 
distribution 
key
MFF 
distribution 
key
MFF 
distribution 
key
MFF 
distribution 
key
MFF 
distribution 
key
MFF 
distribution 
key
Status quo
Min 90% and 
objective 
criteria
Capping scenario - 
number 0 1a 1b 1c 2 3 4 5
Capping scenario - 
description no capping
Progressive 
capping with 
mitigation by 
100%wages
Progressive 
capping with 
mitigation by 
50%wages
Progressive 
capping with 
mitigation by 
15000€/AWU
fixed ceiling of 
200 thousands 
€ with 
mitigation by 
100%wages
fixed ceiling of 
300 thousands 
€ with 
mitigation by 
100%wages
1a with status 
quo
1a with Min 
90% and 
objective 
criteria
(1) Fieldcrops 24.404           -0,5% -0,9% -0,4% -0,5% -0,2% 2,7% -0,4%
(2) Horticulture 36.293           0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% -0,3% 0,0%
(3) Wine 35.023           0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% -3,5% -0,3%
(4) Other permanent cro 20.896           0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,5% -0,5%
(5) Milk 29.141           0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 2,6% 0,0%
(6) Other grazing livesto 22.771           -1,8% -1,9% -1,9% -2,1% -1,3% -9,5% -2,1%
(7) Granivores 23.210           0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,6% -0,1%
(8) Mixed 14.789           -0,1% -0,3% -0,1% -0,1% -0,1% 0,7% 0,5%
All types 23.717           -0,4% -0,5% -0,4% -0,4% -0,2% 0,0% -0,4%
% of change of 2020 income in comparison with scenario 0
 
 Source: DG AGRI, FADN 
6.3. Environmental and climate change impacts 
Whatever the option, capping has no direct effect on the environment and on climate 
change. It is more the use of capped funds which may have an impact. 
6.4. International impact 
Capping would be neutral as regards WTO aspects. 
6.5. Administrative impacts 
Provisions on capping, especially those providing for mitigation of capping for large 
farmers with high employment and those related to the artificial conditions created to 
avoid capping (artificial "splitting") will be complex to draft and to implement/control or 
enforce by Member States. For the farmers, the capping system will be burdensome as 
more information and supporting documents will be required to "prove" the right to 
mitigation. 
7. SPECIFIC SUPPORT SCHEME FOR SMALL FARMERS 
The EU agricultural sector is characterised by a very high number of small farms (more 
than 70 % of farms have less than 5 ha). These farms are heterogeneous with respect to 
socio-economic characteristics of farm holders, the farm asset base, the availability of 
non-farm incomes, and therefore their capacity to stay or become viable and flourish. 
Many small farms may be unprofitable and uncompetitive from an economic perspective. 
Yet, they are of crucial social importance in certain Member States and rural regions 
where they make a significant contribution to employment, to the maintenance of viable 
areas and to cultural heritage. 
Furthermore, small farms are important for the provision of public goods. Practices 
applied by small-scale farmers vary a lot across the EU but generally small farms play an 
important role in maintaining a varied landscape with a diverse pattern of perennial, 
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natural and planted vegetation. This variety, when accompanied by the presence of 
retained landscape features such as field margins, hedgerows, stonewalls, meadows, 
small woods and watercourses, is valuable for biodiversity through ensuring connectivity 
between semi-natural habitats and cultivated areas. It also contributes to the resilience of 
the landscape in the face of climate change. 
In a context of globalisation and liberalisation, with volatile commodity prices, affecting 
both input costs and output revenues, small farmers have come under renewed pressure, 
including limited financial resources for investments and difficulties with access to credit 
as well as high transaction costs and poor bargaining power, resulting in limited market 
access. 
In the face of these pressures on the one hand, and the important contribution of small 
farms to social and environmental objectives on the other, support structures need to be 
in place that allow small farms to survive and develop. Although at present, there are 
already some rules aimed at relieving smaller structures and Member States 
administrations from some administrative costs related to cross compliance (e.g. with 
respect to the de minimis rule or hygiene regulation), the administrative burden on small 
farmers is in general disproportionately high in relation to the amount of support they 
receive. 
A specific scheme for supporting small farmers would acknowledge the contribution 
such farms make to rural areas and the environment. It could allow small farms to 
restructure, diversify and increase their competitiveness, e.g. by exploring new local 
market opportunities and providing specific regional products. To achieve this, the 
scheme would have to be designed in a way to either promote competitiveness, 
development and structural change or allow small farmers to choose their development 
path (e.g. maintaining local small-scale production) in order to narrow the income gap 
with larger structures. This specific scheme would also make it possible to cut red tape 
by simplifying administrative procedures for farmers as well as for national 
administrations. 
However, a support scheme for small farmers within the first pillar would only offer 
limited possibilities of targeting or imposing requirements in terms of e.g. development 
capacity, investments, or the commitment to continue farming. This is why it is important 
to grant it in combination with more targeted support through Rural Development policy, 
focusing on the competitiveness of farms. 
The purpose of a small farmer scheme in the first pillar would thus be to provide for 
general support to small farms in the form of a higher level of direct payments while 
simplifying the management of the scheme at farm and at Member States level (without 
imposing any specific request on the development strategy of the farm). This could be 
done by introducing a single payment at farm level that replaces all other elements of the 
direct payment (i.e. the basic rate, the payment for natural constraints, coupled payments 
and the greening component). This higher payment could either consist in:  
– The attribution of a fixed EU-wide support (lump-sum) in addition to the "normal" 
payment to farmers below a threshold. In that case, there is a risk that farmers just 
below the threshold may receive a higher level of direct payment compared to the 
ones just above the threshold who would not be entitled to the specific lump-sum for 
small farmers. 
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– The granting of a lump-sum payment corresponding to a pre-determined threshold. 
However, this could lead to grant a high "bonus" to those with the lowest payments 
compared to the ones that are just below the threshold. 
– An increase of direct payments by progressive percentages (the lower the payment 
below the threshold, the higher the percentage – possibility of bands). This would 
assume setting up bands under the threshold to the limit of which the payment of the 
farmers falling in the band would be completed. This option would mitigate the 
concerns of the above option by completing only to the limit of the band but it would 
be complicated to apply. 
As regards the financing of the scheme, it should not put at risk the competitiveness of 
other farms by using a disproportionate share of the total direct payment envelope. 
Several options could be envisaged: either through a share (e.g. 5%) of the national 
envelope for direct payments of each Member States or through the results of capping 
generated in the same Member States. The latter could be an intuitively appealing 
solution as it would link the distribution problems at both end of the farm spectrum. 
However, this would result in a financial mismatch between the funds needed for the 
scheme and those generated owing to the unevenly distributed farm structures between 
Member States. There would be either too little financing available (in Member States 
with many small farms) or the scheme would be over-funded (in Member States with 
large farm structures).  
Clearly, the budgetary needs for financing the small farmer scheme crucially depend on 
the definition of small farmers. Several options could be considered to define the small 
farmers: 
– Option 1: A threshold fixed at EU level for all Member States (e.g. EUR 1 000 per 
beneficiary) 
– Option 2: A threshold calculated at Member States level with an EU-wide formula 
(e.g. 15 % of the average amount of direct payment per beneficiary in each Member 
States) 
– Option 3: A threshold defined at Member States level within an EU framework (e.g. 
maximum EUR 1 000 per beneficiary and maximum 5 % of the direct payments 
envelope in each Member States dedicated to the small farmers) 
7.1. Economic impacts 
The impacts of the three options in terms of number of beneficiaries and share of budget 
that would be dedicated to the scheme have been assessed on the basis of CATS data for 
financial year 2009 (mainly claim year 2008). CATS data gather direct payments really 
paid to farmers in a given year. Results have then been projected in the redistribution 
scenario "MFF distribution key". However, it was not possible to take into account 
structural adjustments that will certainly occur by 2020 as well as the redistribution of 
direct payments between beneficiaries due to the move to a flat rate at regional or 
national level. 
The results would be the following: 
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– Option 1 would use 9.2 % of the EU DP envelope which would mean an additional 
5.1% of DP dedicated to small farmers as compared to what they receive in the Status 
Quo. In CY, MT, RO, more than 40 % of the DP national envelopes would be used for 
more than 70% of beneficiaries. In IT, LT, EL, ES, PL, PT and SI, 8 to 23 % of 
national DP envelopes would be used for more than 40 % of beneficiaries. Detailed 
results are presented in Table 15. 
Table 15: Small farmers - Impacts of option 1 (EUR 1 000 per beneficiary for all 
MS) 
  
Share of beneficiaries 
below the 1000 euros 
threshold 
Share of budget necessary to grant 
1000 euros to the beneficiaries 
below the 1000 euros threshold 
Share of additional budget 
needed to finance these small 
farmers 
AT 22% 3,7% 2,0% 
BE 12% 0,9% 0,5% 
BG 46% 4,5% 2,1% 
CY 76% 57,7% 35,9% 
CZ 17% 0,4% 0,2% 
DE 23% 1,5% 0,9% 
DK 23% 1,5% 0,9% 
EE 36% 4,6% 2,2% 
EL 55% 23,9% 15,1% 
ES 44% 8,1% 4,9% 
FI 9% 1,1% 0,3% 
FR 15% 0,7% 0,4% 
HU 43% 6,2% 3,1% 
IR 8% 0,8% 0,4% 
IT 62% 20,2% 12,3% 
LT 59% 23,5% 11,3% 
LU 9% 0,5% 0,2% 
LV 48% 15,5% 7,0% 
MT 85% 82,3% 66,3% 
NL 24% 2,0% 1,2% 
PL 50% 22,5% 10,6% 
PT 70% 22,5% 15,2% 
RO 79% 43,5% 21,9% 
SE 27% 3,0% 1,4% 
SI 45% 19,6% 9,5% 
SK 48% 1,9% 1,0% 
UK 18% 0,9% 0,4% 
EU 27  50% 9,2% 5,1% 
Source: CATS data, DG AGRI calculation 
– Option 2 would use 4.8% of EU DP envelope which would mean an additional 2.8% 
of DP dedicated to small farmers as compared to what they receive in the Status Quo. 
The maximum share of national DP envelopes dedicated to small farmers would be 
11% (in SK). The scheme would concern more than 40 % of beneficiaries in BG, CZ, 
EE, ES, HU, IT, MT, PT and SK. Detailed results are presented in Table 16. 
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Table 16: Small farmers - Impacts of option 2 (15% of the average amount of direct 
payment per beneficiary in each MS) 
 
Threshold (15% 
of national avg)  
(in €) 
% 
beneficiaries 
below 
threshold 
Total amount needed to raise 
small farmers to the threshold 
set at 15% of nat.avg 
(in % of the DP envelope) 
Share of additional 
budget needed to 
finance these small 
farmers 
AT 868 20% 3,0% 1,6% 
BE 2.070 22% 3,3% 1,8% 
BG 1.524 66% 9,9% 6,3% 
CY 198 21% 3,2% 0,8% 
CZ 5.737 57% 8,6% 5,4% 
DE 2.203 34% 5,1% 3,3% 
DK 2.411 38% 5,8% 3,7% 
EE 1.179 43% 6,4% 3,2% 
EL 348 31% 4,7% 2,4% 
ES 824 40% 6,1% 3,6% 
FI 1.244 12% 1,8% 0,7% 
FR 2.947 26% 3,9% 2,6% 
HU 1.054 45% 6,8% 3,5% 
IE 1.496 13% 2,0% 0,9% 
IT 461 42% 6,3% 3,0% 
LT 379 18% 2,8% 0,9% 
LU 2.800 17% 2,5% 1,5% 
LV 467 21% 3,1% 1,2% 
MT 155 48% 7,2% 3,8% 
NL 1.831 33% 4,9% 3,2% 
PL 335 13% 1,9% 0,4% 
PT 468 51% 7,7% 4,5% 
RO 271 12% 1,8% 0,4% 
SE 1.347 35% 5,2% 2,7% 
SI 347 14% 2,1% 0,8% 
SK 3.855 73% 11,0% 8,3% 
UK 3.046 35% 5,3% 3,4% 
UE27 819  4,8% 2,8% 
Source: CATS data, DG AGRI calculation 
– Option 3: In Figure 22, it is assumed that each Member States would try to maximise 
the threshold by reaching either EUR 1 000/beneficiary or the level of the threshold 
which allows to reach the maximum (5 %) share of national DP envelope. This 
limitation to 5 % of the national DP envelopes would reduce the 
EUR 1 000/beneficiary threshold in eleven Member States. The number of 
beneficiaries concerned still differs widely between Member States. This is due to the 
form of the distribution curves in each Member States that differs a lot (see for 
instance RO and BG). At EU level, it would represent 29% of all beneficiaries. 
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Figure 22: Small farmers - Impact of option 3 (maximum EUR 1 000 per 
beneficiary and maximum 5% of the DP envelope in each MS) 
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Source: CATS data for financial year 2009, DG AGRI calculation  
Note: For those Member States in which a threshold of 1000€ per beneficiary will use more than 5% of the 
direct payments envelope for small farmers, the threshold has been reduced accordingly and its level 
appears after the initials of the Member States on the axe. 
From an economic point of view, the scheme would result in an improvement of the 
position of smaller structures and to a consolidation of micro-size farms, thus 
contributing to vitality of rural areas, increasing the public acceptance of direct payments 
and having a positive impact on the income and purchasing power of small farmers. 
However, due to the lack of specific data there is no scope for additional quantitative 
assessment. 
It has to be noted that, the risk of artificial splitting of holdings that are above the 
threshold to be considered a "small farm" would appear and legal provisions would have 
to be put in place to avoid this practice. 
7.2. Impact on farm income 
The impact of the small farmer scheme on the income of farms has been evaluated 
looking at the global impact on farm incomes as well as on the incomes of those farms 
that are the beneficiaries of the scheme. This was done on the basis of FADN data for the 
'MFF distribution key' distribution option. It has to be noted, in this respect, that FADN 
only includes farms above a specific size threshold within Member States. As a result 
many small farmers which would benefit from this scheme are not covered by the survey. 
In some Member States the number of 'small farmers' (as defined under the 3 options) is 
too small to publish results (in that case, cells are left empty in the tables below). 
Nevertheless, the main advantage of using FADN data, contrary to CATS, is that the 
effects of the redistribution of DP at national/regional level can be taken into account.  
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Table 17 displays the share of farms per Member State included in the FADN that would 
be below the thresholds defined in the 3 options. 
Table 17: Small farmer scheme - share of farms per MS that would be below the 
thresholds  
  option 1 option 2 option 3 
  
MFF distribution 
key 
MFF distribution 
key 
MFF distribution 
key 
  
Total number 
of farms 
Min € 1000 
15% of the 
average DP in 
MS 
 Min € 1000 but 
Max 5% 
 Belgium 30.000 6,3% 8,0% 6,3% 
 Bulgaria 138.000 46,2% 53,2% 40,7% 
 Czech 
Republic 15.000 3,3% 20,0% 3,3% 
 Denmark 33.000 0,3% 1,2% 0,3% 
 Germany 200.000 1,5% 4,4% 1,5% 
 Estonia 7.000       
 Ireland 97.000       
 Greece 546.000 20,9% 1,1% 1,4% 
 Spain 713.000 30,5% 25,2% 19,2% 
 France 343.000 4,5% 10,0% 4,5% 
 Italy 609.000 21,1% 5,1% 4,1% 
 Cyprus 20.000 59,0%   9,0% 
 Latvia 25.000 4,0%   2,4% 
 Lithuania 51.000 2,5%     
 Luxembourg 2.000       
 Hungary 94.000 12,6% 14,9%   
 Malta 2.000 20,0%     
 Netherlands 57.000 4,7% 9,8% 4,7% 
 Austria 81.000 2,5%   2,5% 
 Poland 819.000 8,0% 0,7% 1,4% 
 Portugal 103.000 31,8% 10,6% 6,2% 
 Romania 956.000 63,9% 5,8% 11,5% 
 Slovenia 38.000 7,4%     
 Slovakia 3.000       
 Finland 44.000       
 Sweden 32.000       
 United 
Kingdom 97.000 1,2% 2,8% 1,2% 
EU-27 5.155.000 25,0% 8,5% 7,5% 
Source: DG AGRI- FADN  
Note: The absence of figures for some option in some MS means that there is no farm below the threshold  
The analysis shows that overall impacts on the income of the farm population, according 
to size units as in Table 18, are extremely low with detectable effects only in the smallest 
size units. 
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Table 18: Impact of a small farmer scheme on farm income according to size units 
(in % of change compared to an option 'MFF distribution key' without the small 
farmer scheme) 
MFF distribution 
key
MFF distribution 
key
MFF distribution 
key
MFF distribution 
key
Min € 1000 15% of the average DP in MS
 Min € 1000 but 
Max 5%
0 - <4 ESU 4.701 2,7% 0,9% 0,4%
4 - <8  ESU 11.255 0,5% 0,2% 0,1%
8 - <16 ESU 16.253 -0,3% 0,0% 0,0%
16 - <40 ESU 25.800 -0,2% 0,0% -0,1%
40 - <100 ESU 40.690 -0,2% -0,1% -0,1%
>= 100 ESU 54.215 -0,2% -0,1% 0,0%  
Source: DG AGRI- FADN  
On the other hand, when looking at the income effects for those farmers who are 
beneficiaries of the scheme, it becomes clear that, depending on the option, impacts can 
be very substantial reaching up to +21.8 % for the income of small farmers in BG under 
option 2 (where the threshold is fixed at 15 % of national average of DP per beneficiary) 
as shown in Table 19. 
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Table 19: Impact of small farmer scheme on income for benefiting farms 
represented in FADN (in % of change compared to an option 'MFF distribution 
key' without the small farmer scheme) 
Change in income of farms benefiting from small farmer scheme
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3
Min € 1000 15% of average DP in MS Min € 1000 but max 5%
 Belgium 0,4% 1,0% 0,4%
 Bulgaria 13,6% 21,8% 7,6%
 Czech Republic 2,5% 17,0% 2,5%
 Denmark 0,0% 0,3% 0,0%
 Germany 0,3% 1,0% 0,3%
 Estonia
 Ireland
 Greece 2,6% 0,3% 0,3%
 Spain 2,4% 1,6% 1,4%
 France 0,5% 1,5% 0,5%
 Italy 1,9% 0,5% 0,4%
 Cyprus 9,2% 10,2%
 Latvia 1,5% 1,9%
 Lithuania 2,7%
 Luxembourg
 Hungary 4,4% 4,7%
 Malta 0,9%
 Netherlands 0,1% 0,2% 0,1%
 Austria 1,6% 1,6%
 Poland 2,2% 0,2% 0,6%
 Portugal 6,7% 2,3% 1,8%
 Romania 12,4% 1,7% 2,7%
 Slovenia 8,9%
 Slovakia
 Finland
 Sweden
 United Kingdom 0,1% 0,7% 0,1%  
Source: DG AGRI- FADN   
Note: These results should not be considered as representative for all the "small farmers" of a given 
Member States. They serve merely as an illustration of the possible impacts on some small farms. 
In summary, these estimated impacts on income demonstrate that a small farmer scheme 
could lead to considerable benefits for the farmers targeted by the measure while the 
impact on the farm population not benefiting from the scheme would be small. 
7.3. Environmental and climate change impacts 
By supporting the economic situation of small farmers, the small farmers scheme would 
allow to keep in place the varied field structures with diversity of crops, field margins 
and hedgerows and niches of unproductive land that often goes together with these types 
of farms. Furthermore, by providing some development opportunities, the scheme could 
also help to alleviate some of the environmental problems of small scale farms, for 
example the fact that small-scale farmers often lack the knowledge and machinery to 
handle inputs in the most efficient way and to handle and apply manure in a way that has 
the least negative environmental impact.  
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7.4. Administrative impacts 
Depending on the share of farmers concerned and on the rules that would be simplified 
for the small farmers, the small farmer scheme could considerably simplify the overall 
management of the direct payments scheme for Member States. For the farmer, the 
application procedure for this approach can be very simple and would mean a much less 
burdensome access to support. 
An approach built on the assumption that the direct payments for small farmers would be 
generally increased does not require any additional control but cross-reporting from 
existing controls. 
However, provisions aimed at preventing artificial "splitting" of farms could be complex 
to draft. 
8. SPECIFIC SUPPORT SCHEME FOR YOUNG FARMERS 
Data on the age structure of farmers in the EU indicate the ageing of the farming 
community. As Table 20 shows, there are 1.8 mio young farmers (defined as farm 
holders "under 40 years of age") which make up 14% of the population of farmers in the 
EU-27 and hold 20% of the potentially eligible area (PEA)28. The largest share in PEA 
held by young farmers is found in PL (29%), AT and FR (both 27%), while the smallest 
one in RO (12%), MT and CY (both 13%). The average farm size of young farmers in 
most Member States is larger than the average farm size. Other indicators also suggest 
that their performance is better compared to farmers above 45 years of age. However, the 
weight of this comparison might be biased by a higher share of small and unprofitable 
farms. 
                                                 
28  The share of PEA held by young farmers has been calculated based on information from EUROSTAT 
on the share of utilised agricultural area (UAA) held by young farmers whereby the same share of 
PEA as for UAA has been assumed for YF. 
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Table 20: Importance of young farmers 
N° % N° %
BE 7.380 16,7% 278.606 21,3%
BG 37.805 7,7% 672.330 19,3%
CZ 6.745 18,5% 524.098 14,9%
DK 7.300 16,7% 541.021 20,4%
DE 80.010 21,9% 3.514.826 20,8%
EE 2.845 13,0% 200.716 23,2%
IE 20.220 15,8% 905.069 19,5%
GR 124.650 14,5% 1.257.560 22,6%
ES 110.260 11,2% 3.861.319 18,4%
FR 79.535 18,6% 7.183.943 27,1%
IT 134.410 8,1% 1.646.856 16,1%
CY 3.465 8,7% 18.599 12,9%
LV 17.460 16,2% 350.323 22,7%
LT 28.755 12,5% 509.308 19,3%
LU 360 15,9% 29.663 23,9%
HU 91.830 14,8% 821.250 16,2%
MT 1.000 9,1% 927 12,6%
NL 11.270 15,5% 314.547 17,3%
AT 38.785 24,0% 737.087 27,0%
PL 549.780 23,0% 4.106.957 29,0%
PT 15.365 5,7% 414.747 14,2%
RO 394.390 10,1% 1.158.933 11,9%
SI 7.875 10,5% 72.142 16,3%
SK 6.295 9,4% 285.412 15,2%
FI 13.755 20,5% 580.264 25,5%
SE 9.480 14,0% 534.687 17,5%
UK 24.820 8,8% 2.271.137 14,2%
EU-27 1.825.845 13,6% 32.445.877 20,1%
EU-15 677.600 12,4% 23.888.668 20,3%
EU-12 1.148.245 14,4% 8.564.459 19,7%
* age class 'less than 40 years old' has been estimated by assuming a uniform distribution of 
farmers in the age class 'from 35 to 44 years old' based on Eurostat data
YF (farmers less than 40 
yrs old*) Hectares of PEA held by YF
 
Source: Eurostat data, DG AGRI calculation 
The CAP has recognized the age structure in the farming sector as a problem years ago 
and has been addressing it by rural development measures, in particular by the measure 
“Setting-up of young farmers”. By contrast, direct support schemes up to now do not 
explicitly target young farmers. Within an overall aim to enhance the competitiveness of 
EU agriculture, direct support schemes serve as an income support for farmers and have 
to be granted in line with the principle of non-discrimination. Nevertheless, when 
allocating payment entitlements under the SPS, Member States have the possibility to 
address young farmers indirectly through provisions for farmers commencing their 
agricultural activity between the reference period and the first year of the SPS and later 
on by using the national reserve. 
Farmers commencing their agricultural activity are defined as a natural or legal person 
that did not have any agricultural activity in her own name and at her own risk in the 5 
years preceding the start of the new agricultural activity. It is highly likely that many of 
the newcomers who apply are young farmers. However, further narrowing down of 
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newcomers as only young farmers, e.g. on the basis of criteria used for rural development 
measures, risks to be challenged at the European Court of Justice because of being 
discriminatory. 
While a majority of Member States uses the national reserve for newcomers, there are a 
few that do not (DK, NL, SE, MT, DE, UK), which means that their young farmers can 
get the access to direct support under the SPS only by transfers of entitlements (by 
buying, leasing or inheriting). As this can be, together with land, rather costly, young 
farmers may not be encouraged to start farming. This is particular the case when the 
support for setting-up (or for an early retirement) is not available under the rural 
development programme (MT, NL, SK). In terms of access to direct payments, young 
farmers in Member States applying SAPS benefit from a more favourable treatment as 
they can claim direct support any year provided that they have at their disposal eligible 
land. 
In the light of this situation, a specific support scheme for young farmers in Pillar I could 
be envisioned that would encourage the setting-up of young farmers and/or support the 
operation of their farms in the first years. When designing such a new scheme, the 
objectives of the scheme should guide further decisions such as whether it is mandatory 
or voluntary, who are beneficiaries, the amount and the form of support, when and for 
how long to grant support and whether to set any budgetary limits. 
A mandatory application would ensure that the often difficult situation for young new-
comers would be equally taken into account in all MS. On the other hand, voluntary 
application could be argued as well since Member States are in the best position to 
decide if an additional measure is necessary in their case. 
As defining beneficiaries on the basis of their age could be challenged at the European 
Court of Justice, an alternative could be to use the current definition of "newcomers", 
with the expectation that most of them would be young farmers, or to apply the definition 
foreseen under rural development measures29. The justification could be that “the 
creation and development of new economic activity by farmers commencing their 
agricultural activities (or young farmers) is financially challenging, in particular for 
young farmers, and this should be considered in the allocation and targeting of direct 
support”. Besides legal implications, both targeted definitions also narrows down the 
number of potential beneficiaries, thus having more limited implications in terms of 
budgeting and administrative burden than if all farmers under 40 are granted support. 
The following options for a specific support to young farmers could be envisaged: 
– Option 1: Granting a fixed top-up payment per hectare to young farmers (less than 40 
years of age) 
– Option 2: Devoting a fixed percentage of the Member States’ direct payment budget 
to a scheme for young farmers (less than 40 years of age) 
– Option 3: Granting a top-up of a certain percentage of the basic rate for direct 
payments in each Member State to a scheme for young farmers (less than 40 years of 
age) 
                                                 
29  Beneficiaries for RD measure "YF setting-up for the first time" are those who are less than 40 years of 
age, possess adequate occupational skills/competence and have submitted a business plan. 
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– Option 4: Granting a lump-sum support to starting-up farmers based on average farm 
size and average direct payments per ha in the Member State. 
In all options, the support would be given for a limited number of years, e.g. 3 years or 5 
years, or until a farmer reaches the age of more than 40 years.  
8.1. Economic impacts 
The impacts of the four options are assessed in terms of the level of the payment to 
young farmers and the share of budget that would have to be dedicated to the scheme in a 
given year. The analysis is done on the basis of Eurostat data on the number of young 
farmers and the size of their farms. Results have then been projected in the redistribution 
scenario "MFF distribution key".  
The results would be the following: 
– Option 1: The impact of a YFS with a fixed top-up amount per hectare for small 
farmers has been examined for three different amounts for the top-up of 100€/ha, 
50€/ha and 20€/ha. Both a top-up of 100€/ha and a top-up of 50€/ha would require a 
considerable share of the direct payment budget for its financing (7.6 % and 3.8 % 
respectively at EU level) while these amounts would be reduced substantially for the 
top-up of 20€/ha (1.5 %). LV would be the Member State with the highest share of the 
national direct payment envelope going into the YFS, up to 16 % with a 100€/ha top-
up due to the fact that its number of young farmers is relatively high and the 
budgetary envelope for direct payments relatively low (see Table 21). 
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Table 21: Impact of YFS with fixed top-up payment per hectare 
Budget for YFS 
with 100€/ha
Share of 
budget YFS 
with 
100€/ha
Budget for 
YFS with 
50€/ha
Share of 
budget YFS 
with 50€/ha
Budget for 
YFS with 
20€/ha
Share of 
budget YFS 
with 20€/ha
mio € % mio € % mio € %
BE 27,9 5,3% 13,9 2,6% 5,6 1,1%
BG 67,2 8,2% 33,6 4,1% 13,4 1,6%
CZ 52,4 5,9% 26,2 2,9% 10,5 1,2%
DK 54,1 5,9% 27,1 3,0% 10,8 1,2%
DE 351,5 6,8% 175,7 3,4% 70,3 1,4%
EE 20,1 14,8% 10,0 7,4% 4,0 3,0%
IE 90,5 7,3% 45,3 3,6% 18,1 1,5%
GR 125,8 6,2% 62,9 3,1% 25,2 1,2%
ES 386,1 7,7% 193,1 3,9% 77,2 1,5%
FR 718,4 9,4% 359,2 4,7% 143,7 1,9%
IT 164,7 4,3% 82,3 2,1% 32,9 0,9%
CY 1,9 3,7% 0,9 1,8% 0,4 0,7%
LV 35,0 16,0% 17,5 8,0% 7,0 3,2%
LT 50,9 11,1% 25,5 5,5% 10,2 2,2%
LU 3,0 8,7% 1,5 4,3% 0,6 1,7%
HU 82,1 6,3% 41,1 3,2% 16,4 1,3%
MT 0,1 1,9% 0,0 0,9% 0,0 0,4%
NL 31,5 4,1% 15,7 2,1% 6,3 0,8%
AT 73,7 10,4% 36,9 5,2% 14,7 2,1%
PL 410,7 13,1% 205,3 6,5% 82,1 2,6%
PT 41,5 6,8% 20,7 3,4% 8,3 1,4%
RO 115,9 5,9% 57,9 3,0% 23,2 1,2%
SI 7,2 5,2% 3,6 2,6% 1,4 1,0%
SK 28,5 7,1% 14,3 3,5% 5,7 1,4%
FI 58,0 10,8% 29,0 5,4% 11,6 2,2%
SE 53,5 7,5% 26,7 3,7% 10,7 1,5%
UK 227,1 6,2% 113,6 3,1% 45,4 1,2%
EU-27 3.244,6 7,6% 1.622,3 3,8% 648,9 1,5%
EU-15 2.388,9 7,1% 1.194,4 3,6% 477,8 1,4%
EU-12 856,4 9,0% 428,2 4,5% 171,3 1,8%
* age class 'less than 40 years old' has been estimated by assuming a uniform distribution of farmers in the age class 'from 35 to 
44 years old' based on Eurostat data  
Source: Eurostat data, DG AGRI calculation 
– Option 2: The impact of a YFS with a fixed percentage of the Member State overall 
direct payment budget devoted to the scheme was examined for two shares of the 
direct payment budget, i.e. 5 % and 2.5 %. At EU level, the per hectare top-up 
amounts resulting from the application of such a scheme would be 66€/ha for a 5% 
share of the budget and 33 €/ha for a 2.5% share of the budget. However, the amounts 
would vary substantially between Member States with, for example, MT going up to 
266 €/ha in the 5% budget situation while LV would be at 31€/ha for the same setting 
(see Table 22). 
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Table 22: Impact of YFS with fixed percentage of direct payment budget 
Budget for YFS 
with 5% of MS 
envelope for 
YFS
€/ha for YF 
with 5% of 
MS budget 
for YFS
Budget for 
YFS with 
2.5% of MS 
envelope for 
YFS
€/ha for YF 
with 2.5% of 
MS budget 
for YFS
mio € €/ha mio € €/ha
BE 26,4 94,7 13,2 47,4
BG 40,8 60,7 20,4 30,3
CZ 44,7 85,4 22,4 42,7
DK 45,7 84,5 22,8 42,2
DE 259,2 73,7 129,6 36,9
EE 6,8 33,7 3,4 16,9
IE 62,1 68,6 31,0 34,3
GR 101,2 80,5 50,6 40,2
ES 249,9 64,7 124,9 32,4
FR 382,7 53,3 191,4 26,6
IT 192,8 117,1 96,4 58,5
CY 2,5 135,9 1,3 67,9
LV 11,0 31,3 5,5 15,6
LT 23,0 45,2 11,5 22,6
LU 1,7 57,8 0,9 28,9
HU 65,1 79,2 32,5 39,6
MT 0,2 266,4 0,1 133,2
NL 38,3 121,8 19,2 60,9
AT 35,4 48,1 17,7 24,0
PL 156,9 38,2 78,4 19,1
PT 30,3 73,1 15,2 36,5
RO 97,5 84,1 48,7 42,0
SI 6,9 96,2 3,5 48,1
SK 20,2 70,8 10,1 35,4
FI 26,9 46,3 13,4 23,2
SE 35,9 67,1 17,9 33,5
UK 184,1 81,0 92,0 40,5
EU-27 2.148,2 66,2 1.074,1 33,1
EU-15 1.672,6 70,0 836,3 35,0
EU-12 475,6 55,5 237,8 27,8
* age class 'less than 40 years old' has been estimated by assuming a uniform distribution of 
farmers in the age class 'from 35 to 44 years old' based on Eurostat data  
Source: Eurostat data, DG AGRI calculation 
– Option 3: The impact of a YFS with a top-up for young farmers as a percentage of the 
basic payment rate was examined for a top-up percentage of 20 % and 25 %. 
Assuming a basic rate of 60 % of the overall direct payment envelope of a Member 
State, for the EU-27 the 20 % top-up would be 30€/ha leading to a basic rate of 
179€/ha for young farmers (as compared to 149€/ha for other farmers) and 37€/ha for 
the 25% top-up leading to a basic rate of 186€/ha for young farmers. This would mean 
2.3 % and 2.8 %, respectively, of the direct payment budget at EU level. The highest 
25% top-up would be paid in GR (75€/ha) while the lowest would be in LV (19€/ha). 
The share of the direct payment budget devoted to the YFS would vary between 1.3 % 
in RO and MT and 4.6 % in GR with the 25% top-up (see Table 23). 
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Table 23: Impact of YFS with top-up of a certain percentage of the basic rate 
basic rate 
per ha
20% top-up 
to basic rate
basic rate 
per ha for 
YF with 20% 
top-up
Budget for 
YFS with 
20% top-up 
for YF
Share of 
YFS in total 
budget with 
20% top-up
25% top-up 
to basic rate
basic rate 
per ha for 
YF with 25% 
top-up
Budget for 
YFS with 
25% top-up 
for YF
Share of 
YFS in total 
budget with 
25% top-up
€/ha €/ha €/ha mio € % €/ha €/ha mio € %
BE 230,5 46,1 276,5 12,8 2,4% 57,6 288,1 16,1 3,0%
BG 160,5 32,1 192,6 21,6 2,6% 40,1 200,7 27,0 3,3%
CZ 152,6 30,5 183,1 16,0 1,8% 38,1 190,7 20,0 2,2%
DK 206,0 41,2 247,2 22,3 2,4% 51,5 257,5 27,9 3,0%
DE 183,7 36,7 220,4 129,1 2,5% 45,9 229,6 161,4 3,1%
EE 89,6 17,9 107,5 3,6 2,7% 22,4 112,0 4,5 3,3%
IE 180,0 36,0 216,0 32,6 2,6% 45,0 225,0 40,7 3,3%
GR 298,0 59,6 357,6 74,9 3,7% 74,5 372,5 93,7 4,6%
ES 120,5 24,1 144,5 93,0 1,9% 30,1 150,6 116,3 2,3%
FR 167,2 33,4 200,6 240,2 3,1% 41,8 208,9 300,2 3,9%
IT 181,5 36,3 217,8 59,8 1,6% 45,4 226,9 74,7 1,9%
CY 207,7 41,5 249,3 0,8 1,5% 51,9 259,7 1,0 1,9%
LV 74,2 14,8 89,0 5,2 2,4% 18,5 92,7 6,5 3,0%
LT 104,3 20,9 125,2 10,6 2,3% 26,1 130,4 13,3 2,9%
LU 157,2 31,4 188,6 0,9 2,7% 39,3 196,5 1,2 3,4%
HU 184,6 36,9 221,5 30,3 2,3% 46,2 230,8 37,9 2,9%
MT 287,0 57,4 344,4 0,1 1,1% 71,8 358,8 0,1 1,3%
NL 240,2 48,0 288,3 15,1 2,0% 60,1 300,3 18,9 2,5%
AT 133,4 26,7 160,1 19,7 2,8% 33,3 166,7 24,6 3,5%
PL 121,6 24,3 145,9 99,9 3,2% 30,4 152,0 124,9 4,0%
PT 104,7 20,9 125,7 8,7 1,4% 26,2 130,9 10,9 1,8%
RO 85,0 17,0 102,0 19,7 1,0% 21,3 106,3 24,6 1,3%
SI 170,3 34,1 204,4 2,5 1,8% 42,6 212,9 3,1 2,2%
SK 125,2 25,0 150,2 7,1 1,8% 31,3 156,5 8,9 2,2%
FI 138,4 27,7 166,1 16,1 3,0% 34,6 173,1 20,1 3,7%
SE 137,8 27,6 165,3 14,7 2,1% 34,4 172,2 18,4 2,6%
UK 133,9 26,8 160,6 60,8 1,7% 33,5 167,3 76,0 2,1%
EU-27 149,1 29,8 178,9 967,5 2,3% 37,3 186,4 1.209,4 2,8%
EU-15 160,6 32,1 192,7 767,4 2,3% 40,2 200,8 959,2 2,9%
EU-12 119,0 23,8 142,9 203,9 2,1% 29,8 148,8 254,9 2,7%
* age class 'less than 40 years old' has been estimated by assuming a uniform distribution of farmers in the age class 'from 35 to 44 years old' based on Eurostat data  
Source: Eurostat data, DG AGRI calculation 
– Option 4: The impact of a lump-sum support to young farmers was analysed for a 
model that would give young farmers a payment at the level of 25 % of the average 
direct payment per ha in the Member State in which they are located times their farm 
size in hectare with a limit of 25 ha in Member States whose average size of holding is 
below 25 ha and a maximum comprised between 25 ha and the average size of 
holdings in the Member States where average holding size is equal to or higher than 
25 ha. The results shown in Table 2430 indicate that the overall budgetary impact at 
EU-27 level would be limited to 0.21 % of the total direct payment budget. In the 
different Member States, the amounts would lie between 0.1 % in the UK and 0.36 % 
in PL. 
                                                 
30  Note that the calculations are based on a number of assumptions about the number of farmers that 
could profit from the scheme that are difficult to verify. Therefore, the figures should only be seen as 
indicative. 
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Table 24: Impact of YFS with a lump-sum support 
N° ha ha ha DP/ha € € %
BE 369 37,8 28,6 28,6 403,4 2.887 1.065.345 0,20%
BG 1.890 17,8 6,2 17,8 233,7 1.039 1.964.112 0,24%
CZ 337 77,7 89,3 77,7 254,8 4.950 1.669.390 0,19%
DK 365 74,1 59,7 59,7 344,2 5.135 1.874.111 0,21%
DE 4.001 43,9 45,7 43,9 307,3 3.375 13.503.337 0,26%
EE 142 70,6 38,9 38,9 156,6 1.521 216.314 0,16%
IE 1.011 44,8 32,3 32,3 267,8 2.161 2.185.040 0,18%
GR 6.233 10,1 4,7 10,1 363,9 918 5.720.039 0,28%
ES 5.513 35,0 23,8 25,0 237,7 1.485 8.188.837 0,16%
FR 3.977 90,3 52,1 52,1 288,9 3.763 14.965.404 0,20%
IT 6.721 12,3 7,6 12,3 378,0 1.158 7.782.255 0,20%
CY 173 5,4 3,6 5,4 351,7 472 81.777 0,16%
LV 873 20,1 16,5 20,1 141,8 711 620.911 0,28%
LT 1.438 17,7 11,5 17,7 174,4 772 1.110.348 0,24%
LU 18 82,4 56,9 56,9 275,7 3.922 70.593 0,21%
HU 4.592 8,9 6,8 8,9 257,3 575 2.641.290 0,20%
MT 50 0,9 0,9 0,9 673,7 156 7.803 0,16%
NL 564 27,9 24,9 25,0 422,1 2.638 1.486.754 0,19%
AT 1.939 19,0 19,3 19,0 259,8 1.234 2.393.323 0,34%
PL 27.489 7,5 6,5 7,5 221,7 414 11.381.403 0,36%
PT 768 27,0 12,6 25,0 207,7 1.298 997.349 0,16%
RO 19.720 2,9 3,5 2,9 200,5 147 2.904.727 0,15%
SI 394 9,2 6,5 9,2 312,6 716 281.911 0,20%
SK 315 45,3 28,1 28,1 215,4 1.512 475.785 0,12%
FI 688 42,2 33,6 33,6 236,0 1.983 1.363.523 0,25%
SE 474 56,4 42,9 42,9 234,9 2.522 1.195.325 0,17%
UK 1.241 91,5 53,8 53,8 230,9 3.106 3.854.291 0,10%
EU-27 91.292 17,8 266,7 90.001.296 0,21%
EU-15 33.880 35,3 284,4 66.645.526 0,20%
EU-12 57.412 7,5 218,9 23.355.770 0,25%
** it was assumed (on the basis of the figures of farmers assisted in the RD programmes for YF) that the number of assisted farmers in the YFS could 
be around 5% of the farmers <40yrs 
*** 25% of average DP/ha x average farm size of young farmers (with limit of 25 ha in MS whose average size of holding is below 25 ha and limit of 
average size of holdings in the MS where average holding size is more than 25 ha) 
total 
payments to 
YFS
YFS in share 
of total DP 
budget
5% of 
farmers 
<40yrs**
* age class 'less than 40 years old' has been estimated by assuming a uniform distribution of farmers in the age class 'from 35 to 44 years old' based on 
Eurostat data
average 
farm size of 
YF
average 
DP/ha PEA
YFS 
payment 
per 
farmer***
average farm 
size in MS
number of 
hectares 
taken into 
ccount for 
YFS
 
Source: Eurostat data, DG AGRI calculation 
8.2. Social impacts 
A specific support scheme for young farmers could encourage the entry of young farmers 
into the sector and thus improve the age structure in the farming sector. A setting-up aid 
(option 4) is likely to prove more efficient in this respect because it is targeted only to 
new entrants, not to those young farmers already in the sector. 
However, an aid given to all new entrants - whether young farmers or not – would risk 
supporting some people who were not actually targeted by the measure. Furthermore, 
option 4 bears a certain risk of leading to double funding with the already existing aid for 
“Setting-up of young farmers” under rural development policy, which is based on similar 
criteria. However, if the young farmer scheme was designed in such a way as to bring 
additional income and lower the cost of capital it could actually be complementary to the 
support possible under Pillar II.  
Options 1-3, which are not targeted as a start-up support but an income support to all 
farmers under a certain age – risk less of an overlap with existing rural development 
support as they are based on different criteria. On the other hand, due to the fact that they 
are based on age alone as the selection criterion they may be challenged at the European 
Court of Justice for being discriminatory. 
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8.3. Environmental impacts 
It is unlikely that there would be substantial environmental impacts from the introduction 
of a young farmer scheme. However, it is possible that young farmers would have a 
particularly good awareness of environmental problems and the skills and knowledge to 
use modern technology that allows environmentally and climate friendly production 
methods. 
8.4. International impacts 
There would be no particular international impacts from a young farmer scheme. 
8.5. Administrative impacts 
The implementation of a scheme for young farmers would cause additional 
administrative burden but the costs would be limited as the number of farmers that could 
take part in such a scheme would not be extremely high. It is important that such a 
scheme would be designed not to double existing support possibilities under rural 
development. 
9. BETTER DEFINITION OF "ACTIVE FARMERS" 
The current definition of "farmer" ("…a natural or legal person, or a group of natural or 
legal persons (…) who exercises an agricultural activity.") acknowledges the fact that 
direct support is decoupled and, thus, not linked to production activity. However, the 
application of this definition has resulted in criticism from the European Court of 
Auditors (ECA), and also from the public at large, as certain cases have been reported 
where direct payments seem to have been granted to persons or companies that cannot be 
considered as genuine farmers as they are only to a very small extent engaged in 
agriculture or agriculture is not their main business activity. 
This problem was already addressed in the Health Check of the CAP that provided for 
optional additional criteria for the exclusion of persons/companies from the aid whose 
agricultural activity is only an insignificant part of their overall activity and/or whose 
main business objects do not consist of exercising an agricultural activity. However, no 
Member State has made use of the possibility of setting up these additional criteria.  
This is why a provision could be introduced that obliges Member States to define who is 
an "active farmer". However, the introduction of such a provision poses substantial 
practical difficulties: 
• First, as there exists limited information on the exact dimension of the problem 
(number of beneficiaries now receiving direct support but not qualifying as "active 
farmers") it is rather difficult to make a quantitative analysis of impacts. 
• Second, the definition needs to be fine-tuned to reliably exclude non-active farmers 
while at the same time not affecting the access to support of genuine farmers. The 
criteria to define 'active farmers' would have to ensure that part-time farmers are not 
excluded as it is clear that diversification of activities is a valuable alternative to 
limited growth opportunities within the farm sector and contributes to maintaining 
farming in areas where agriculture is socially and environmentally valuable. 
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• Third, the situations differ substantially between Member States with respect to how 
many beneficiaries could be affected and with respect to what kind of information is 
available in national statistics to be used as criteria to determine what is an "active 
farmer".  
As for establishing the criteria to define who is an "active farmer" there are two 
approaches both of which, however, may create problems: 
• Due to the differences between Member States mentioned above, it could be a 
promising approach to establish a list of criteria for the definition of "active farmers" 
at European level from which Member States could then choose those elements that 
best fit their national situation and the availability of information. The problem with 
this approach is that it could give rise to complaints about discrimination and unequal 
treatment between farmers. 
• Alternatively, fixed and equal criteria could be set that all Member States would have 
to apply. This, however, would not leave flexibility to Member States and could create 
problems for those Member States that are not in a position to apply the selected 
elements. 
Possible elements to be considered as criteria to determine who is an "active farmer" 
could be, for example: 
• That the turnover (or income, or receipts) derived from an agricultural activity 
represents or represented at least X % of the total turnover (income, receipts) of a 
natural or legal person. This would mean that payments would be granted only to 
those natural and legal persons for whom agriculture forms a significant part of 
overall economic activities or whose principal business or company objects consists 
of exercising an agricultural activity. However, care would have to be taken not to 
exclude part time farmers with such a definition (most notably those engaged in 
diversification strategies).  
• That farm animals or agricultural crops, or of farm machinery, or relevant facilities 
for an agricultural activity are present on the agricultural holding. However, these 
criteria could result in problems with the Green Box classification of support if they 
were not linked to a date in the past – which, in turn, would make them questionable 
for determining who is an active farmer today. 
• That professional qualification and/or practical experience is properly credited or that 
the physical residence of the person is on the agricultural holding or close to it. 
However, while these criteria are not problematic from a WTO or discrimination 
point of view, they would also not suffice as the only criteria to determine who is an 
active farmer.  
• Certain types of business (such as airports, railway companies, sport grounds, etc.) 
could be excluded from qualifying as active farmers ("negative list"). However, such 
a negative list could pose problems since it may not be exhaustive and thus may leave 
out certain companies which could lead to complaints about unequal treatment by the 
economical agents explicitly mentioned on the list. 
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• Farmers subscribing to rural development measures could be considered as active 
farmers. However, this criterion is, again, not sufficient as the sole determinant of 
who should be seen as an active farmer.  
9.1. Economic and social impacts 
The economic impacts of a better definition of "active farmers" would most likely not be 
substantial as the problem of granting direct payments to non-genuine farmers seems to 
be limited to particular cases and is not a widespread phenomenon. This having been 
said, a definition that guarantees that only active farmers receive support means, of 
course, a better targeting of payments to those who actually are the intended recipients. 
Thus, the approach would improve the use of public funds and increase the public 
acceptance of direct payments. 
9.2. International impacts 
It would have to be ensured that the list of criteria set up to define who is an "active 
farmer" contains only elements that respect WTO Green Box criteria. In particular, it 
would have to be avoided that any of the criteria would imply an obligation to produce in 
order to be classified as an "active farmer" as this would be against the principle of 
decoupling. 
9.3. Environmental impacts 
Care is needed not to exclude from support - and so from GAEC - land which is 
important for environmental reasons and/or which may also at some stage be needed for 
agriculture. 
9.4. Administrative impacts 
Improving the targeting of payments to active farmers would require careful fine tuning 
of definitions, possibly in cooperation with Member States, and selecting criteria to be 
integrated into the IACS register. This would generate substantial administrative effort 
for farmers who would have to prove eligibility by providing supplementary detailed 
information and possibly submitting accompanying documents with their application and 
for national/regional authorities who would have to control the received information. 
This could lead to a considerable increase of administrative burden for farmers and 
Member States. 
10. COUPLED AID FOR SPECIFIC SECTORS AND REGIONS 
Decoupling has been the principle of recent CAP reforms as it introduces flexibility in 
the choice of producers who continue to produce where it is profitable, and adapt their 
output to the market, like changing to alternative crops where it is adequate.. However, 
there are particular sectors and regions where the maintenance of a specific type of 
production is important to generate economic benefits and benefits in terms of the social 
fabric of areas and where, without coupled support, there is a danger of this production 
vanishing. 
This is why the Communication on the future CAP foresees that coupled support may 
continue to be granted to take into account specific problems in certain regions where 
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particular type of farming are considered particularly important for economic and/or 
social reasons. The potential risks and benefits in the regions should be identified on a 
case-by-case basis before deciding to which extent and where a possibility for coupled 
support should remain. 
To this end, the role of coupled payments on farmer's margins was assessed on the basis 
of FADN data (see details in sub-annex 3E "Impact of suppression of coupled support for 
beef, sheep and goat sectors based on FADN data"). As some current coupled payments 
will become decoupled in the coming years (sugar beet and cane, fruits and vegetables) 
and as some others are part of specific programmes (POSEI and Small Aegean Islands) 
or are guaranteed by the Treaty (cotton), the assessment was limited to the beef, sheep 
and goat sectors31. All types of coupled payments implemented during the analysed 
period were taken into account: "re-coupled" payment, specific support (Article 69 of 
Reg. 1782/2003), national aid or Complementary National Direct Payment. 
The analysis is based on the principle consideration that, if all the payments are 
decoupled, it is assumed that a farmer continues producing only if the output covers the 
operating costs. Therefore the analysis compares the margin over operating costs with 
and without coupled payments and looks at the particular Member States, types of 
production systems and types of areas (LFA, mountain LFA, non-LFA) to assess the 
impacts.  
10.1. Farm level impacts of keeping certain types of coupled supports  
The impacts of withdrawing coupled payments on farmers' margins vary substantially 
across the analysed Member States and the different production systems and regions. 
In the beef sector, in FI and SE direct payments (both EU and national coupled & 
decoupled payments – especially LFA and environmental payments) are so important 
that the farmers may not take their production decision solely on the basis of a margin 
analysis per enterprise. Specialist breeders especially in mountainous LFA are the most 
sensitive to the decoupling of any of the per head payments especially in FR, AT and PT 
where from 18 to 44 % of the suckler cow population could be affected. The payments 
per head represent a lower share of the margin of the specialist breeders and fatteners 
(B&F); therefore the impact of a total decoupling would be limited for these systems 
except in FR and PT where respectively 15 % and 36 % of the cows could be affected, 
especially in other LFA areas. Suppression of the coupled direct payments for fatteners 
affected estimated 86 % of FI fattening farms and 89 % of the total population of 
animals.  
In the sheep and goat sector, effects likewise vary strongly between different production 
systems. For sheep milk producers, the impact of a total decoupling would be limited 
because of the high output they obtain from milk and cheese. The highest impact is 
estimated in PT (5 % of the ewes). For goat milk farms, 5 % of the she-goats in FR and 
ES are grazed on farms moving to a negative margin and 9 % in CY. On the contrary 
sheep meat specialists are more sensitive to any decoupling because coupled payments 
represent a high share of their margin. In FR 26 % of the 'meat' ewes may be affected, in 
                                                 
31  Coupled supports for rice and silk worms (possible under article 68) are also not covered in this 
impact assessment. 
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ES the impact may be limited to 5 % of the ewes. Despite the limitation due to small 
sample sizes, it seems plausible that the impact would be also significant in HU and PT. 
10.2. Environmental and climate change impacts 
The question of whether margins would turn negative without coupled support in the 
beef, sheep and goat sectors is of substantial importance from an environmental point of 
view as many of the producers are located in environmentally sensitive areas where little 
or no other agricultural activity is possible as production conditions are particularly 
challenging. The move to negative margins and, as a consequence, the termination of 
agricultural production in these areas could result in land abandonment with negative 
environmental and climate change consequences. 
For example, 84 % of the EU-27 beef breeders are located in less favoured areas and 
gross margin is significantly lower in mountainous LFA as the lower value of output is 
not fully compensated by lower costs of production. In general, sheep and goat 
production is also located mainly in LFA where often no other production is possible. 
10.3. Social impacts 
In rural areas where little other agricultural or general economic activity takes place, 
beef, sheep and goat production can contribute to providing employment and keeping up 
the vitality and attractiveness of rural areas. As these types of farming are often located 
in disadvantaged regions, the continuation of production can be judged favourably from a 
social point of view in these cases. 
10.4. International impacts 
A precondition for maintaining some payments coupled to production is that these 
payments stay within strict limits to be fully compatible with WTO requirements.  
10.5. Administrative impacts 
Keeping the possibility for provision of coupled direct support in certain sectors and 
regions does imply that some administrative complexity remains as compared to a 
situation without coupled payments. However, the fact that this support would be 
restricted to particular situations where it is deemed necessary means that overall 
administrative impacts would be limited.  
11. INCREASE IN DIRECT PAYMENTS' CONTRIBUTION TO ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION 
As regards Pillar I's increase in environmental performance, the Communication of the 
future CAP mentions several elements: 
– a mandatory greening component of direct payments which would support simple, 
annual, generalised and non contractual measures addressing both climate and 
environmental policy goals and applicable across the whole of the EU territory (e.g. 
permanent pasture, green cover, crop rotation, ecological set-aside);  
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– the enhancement of certain elements of Good Agricultural and Environmental 
Conditions (GAEC) within cross compliance. 
The analysis in annex 2 "Greening of the CAP" shows that there is a place for a greening 
component of direct payments within this two pillar structure, which would - together 
with enhanced cross compliance and a stronger rural development - considerably 
enhance the environmental performance of the CAP throughout the EU territory.  
To be effective, the design of such a greening component should strike the right balance 
between benefits for the environment and efforts required by the farming sector, while 
staying simple as befits the Pillar I and keeping administrative burden as low as possible.  
12. COMBINATION OF OPTIONS FOR DIRECT PAYMENTS INTO SCENARIOS  
This section discusses the overall impacts of the direct payment aspects of the three 
broad policy scenarios mentioned in the Communication on the CAP, i.e. the 
"adjustment", "integration" and "re-focus" scenario. As each scenario includes a different 
combination of the elements for direct payments discussed in chapters 4 to 10, the 
section draws strongly on the discussion earlier in this paper and only briefly 
recapitulates the effects that the combination of the options will produce. 
12.1. Description of the combined options into scenarios for direct payments 
12.1.1. "Adjustment" scenario  
The "adjustment" scenario focuses on the redistribution of direct payments toward more 
equity between Member States and farmers. Different approaches to this redistribution 
are applied (such as convergence to EU flat rate, "Min 80%" or "Min 90% with 
objective criteria"). The redistribution would imply a move of all Member States 
towards a regional model for direct payments, independently of the options chosen for 
redistributing the envelopes (see chapter 4).  
Additionally, cross compliance is streamlined while its contribution to the climate 
change objective is increased (see annex 2 to the Impact Assessment on "Greening of the 
CAP"). Some coupled payments (suckler cow, sheep and goat) remain for those countries 
which apply them (see chapter 10). 
12.1.2. "Integration" scenario 
The "integration" scenario focuses on better targeting of direct support by improving the 
balance of both economic and environmental concerns within Pillar I of the CAP. It 
consists in: 
• Redistribution of the direct payments between Member States according to "MFF 
distribution key" 
• The granting of direct payments as a combination of different components, consisting 
of: 
– a compulsory basic income support (at least 60% of national envelope in each 
Member States) distributed under the form of a regional flat rate based on 
entitlements (see section 4.2); 
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– a compulsory area-based payment for naturally handicapped areas of maximum 
5% of national direct payments envelope (see chapter 5); 
– a compulsory green payment across the whole EU territory, composed of simple, 
generalized, annual and non-contractual environmental measures going beyond 
baseline standards of cross compliance (the green layer would represent 30% of 
national envelope in each Member States); the measures would concern 
permanent grassland, ecological set-aside, crop diversification and a Natura 2000 
specific support as well as automatic granting of the payment to organic farming 
(see chapter 11 and annex 2 on "Greening of the CAP"); 
– a voluntary coupled support component for specific sectors representing 
maximum 7.5% of the national direct payments envelope (see chapter 10)  
• All layers but the greening are subject to progressive capping mitigated by salaried 
labour employed (see chapter 6) 
• Better targeting of support to active farmers in order to make sure that direct payments 
reach only persons genuinely engaged in agriculture including part-time farmers (see 
chapter 9) 
• A lump sum support to small farmers (defined as small beneficiaries below a certain 
threshold) replacing all the other components of direct payments in order to cut red 
tape, financed by a maximum 5% of direct payments national envelope (see chapter 7) 
• A support scheme for young farmers (defined as farmers starting-up an agricultural 
activity) based on farm size and average direct payments in a Member State, financed 
by a maximum of 2% of direct payments national envelope (see chapter 8) 
• Streamlining of cross compliance while increasing its contribution to climate change 
objective and ensuring consistency with the "green" layer (see annex 2 on "Greening 
of the CAP") 
12.1.3. "Refocus" scenario 
The "re-focus" scenario assumes the phasing out of direct payments between 2013 and 
2020. 
12.2. Description of impacts due to the combination of the different options 
This part summarizes the impact of the three policy scenarios with respect to general and 
income impacts, environmental impacts, international impacts and administrative 
impacts. 
12.2.1. Economic and social (income) impacts 
Adjustment scenario: 
The effects of the redistribution of direct payments would vary strongly depending on the 
option chosen. The option of granting flat rate direct payments across the EU would lead 
to massive redistributions of funds between Member States. The resulting substantial 
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impacts on incomes are likely to make it politically unacceptable for many Member 
States to agree to such a redistribution. 
The options of ensuring a minimum level of convergence or of combining this pragmatic 
approach with the use of objective criteria in redistributing between Member States 
would reduce the effects on incomes while still leading to a more equitable distribution 
of direct payments among Member States. 
The move towards a regional model for direct payments that is implied in the 
redistribution means that direct payments would be redistributed also between farmers 
within Member States, at least in those Member States currently applying a historic 
model. 
The impact on income per type of farming is mainly driven by the move toward a 
regional model. Whatever the option for redistribution, grazing livestock farms and to a 
lower extent wine farms and horticulture would benefit. Field crop farms and milk farms, 
on the other hand, would see a significant decrease in their income. In general, farming 
systems based mainly on grassland would considerably benefit from the redistribution.  
Integration scenario: 
The impact of the redistribution of payments would go in the same direction as described 
for the adjustment scenario, albeit with a somewhat lower level of convergence of 
payment levels between Member States due to the fact that the increase in direct payment 
for Member States below 90% of the EU average is more limited. The extent of changes 
would also be influenced by: 
– The fact that only a part of the national envelope would be devoted to the basic 
income support so that some farmers could see their basic income support 
substantially reduced. The impacts of this reduction may, of course, be mitigated by a 
transitional period in order to allow the adjustments of farm structures; 
– The fact that largest beneficiaries would be capped. As regards capping, it would be 
counter-productive from an environmental point of view to cap the greening 
component of direct payments. Therefore, capping would only apply to a share of the 
direct payment received by the largest beneficiaries, which means that the amounts 
resulting from capping would be lower and the income effect lighter than described in 
chapter 6; 
– The fact that for a share of farms, there will be costs associated to the environmental 
measures required to receive the greening component of the direct payments. Farm 
income would be affected to various extents. Those costs would depend on the 
measures themselves, on the technical orientation of the farms and on the existing 
environmental performance of the farmers (see Annex 2 on "Greening of the CAP").  
– The new payment for farms located in areas with specific natural constraints. In 
LFA/NHA, farm incomes would benefit both from the move to a flat rate at 
national/regional level and from the new payment to areas with specific natural 
constraints. However this would strongly depend on the level of implementation of the 
flat rate and delimitation of regions by the Member States; 
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– The maintenance of coupled supports to livestock. The effect would depend on the 
allocation of budget to this component. If a reduction of the envelope of coupled aids 
occurs compared to the Status Quo, the most affected farms would be grazing 
livestock farms in certain regions. However, this is mitigated by the rest of the scheme 
(redistribution of direct payments) which is in general more favourable to grazing 
livestock farms; 
– The fact that small farmers would see an increase in their direct payments, narrowing 
the income gap with bigger structures. This would allow them to choose the 
development path they wish, whether towards structural change or maintaining local 
small-scale production; 
– The support scheme for young farmers which would increase the incomes of farmers 
starting-up agricultural activity for a limited number of years and thus encourage the 
entry of young farmers into the sector; 
– The better targeting of support to active farmers, which would most likely not have 
substantial overall income effects for the sector but would increase the public 
acceptance of direct payments; 
– The fact that there are farmers who can profit from many components of the system, 
e.g. being located in areas with specific natural constraints thus eligible to the LFA 
component of the direct payments and efficiently carrying out the environmental 
measures of the greening component. They would see their income increase as 
compared to farmers who can make use only of some components of the system. 
Refocus scenario: 
The end of direct support would result in structural changes by accelerating the move 
towards larger farm sizes and to more competitive production regions. Substantial 
reductions in farm incomes would force many producers out of business and could even 
endanger generally economically viable farms in years of difficult market situations as 
the role of direct payments in providing income support would be lost. Structural 
changes are likely to result in loss of employment in the farm sector and possibly also in 
up- and downstream sectors. 
The main impacts would likely be not on the overall quantity of agricultural production 
in the EU but on the way this production is distributed over the EU territory. The lack of 
regional production in many areas could have negative consequences for local markets 
and products and could negatively affect certain up- and downstream enterprises and 
more generally the vitality of rural areas. 
However, due to the fact that the phasing out would take place gradually, these changes 
would be spread out over time. 
12.2.2. Environmental and climate change impacts 
Adjustment scenario: 
The effect of the redistribution of direct payments between farms would in itself have an 
important effect on the support to more environmentally sustainable and climate friendly 
farming. Grazing livestock farms and farms in least favoured areas would benefit from 
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the redistribution, which would to a certain extent be favourable for the maintenance of 
permanent grassland and all its environmental and climate action benefits, while more 
intensive crop production would be supported to a lesser degree. 
Integration scenario: 
Farms located in LFA/NHA would benefit both from the additional income support to 
areas with specific natural constraints in Pillar I and the move to a regional flat rate as 
well as the redistribution between Member States. This would be favourable for the 
continuation of farming in areas with a high risk of land abandonment, which is in turn 
positive for biodiversity.  
The environmental effects of the "greening" component and streamlining of cross 
compliance, which would increase the environmental performance of the CAP as a whole 
in terms of soils, biodiversity, water balance, climate change mitigation and adaptation, 
and landscape amenities, are discussed in annex 2 on "Greening of the CAP").. 
Refocus scenario: 
The main environmental impacts of the end of direct support would be due to the 
changing territorial distribution of agricultural activity. Both the concentration of 
production in particularly productive areas and the abandonment of production and land 
in more marginal regions would have far reaching consequences for the environmental 
balance in these areas with, e.g. possible loss of biodiversity32. The extent of many of 
these impacts depends strongly also on whether and how policies of Pillar II would be 
adapted to mitigate the consequences. 
With the end of direct payments, the enforcement and sanctioning mechanism of cross 
compliance would be lost to a large extent and the wide reach of the GAEC ensuring a 
minimum maintenance of land without economic use would be lost. However the gradual 
nature of phasing out of direct payments may make it possible to introduce over time 
other ways of contribution to a better enforcement of environmental legislation.  
12.2.3. International impacts 
Adjustment scenario: 
The redistribution of direct payments between Member States and farmers should not 
affect the classification of EU support at WTO provided that provided that it remains in 
line with WTO rules (in such a manner that farmer anticipation and effect on production 
level is avoided). 
Integration scenario: 
With respect to the targeting of direct payment, it will have to be ensured that all 
components of the payment are in line with WTO rules. This means in particular that the 
extent of coupled support would need to remain within clearly defined limits and the 
                                                 
32  See study "Scenar 2020; Scenario study on agriculture and the rural world" for European Commission 
– DG AGRI, December 2006, Contract No. 30 – CE – 0040087/00-08 
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elements used to define who is an "active farmer" need to respect WTO Green Box 
criteria, in particular they cannot imply an obligation to produce.  
Re-focus scenario: 
The WTO compatibility of CAP payments would not be affected. 
12.2.4. Administrative impacts 
Adjustment scenario: 
In the first year of implementation of the new system, there would be an administrative 
burden associated with the redistribution (distribution of new entitlements and/or 
recalculation of the value of entitlements) and possibly transition (defining steps for 
progressive modifications in subsequent years for each farmer). However, this would be 
a one-off administrative impact. 
Integration scenario: 
In addition to the need of managing the redistribution in the first year of implementation 
of the new scheme, a number of the components for direct payments, such as capping, 
the definition of "active farmers" and the "greening" could be burdensome as additional 
control requirements could result from them. 
On the other hand, the small farmer scheme would substantially reduce the 
administrative demands from the application for and granting of direct payments to such 
beneficiaries. 
Refocus scenario: 
In the long run, the phasing out of direct payments would bring administrative 
facilitation since the scheme would not have to be administered anymore. 
12.3. Summary of overall impacts 
Table 25 provides a qualitative assessment of the three policy scenarios with regard to 
their impact on income, environment, the international dimension and administrative 
burden. A scale of +2 to -2 is used to rate which impact is deemed very positive (+2) to 
very negative (-2). 
Table 25: Overview of the impact of policy scenarios 
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  Adjustment Integration Refocus 
  Flat 
rate 
Min 
80% 
Min 90% 
+ obj 
criteria 
MFF 
distrib. 
key 
Small 
farmers 
scheme 
Young 
farmer 
scheme 
Capping Greening Additional 
support for 
NC 
Definition 
active 
farmers 
Coupled 
support 
 
  Effects as compared to status quo Effects of each component as compared to MFF distribution key without any 
components 
Effects as 
comp. to 
status quo 
Income effect              
 EU27 0 
 
0 0 0    -1  +1  -2 
 EU15 -2 
 
-1 -2 -1    -1    -2 
 EU12 +2 
 
+1 +2 +1    -2    -2 
 LFA -1 
 
-1 -1 -1    0 +1  +1 -2 
 Non-
LFA 
+1 +1 +1 +1    -1 -1   -1 
 Arable 
farms 
-1 -1 -1 -1   -1 -1 0   -1 
 Grazing 
lifestock 
farms 
+2 +2 +2 +2   -1 +1 +1  +1 -2 
 Large 
farms 
      -1     -1 
 Small 
farms 
    +2   +1    -2 
 Young 
farmers 
     +2       
Environmental 
effects 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 +2 +1 0 +1 -2 
International 
effects 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 
Admin. effects 
-simplification 
 +1 +1 +1 +1 +2 -1 -1 -1 -1 -2 -1 +2 
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SUB-ANNEX 3A – Evaluation of income effect of direct support – Main results 
(1) SCOPE  
The evaluation examines the effects of the direct support schemes laid down in Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1782/2003 on the income of farmers and answers how effective and efficient these 
schemes have been in ensuring a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular 
by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture (Art. 39 of the Treaty of 
Lisbon). The evaluation also examines the coherence of direct payments with measures under the 
Single CMO and rural development measures with respect to the income objectives. 
The evaluation covers the 27 EU Member States over the period since 1 January 2005 onwards, but 
it uses data going back to 2001.   
(2) METHODOLOGY 
The analysis was carried out: 
• At the macro-economic level, based on agricultural statistics from EUROSTAT at regional 
level (NUTS II); 
• At the micro-economic level, based on farm data from the FADN database (Source: EU-FADN-
DG AGRI L-3). 
The analysis distinguished between seven agricultural sectors, the choices of implementation of the 
direct payment schemes in different Member States/regions, farm size, type of organisation and 
geographical location. 
The following table provides a synthesis of the main issues covered by the evaluation and the tools 
used for addressing them: 
 
                           Tools 
 
Issues 
Statist
ical 
analys
is 
Update 
of 
FADN 
data 
(BU 
and RO, 
2008) 
Ordinar
y least 
square 
models 
Probit 
regressi
on 
Quantile 
regression
s 
Gini 
coefficient 
of 
concentrati
on 
Estimatio
n of the 
effects of 
CMO 
measures 
Litera
ture 
Revie
w 
Panel 
of 
exper
ts 
Role of direct support in 
enhancing the farm 
business income of 
farmers  
? ? ?    ?  ? 
Role of direct support in 
stabilising the income of 
farmers  
?   ?     ? 
Role of direct support in 
improving the standard 
of living 
? ?        
Role of direct support on 
the farm household total 
income 
       ? ? 
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                           Tools 
 
Issues 
Statist
ical 
analys
is 
Update 
of 
FADN 
data 
(BU 
and RO, 
2008) 
Ordinar
y least 
square 
models 
Probit 
regressi
on 
Quantile 
regression
s 
Gini 
coefficient 
of 
concentrati
on 
Estimatio
n of the 
effects of 
CMO 
measures 
Litera
ture 
Revie
w 
Panel 
of 
exper
ts 
Contribution to the 
economic viability of 
farms 
? ?       ? 
Efficiency in targeting 
the beneficiaries 
? ?   ? ?   ? 
Relative income transfer 
efficiency  
  ?    ?   
Coherence between 
direct support and other 
CAP measures 
?  ?    ?   
Coherence between 
direct support and LFA 
compensatory allowance 
? ?        
 
(3) MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
Contribution of direct payments to achieving a fair standard of living for the agricultural 
community, by stabilising and enhancing the income of farmers 
In terms of enhancing farmers' income, direct payments: 
• Contribute to enhancing the income of farmers; 
• Play a particularly important role in generating income in grazing livestock specialist farms, 
field crops, mixed farms and dairy farms; 
• Play also a role in strengthening the cohesion between regions, in particular in the sectors of 
field crops, milk, other grazing livestock and mixed farms;  
• Allow a reduction of the existing gap between the average income per labour unit of small 
and large farms. 
In terms of stabilizing farmers' income, direct payments: 
• Make a positive and robust contribution to the stability of income. The highest effect on 
income stability is shown in the sectors which are the most supported by direct payments 
(field crops, other grazing livestock and mixed farms); 
• Have a larger role for income stability in small farms in comparison with medium and large 
farms. 
In terms of ensuring a fair standard of living of the agricultural community, direct payments: 
• Help improving the standard of living of the farming community. 
 83 
Role of direct payments for farmers' income according to farm location and the type of 
organisational form of holding 
Direct payments: 
• Reduce the existing differences between farmers’ income in non LFA areas and in LFA 
areas and the subgroup of mountain LFA areas; 
• Have larger effects on income stability in LFA areas in comparison to non-LFA areas; 
• Contribute to improving the standard of living of the agricultural communities in the LFA 
areas and in the subgroup of mountain LFA areas;  
• Appear to have a larger income stabilizing effect in individual farms and farms organised as 
partnerships compared to farms having other types of organisational forms. 
Direct payments and economic viability  
• Direct payments are vital in ensuring the economic viability of farms in field crops, other grazing 
livestock, mixed farming and in part the milk sector; 
• Farms in which the unpaid labour component is modest (FWU/AWU <30%) are relatively 
more efficient in the EU15 and less efficient in the EU12. This suggests that the strategic 
goals in these classes of farms are completely different: more targeted to economic results 
in the EU15 and more focused on social aspects in the EU12. In other words, maximisation 
of profit in the first case, and maximisation of employment in the second; 
• The hybrid SPS model has probably contributed to a stronger growth of the return on 
investments (ROI) and of the return on assets (ROA) in the EU15 after the reform in 
comparison with the pre-reform period. 
Efficiency of direct payments  
• At global level, the efficiency of direct payments is quite high (The analysis indicates that 
in 2007, 82% of the expenditure is going to farms which, even with direct payments, do not 
reach the fair standard of living). However, at sector level, and even more at regional level, 
the system generates very uneven levels of efficiency. In a large number of regions the 
redistribution of surpluses (payments made to farmers whose income bypasses the 
benchmark) generated by large margins of inefficiency would make it possible to attain a 
fair standard of living for a lot more farmers in the same region and/or in other regions (In 
36.4% of the EU27 regions, the surplus is under 10% of the total expenditure and in 16.4% 
of regions the surplus is above 30% of the total expenditure);   
• Direct payments contribute to reducing the disparities among farmers' income across the 
EU, but an uneven income distribution persists in most sectors and in most geographical 
areas; 
• Direct payments have a larger positive effect on income equality in the regions applying the 
hybrid and the regional SPS models than in the regions applying the historic SPS model; 
• Coupled payments are not efficient in  respect to the objective of reducing the disparities 
between farmers' income; 
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• Regarding the decoupled payments, the results of the modelling at the macro-economic and 
the micro-economic level are not completely similar. While the results of the regressions at 
macro-economic level allow us to conclude that this type of payments contribute to 
decreasing income disparities, the results of the regressions run at micro-economic level are 
less clear-cut.  
Coherence of direct payments with other CAP measures: measures under the Single 
CMO and rural development measures 
• Direct payments are coherent with the other measures in relation to the objective of 
enhancing farmers’ income: the three types of support measures complement each other as 
they substitute each other over time in order to maintain the overall level of support roughly 
constant;  
• Direct payments have been coherent with the measures under the Single CMO as farm 
income support tools; 
• Concerning the rural development measures, the results of the regression estimates are less 
clear-cut; 
• The three types of policy instruments are coherent with respect to contributing to more 
stable incomes. Coherence between direct payments and CMO support appears to be higher 
than between direct payments and rural development measures in most types of farming;  
• Direct payments (at EU level considering all regions and all types of farming) are coherent 
with the compensatory allowance given to specific farms within a certain LFA area (i.e. the 
income of farmers receiving the compensatory allowance is lower or equal to the income of 
other farmers either not located in LFA or located in LFA but not receiving the 
compensatory allowance). However, the analysis by type of farming and by groups of 
regions according to the SPS implementation model indicates that there are also cases of 
overlap of direct payments with the compensatory allowance (the income of farmers 
receiving the compensatory allowance is higher than the income of other farmers); 
• After the reform, in the groups of regions implementing the SPS hybrid model (with a 
prevalent regional component) and of regions implementing the regional model, the degree 
of coherence between direct payments and compensatory allowance increases. 
(4) RECOMMENDATIONS  
• The comparative analysis across types of farming shows that the lowest income levels per 
labour unit are found (besides the other grazing livestock sector) in the two sectors 
benefitting to a very limited extent or not at all from direct support, namely horticulture and 
other permanent crops. In the EU15 Member States, the average income per labour unit of 
these sectors (post–reform period) is about 22% lower than the EU15 average of all sectors. 
Furthermore, both sectors show the highest risk in terms of farm viability (in 37% and 21% 
of the regions, respectively for the horticultural and the other permanent crops sectors, 
average returns on assets are negative). In the light of these results, we recommend to 
extend direct payments to include farms operating in these sectors. 
• The analysis has revealed that in the various regions the income of most farmers does not 
reach the reference benchmark (regional GDP per employee). This means that direct 
payments are basically granted to farmers who need them, therefore, efficiency of direct 
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payments’ expenditure can be considered as good. However, the analysis has also revealed 
that margins of inefficiency exist (direct payments are granted to a certain share of farmers 
whose income is above the benchmark), especially in certain sectors (i.e. in the field crops 
sector) and in certain regions. Therefore, and taking into account also other objectives 
pursued with direct payments (e.g. public goods provision), it seems reasonable to 
recommend the identification of adequate assignment criteria and appropriate instruments 
able to redistribute at least part of the financial surplus generated by inefficiency to farmers 
who are most in need (i.e. for whom the current level of direct payments does not allow 
reaching the benchmark), regardless of the sector. A more efficient allocation of the 
expenditure would also contribute to re-aligning agricultural and other population income 
distribution curves. 
• It was not possible to evaluate the role played by direct payments in farm household total 
income, in spite of noticeable interest in this matter. The analysis of the existing literature 
(studies and statistics) reveals the existence of heterogeneous definitions of agricultural 
households and, thus, of a variety of measurement criteria and data collection instruments 
(where they exist). In essence, therefore, the high heterogeneity of definitions and methods 
makes a combined reading of the existing information impossible.  Consequently, it is 
recommended that a common definition of farm household and farm household total 
income is provided and that harmonised statistics are implemented with respect to both the 
official national and EU statistics and the FADN. 
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SUB-ANNEX 3B - Overview of the implementation of direct payments under the CAP in Member States in 2010 (Reg. 73/2009) (*) 
November 2010 
Member 
States 
Start 
SPS 
Regions Model 
SPS / 
SAPS 
Min. 
Require 
ments 
Sectors remaining coupled  
and transitional coupled payments of the Fruit & 
Vegetables sector 
Specific Support under  
Articles 68 - 72 
2005 Zone Nord: Flanders 
+ Brussels 
SPS 
historical 
100€ Suckler cow premium 100%
Slaughter premium calves 100% 
Protein crops, Flax for Fibre 
For a better quality–all sectors 68(1)(a)(ii) Belgium 
2005 Zone Sud: Wallonia SPS 
historical 
100€ Suckler cow premium 100% 
Protein Crops, Flax for Fibre 
Grassland premium – breeding 68(1)(b) 
Bulgaria   SAPS 0,5 ha 
100 € 
F&V: Transitional soft fruit payments 100% In the dairy sector 68(1)(b) 
Czech 
Republic 
  SAPS 1 ha Separate sugar payments 100% 
F&V:Separate payment for tomatoes intended for processing 
100% 
Aid for dairy farmers 68(1)(b) 
Denmark 2005 one region SPS 
dynamic 
hybrid  
2 ha  
300 € Sp 
Special male bovine premium 75%
Sheep and goat premium 50% 
Starch Potato, Dried fodder, Flax for Fibre 
Agri-environment Measures 68(1)(a)(v) 
Perennial Energy Crops 68(1)(a)(i)  
Germany 2005 Bundesländer 
(Berlin included in 
Brandenburg, 
Bremen in Lower 
Saxony and 
Hamburg in 
Schleswig-Holstein) 
SPS 
dynamic 
hybrid 
moving to 
a flat rate  
1 ha Protein Crops, Nuts,  
Starch Potato, Dried fodder, Flax for Fibre 
Grassland premium in dairy sector 68(1)(b) 
Estonia   SAPS 1 ha  In the dairy sector   68(1)(b) 
Ireland 2005 - SPS 
historical 
100 € Protein Crops, Dried Fodder Grassland Sheep  Scheme and Grassland 
Dairy Efficiency 68(1)(b) 
Conservation in the Burren 68(1)(a)(i) 
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Member 
States 
Start 
SPS 
Regions Model 
SPS / 
SAPS 
Min. 
Require 
ments 
Sectors remaining coupled  
and transitional coupled payments of the Fruit & 
Vegetables sector 
Specific Support under  
Articles 68 - 72 
Greece 2006 - SPS 
historical 
200 € F&V: Until end 2010: 30% of the envelope for tomatoes 
 intended for processing 
Cotton, Sugar, Dried fodder 
Small Aegean Islands 100% 
 
Improvement of quality of olive oil, durum 
wheat   68(1)(a)(ii) 
LFA producers in meat sectors (beef, sheep 
and goat)   68(1)(b) 
Restructuring programmes in LFA 
Mountainous areas   68(1)(c) 
Spain 2006 - SPS 
historical 
100 € Suckler cow premium 100% 
Slaughter premium calves 100% 
Slaughter premium bovine adults 40% 
Seeds, Protein Crops, Rice, Nuts, Cotton 35%, Sugar, Dried 
fodder, Flax for Fibre, Starch Potato 60% 
Outermost regions 100% 
F&V:   Until end 2010: 50% of the envelope for tomatoes 
 intended for processing 
Improving quality of legumes, tobacco sheep 
and goat farmers and milk products    
 68(1)(a)(ii) 
National programme crop rotation  
 68(1)(a)(v) 
Aid to sheep and goat producers and milk 
producers in LFA 68(1)(b) 
Ex article 69 measures (beef ,cotton, sugar, 
milk) 72(3) 
France 2006 - SPS 
historical 
100 € Suckler cow premium 75% 
Seeds (some species), Protein Crops, Rice, Nuts,  
Starch Potato, Dried fodder, Flax for Fibre 
Outermost regions 100% 
F&V:   Until end 2011: 50% for tomatoes intended for 
 processing  
Until end 2010: 98% of national envelope for 
orchards producing prunes, peaches, and pears 
intended for processing  
From 2011 until end 2012: 75% of national envelope  
for orchards producing prunes, peaches, and pears 
intended for processing  
Additional aid for protein crops 68(1)(a)(i) 
Aid for quality of durum wheat 68(1)(a)(ii) 
To maintain organic farming 68(1)(a)(v) 
Diversification of crop rotation 68(1)(a)(v) 
Aid for calves from suckling cows and for  
organic labelled calves; aid for sheep and goat 
producers; aid for milk producers in mountain 
areas 68(1)(b) 
Crop harvest insurance 68(1)(d) 
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Member 
States 
Start 
SPS 
Regions Model 
SPS / 
SAPS 
Min. 
Require 
ments 
Sectors remaining coupled  
and transitional coupled payments of the Fruit & 
Vegetables sector 
Specific Support under  
Articles 68 - 72 
Italy 2005 - SPS 
historical 
100 € Seeds, Protein Crops, Rice, Nuts, Sugar, 
Dried Fodder, Flax for Fibre 
F&V:   Until end 2010: 50% for tomatoes intended for 
 processing 
Until end 2010: 100% for pears, peaches and prunes 
intended for processing. 
From 2011 until end 2012: 75% of envelope for 
prunes 
Improvement of quality  (beef and veal; sheep 
and goat meat; olive oil; dairy products; 
tobacco; sugar; floricultural products)
 68(1)(a)(ii) 
Crops rotation 68(1)(a)(v) 
Insurance payments for harvests, animals and 
plants 68(1)(d) 
Cyprus   SAPS 0,3 ha F&V:   Until end 2010: 100% of national envelope for citrus 
fruits 
Until end 2012: 75% of national envelope for citrus fruits 
 
Latvia   SAPS 1 ha Separate sugar payments 75% 
F&V: Transitional soft fruit payment 100% 
In the dairy sector 68(1)(b) 
Lithuania   SAPS 1 ha Separate sugar payments 100% 
F&V: Transitional soft fruit payment 100% 
 
Luxemburg 2005 one region SPS static 
hybrid 
100 € None  
Hungary   SAPS 1 ha  
0,3 ha for 
orchards 
and 
vineyards 
Separate sugar payments 100% 
F&V:   Separate F&V payments (tomatoes and other fruits) 
 100% 
 Transitional soft fruit payment 100% 
In the dairy sector 68(1)(b) 
For tobacco and fresh fruit and vegetables 
growing areas subject to restructuring and 
development programmes 68(1)(c) 
Malta 2007 one region SPS 
regional  
0,1 ha 
100 € Sp 
None  
Netherlands 2006 - SPS 
historical 
500 € Seeds for fibre flax 
 Starch Potato, Dried Fodder, Flax for Fibre 
For transport over water 68(1)(a)(i) 
Animal welfare 68(1)(a)(iv) 
Electronic I&R for sheep 68(1)(b) 
Weather insurance 68(1)(d) 
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Member 
States 
Start 
SPS 
Regions Model 
SPS / 
SAPS 
Min. 
Require 
ments 
Sectors remaining coupled  
and transitional coupled payments of the Fruit & 
Vegetables sector 
Specific Support under  
Articles 68 - 72 
Austria 2005 - SPS 
historical 
100 € Suckler cow premium 100% 
Nuts, Starch Potato,  Dried Fodder, Flax for Fibre 
Dairy cow premium 68(1)(b) 
Poland   SAPS 1 ha Separate sugar payments 100% 
F&V:  Separate F&V payment for tomatoes100% 
           Transitional soft fruit payment  100% 
For cultivating pulses and herbage legumes  
 68(1)(a)(i) 
For keeping cows in South-eastern Poland and 
sheep in Southern Poland 68(1)(b) 
Portugal 2005 - SPS 
historical 
0,3 ha Suckler cow premium 100%
Slaughter premium calves 100%
Slaughter premium bovine adults 40%
Sheep and goat premium 50%
Seeds 100% 
Protein Crops, Rice, Nuts, Cotton, Sugar, Dried Fodder 
Outermost regions 100% 
F&V:  Until end 2011: 50% of envelope for tomatoes 
 intended for processing 
Maintaining of extensive farming systems 
based on native breeds (beef, sheep, goats)
 68(1)(a)(i) 
Quality improvement of agricultural products 
(crops and animals) 68(1)(a)(ii) 
Agri-environmental measures for protection 
of olive national patrimony and support to 
extensive pasturing 68(1)(a)(v) 
To economic vulnerable types of agriculture 
in milk and sheep sectors 68(1)(b) 
Romania   SAPS 1 ha Separate sugar payments 100% 
F&V: Until end 2011: 50% of envelope for tomatoes intended   
for processing 
For improving quality in the organic farming 
sector 68(1)(a)(ii) 
To the milk sector in LFA 68(1)(b) 
Slovenia 2007 one region SPS 
regional 
0,3 ha / 
100€ Sp 
Special male bovine premium 65% 
Protein Crops, Nuts 
 
For extensive rearing of female bovine 
animals and dairy payment for farmers in 
mountain areas and on steep hills  68(1)(b) 
Preserving animal rearing on farms with 
permanent pastures 68(1)(c) 
Slovakia    SAPS 1 ha Separate sugar payments 50 % 
F&V: Separate F&V payment: 67% (Art.127of Reg. 73/2009) 
Separate transitional F&V payment: 33% of envelope 
for tomatoes intended for processing  (Art. 128 of Reg. 
73/2009). 
In the dairy sector 68(1)(b) 
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Member 
States 
Start 
SPS 
Regions Model 
SPS / 
SAPS 
Min. 
Require 
ments 
Sectors remaining coupled  
and transitional coupled payments of the Fruit & 
Vegetables sector 
Specific Support under  
Articles 68 - 72 
Finland 2006 three regions 
(based on reference 
yield) 
SPS 
dynamic 
hybrid 
moving to 
a flat rate  
200 € Sheep and goat premium 50% 
Seeds (timothy seed), Protein Crops,  
Starch Potato, Dried Fodder; Flax for Fibre 
Supporting beef and veal production;  dairy 
cow premium 68(1)(b) 
Ex-Art 69 measures (arable crops)   72(3) 
Sweden 2005 five regions 
(based on reference 
yield) 
SPS static 
hybrid 
4 ha 
100 € Sp 
Special male bovine premium 74.55% 
Starch Potato, Dried Fodder 
Ex-Art 69 measures: 
Improving quality and marketing  
(all sectors) 72(3) 
 91 
Member 
States 
Start 
SPS 
Regions Model 
SPS / 
SAPS 
Min. 
Require 
ments 
Sectors remaining coupled  
and transitional coupled payments of the Fruit & 
Vegetables sector 
Specific Support under  
Articles 68 - 72 
2005 England normal SPS 
dynamic 
hybrid 
moving to 
a flat rate  
1 ha 
200€ Sp 
Protein Crops, Nuts 
Dried Fodder, Flax for Fibre 
 
2005 England - moorland SPS 
dynamic 
hybrid 
moving to 
a flat rate  
1 ha 
200€ Sp 
Protein Crops, Nuts 
Dried Fodder, Flax for Fibre 
 
2005 England - SDA 
minus moorland 
SPS 
dynamic 
hybrid 
moving to 
a flat rate  
1 ha  
200€ Sp 
Protein Crops, Nuts 
Dried Fodder, Flax for Fibre 
 
2005 Scotland SPS 
historical 
3 ha 
100€ Sp 
Dried Fodder, Flax for Fibre Ex-art 69 measures: 
High quality beef                                    72(3) 
2005 Wales SPS 
historical 
1 ha 
100€ Sp 
Dried Fodder, Flax for Fibre  
United 
Kingdom 
2005 Northern Ireland SPS static 
hybrid 
100 € Dried Fodder, Flax for Fibre  
Abbreviations: SPS     Single Payment Scheme SAPS  Single Area Payment Scheme F&V   Fruit and Vegetables Sp   Special entitlements  
(*)      For the statutory dates and amounts of decoupling please see Annex XI and XII of Regulation (EC) No 73/2009  
N.B.: Hybrid model consists of elements from the regional and the historical model 
  
SUB-ANNEX 3C – Detailed results on income and methodology for simulations 
based on FADN data 
Assumptions and methodology of partial analysis based on FADN 
General 
The simulation is conducted with the model AIDS7K, which has been developed in DG 
AGRI. The analysis is based on 2007 FADN data. The model is able to simulate the impact of 
the change of DP schemes on farm income and DP for the approximately 81 000 sample 
farms included in FADN. The impact on the sector level e.g. EU-27 is measured by 
aggregating the individual data using the FADN weighting scheme. The model is static. This 
means that the structure of farms and the allocation of land do not change in different 
scenarios. Outmost regions are not covered in this analysis because it is difficult to separate 
the POSEI payments from the rest of the EU DP received by the farmers in these regions. 
For the calculation of farm income both changes in output and intermediate consumption and 
DP are taken into account at individual farm level. The coefficients for agricultural outputs 
and inputs are mainly derived from medium term projections of DG AGRI using from 
AGLINK COSIMO, assuming the removal of sugar beet quotas. For certain agricultural 
outputs not covered by AGLINK (vegetable, flowers, olive and wine), the coefficients were 
set based on the analysis of long historical price series. 
For the purpose of the analysis it was necessary to calibrate the model in several ways in 
order ensure comparability of the results between the policy scenarios. 
First, the weighting coefficients in the FADN were adjusted in order to adjust the eligible area 
in the FADN to the one reported by IACS. This was necessary because the DP levels in the 
scenarios were calculated based on the information on eligible area in IACS and, thus, 
differences in the representation of the area would have lead to distorted results. Secondly, the 
aggregated amount of DP in the status quo scenario was adjusted proportionally in order to be 
in line with the forecasted budget in the year 2020 on which the calculation of the DP level in 
the scenarios is based. 
Partial analysis 
In the frame work of the impact assessment a large number of partial analyses assessing the 
effect of different options for the re-distribution of DP, the capping of DP, the support of 
farmers in areas with specific natural constrains and small farmers were conducted.   
For all partial analyses with the exception of the options for the capping it is made sure that 
the total amount of DP is approximately the same for all options. For this purpose the level of 
the area payments and the level coupled payments are reduced taking into account the amount 
of payments distributed via the schemes to be assessed (payments to small farmers, payment 
to farmers in areas with specific natural constraints). In the case of the options for the capping 
of DP it was assumed that the capped amounts are not re-distributed to the other farmers. 
Thus, in this case the total amount of DP differs among the options depending on the amount 
capped.  
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Redistribution options 
All comparisons are done to the Status quo in 2020. Options of redistribution are described 
in section 4.1. 
Impact per EU group and per Member States 
1 2 3 4
EU flat rate Min 80%
MFF 
distribution 
key
Min 90% and 
objective 
criteria
EU-15 -2,1% -0,7% -0,5% -1,3%
EU-12 8,6% 2,4% 1,5% 5,2%
EU-27 -0,1% -0,1% -0,1% -0,1%
Change in FNVA per AWU in comparison with the status 
quo in 2020
 
INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
EU12 Base
Status quo
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 29.202 29.202 0% 29.202 0% 29.202 0% 29.202 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 4.182 5.342 27,7% 4.500 8% 4.384 5% 4.888 17%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 4.178 5.338 28% 4.496 8% 4.380 5% 4.884 17%
Coupled payments - €/farm 4 4 1% 4 -5% 4 -5% 4 -5%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 5.044 6.205 23% 5.362 6% 5.246 4% 5.750 14%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 20.736 20.736 0% 20.736 0% 20.736 0% 20.736 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 5.533 5.756 4% 5.593 1% 5.571 1% 5.668 2%
    External factor costs - €/farm 3.539 3.653 3% 3.576 1% 3.563 1% 3.609 2%
Own capital - €/farm 2.043 2.152 5% 2.066 1% 2.057 1% 2.108 3%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 13.511 14.671 9% 13.829 2% 13.713 1% 14.217 5%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 10.041 10.904 9% 10.278 2% 10.191 1% 10.566 5%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 7.978 8.915 12% 8.236 3% 8.142 2% 8.549 7%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 7.116 7.739 9% 7.267 2% 7.206 1% 7.493 5%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 31% 36% 18% 33% 5% 32% 3% 34% 11%
EU flat rate Min 80% MFF distribution key Min 90% and objective criteria
41 32
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INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
EU15 Base
Status quo
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 93.890 93.890 0% 93.890 0% 93.890 0% 93.890 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 11.507 10.599 -7,9% 11.200 -3% 11.284 -2% 10.918 -5%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 10.979 10.060 -8% 10.670 -3% 10.754 -2% 10.388 -5%
Coupled payments - €/farm 528 539 2% 531 0% 531 0% 530 0%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 13.736 12.827 -7% 13.429 -2% 13.513 -2% 13.147 -4%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 63.878 63.878 0% 63.878 0% 63.878 0% 63.878 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 22.304 22.161 -1% 22.270 0% 22.287 0% 22.218 0%
    External factor costs - €/farm 15.071 14.967 -1% 15.041 0% 15.054 0% 15.014 0%
Own capital - €/farm 7.189 7.150 -1% 7.185 0% 7.189 0% 7.160 0%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 43.747 42.839 -2% 43.440 -1% 43.525 -1% 43.158 -1%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 34.232 33.521 -2% 33.992 -1% 34.058 -1% 33.771 -1%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 21.444 20.678 -4% 21.170 -1% 21.237 -1% 20.940 -2%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 22.032 21.284 -3% 21.745 -1% 21.810 -1% 21.522 -2%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 26% 25% -6% 26% -2% 26% -1% 25% -4%
EU flat rate Min 80% MFF distribution key Min 90% and objective criteria
41 32
 
INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
EU-27 Base
Status quo
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 66.678 66.678 0% 66.678 0% 66.678 0% 66.678 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 8.426 8.387 -0,5% 8.382 -1% 8.382 -1% 8.382 -1%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 8.118 8.074 -1% 8.073 -1% 8.073 -1% 8.073 -1%
Coupled payments - €/farm 308 314 2% 309 0% 309 0% 309 0%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 10.079 10.041 0% 10.036 0% 10.035 0% 10.035 0%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 45.729 45.729 0% 45.729 0% 45.729 0% 45.729 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 15.249 15.260 0% 15.255 0% 15.255 0% 15.256 0%
    External factor costs - €/farm 10.220 10.208 0% 10.218 0% 10.220 0% 10.216 0%
Own capital - €/farm 5.024 5.047 0% 5.032 0% 5.030 0% 5.035 0%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 31.028 30.990 0% 30.984 0% 30.984 0% 30.984 0%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 23.751 23.722 0% 23.717 0% 23.717 0% 23.717 0%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 15.779 15.730 0% 15.729 0% 15.729 0% 15.728 0%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 15.624 15.464 -1% 15.525 -1% 15.535 -1% 15.494 -1%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 27% 27% 0% 27% 0% 27% 0% 27% 0%
EU flat rate Min 80% MFF distribution key Min 90% and objective criteria
41 32
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Impact per type of farming at EU level 
INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
 Fieldcrops Base
Status quo
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 57.563 57.563 0% 57.563 0% 57.563 0% 57.563 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 11.865 11.089 -7% 10.965 -8% 10.942 -8% 11.001 -7%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 11.616 10.827 -7% 10.706 -8% 10.683 -8% 10.742 -8%
Coupled payments - €/farm 249 262 5% 259 4% 259 4% 259 4%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 13.241 12.465 -6% 12.341 -7% 12.318 -7% 12.377 -7%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 40.161 40.161 0% 40.161 0% 40.161 0% 40.161 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 15.918 15.780 -1% 15.757 -1% 15.754 -1% 15.763 -1%
    External factor costs - €/farm 10.801 10.701 -1% 10.697 -1% 10.697 -1% 10.700 -1%
Own capital - €/farm 5.153 5.116 -1% 5.097 -1% 5.094 -1% 5.100 -1%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 30.642 29.866 -3% 29.742 -3% 29.719 -3% 29.778 -3%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 25.162 24.524 -3% 24.422 -3% 24.404 -3% 24.452 -3%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 14.725 14.087 -4% 13.985 -5% 13.966 -5% 14.016 -5%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 15.789 14.764 -6% 14.825 -6% 14.828 -6% 14.780 -6%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 39% 37% -4% 37% -5% 37% -5% 37% -5%
EU flat rate Min 80% MFF distribution key Min 90% and objective criteria
41 32
 
 
INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
 Horticulture Base
Status quo
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 186.202 186.202 0% 186.202 0% 186.202 0% 186.202 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 1.177 1.345 14% 1.417 20% 1.415 20% 1.383 17%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 1.107 1.268 15% 1.339 21% 1.337 21% 1.305 18%
Coupled payments - €/farm 70 78 11% 78 11% 78 11% 78 11%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 1.416 1.584 12% 1.655 17% 1.654 17% 1.621 15%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 97.907 97.907 0% 97.907 0% 97.907 0% 97.907 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 38.719 38.749 0% 38.760 0% 38.760 0% 38.754 0%
    External factor costs - €/farm 33.701 33.723 0% 33.733 0% 33.733 0% 33.729 0%
Own capital - €/farm 4.965 4.972 0% 4.972 0% 4.973 0% 4.971 0%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 89.711 89.879 0% 89.951 0% 89.949 0% 89.917 0%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 36.197 36.265 0% 36.293 0% 36.293 0% 36.280 0%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 50.992 51.131 0% 51.191 0% 51.189 0% 51.163 0%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 45.604 45.726 0% 45.783 0% 45.782 0% 45.757 0%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 1% 1% 14% 2% 20% 2% 20% 2% 17%
EU flat rate Min 80% MFF distribution key Min 90% and objective criteria
41 32
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INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
 Wine Base
Status quo
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 89.602 89.602 0% 89.602 0% 89.602 0% 89.602 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 2.181 3.752 72% 3.998 83% 4.021 84% 3.871 78%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 2.134 3.704 74% 3.952 85% 3.975 86% 3.825 79%
Coupled payments - €/farm 47 48 2% 46 -1% 46 -1% 46 -2%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 2.765 4.337 57% 4.583 66% 4.606 67% 4.456 61%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 40.997 40.997 0% 40.997 0% 40.997 0% 40.997 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 23.932 24.236 1% 24.288 1% 24.292 2% 24.261 1%
    External factor costs - €/farm 16.949 17.077 1% 17.096 1% 17.099 1% 17.090 1%
Own capital - €/farm 7.270 7.447 2% 7.480 3% 7.481 3% 7.459 3%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 51.370 52.941 3% 53.188 4% 53.211 4% 53.061 3%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 33.811 34.846 3% 35.008 4% 35.023 4% 34.924 3%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 27.438 28.706 5% 28.900 5% 28.918 5% 28.799 5%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 30.023 31.375 5% 31.603 5% 31.626 5% 31.487 5%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 4% 7% 67% 8% 77% 8% 78% 7% 72%
EU flat rate Min 80% MFF distribution key Min 90% and objective criteria
41 32
 
 
INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
 Other permanent crops Base
Status quo
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 34.943 34.943 0% 34.943 0% 34.943 0% 34.943 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 2.530 2.240 -11% 2.409 -5% 2.408 -5% 2.300 -9%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 2.481 2.189 -12% 2.360 -5% 2.359 -5% 2.251 -9%
Coupled payments - €/farm 49 50 3% 49 0% 49 0% 49 0%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 2.807 2.516 -10% 2.686 -4% 2.685 -4% 2.577 -8%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 14.543 14.543 0% 14.543 0% 14.543 0% 14.543 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 8.849 8.796 -1% 8.831 0% 8.831 0% 8.809 0%
    External factor costs - €/farm 5.480 5.481 0% 5.486 0% 5.486 0% 5.483 0%
Own capital - €/farm 3.317 3.265 -2% 3.294 -1% 3.294 -1% 3.275 -1%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 23.207 22.917 -1% 23.086 -1% 23.085 -1% 22.977 -1%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 21.006 20.743 -1% 20.897 -1% 20.896 -1% 20.798 -1%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 14.358 14.120 -2% 14.255 -1% 14.254 -1% 14.168 -1%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 17.318 17.021 -2% 17.187 -1% 17.186 -1% 17.081 -1%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 11% 10% -10% 10% -4% 10% -4% 10% -8%
EU flat rate Min 80% MFF distribution key Min 90% and objective criteria
41 32
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INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
 Milk Base
Status quo
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 101.964 101.964 0% 101.964 0% 101.964 0% 101.964 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 10.824 9.500 -12% 9.791 -10% 9.752 -10% 9.739 -10%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 10.713 9.390 -12% 9.682 -10% 9.644 -10% 9.630 -10%
Coupled payments - €/farm 111 110 -1% 109 -2% 108 -2% 108 -3%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 14.070 12.746 -9% 13.037 -7% 12.998 -8% 12.984 -8%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 73.758 73.758 0% 73.758 0% 73.758 0% 73.758 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 20.148 19.956 -1% 19.991 -1% 19.984 -1% 19.989 -1%
    External factor costs - €/farm 12.654 12.528 -1% 12.578 -1% 12.578 -1% 12.567 -1%
Own capital - €/farm 7.244 7.177 -1% 7.162 -1% 7.155 -1% 7.171 -1%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 42.276 40.953 -3% 41.243 -2% 41.205 -3% 41.191 -3%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 29.899 28.963 -3% 29.168 -2% 29.141 -3% 29.131 -3%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 22.128 20.996 -5% 21.253 -4% 21.220 -4% 21.202 -4%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 17.756 16.761 -6% 17.001 -4% 16.990 -4% 16.942 -5%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 26% 23% -9% 24% -7% 24% -8% 24% -8%
EU flat rate Min 80% MFF distribution key Min 90% and objective criteria
41 32
 
 
INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
 Other grazing livestock Base
Status quo
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 53.067 53.067 0% 53.067 0% 53.067 0% 53.067 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 12.094 14.745 22% 14.725 22% 14.779 22% 14.687 21%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 10.769 13.410 25% 13.413 25% 13.466 25% 13.375 24%
Coupled payments - €/farm 1.324 1.335 1% 1.312 -1% 1.313 -1% 1.311 -1%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 16.272 18.923 16% 18.904 16% 18.957 17% 18.865 16%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 42.669 42.669 0% 42.669 0% 42.669 0% 42.669 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 12.467 13.008 4% 12.994 4% 13.005 4% 12.991 4%
    External factor costs - €/farm 6.410 6.706 5% 6.719 5% 6.727 5% 6.714 5%
Own capital - €/farm 6.180 6.425 4% 6.397 4% 6.401 4% 6.400 4%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 26.670 29.322 10% 29.302 10% 29.355 10% 29.264 10%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 20.688 22.745 10% 22.730 10% 22.771 10% 22.700 10%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 14.204 16.313 15% 16.308 15% 16.350 15% 16.272 15%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 12.633 14.488 15% 14.507 15% 14.547 15% 14.463 14%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 45% 50% 11% 50% 11% 50% 11% 50% 11%
EU flat rate Min 80% MFF distribution key Min 90% and objective criteria
41 32
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INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
 Granivores Base
Status quo
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 184.342 184.342 0% 184.342 0% 184.342 0% 184.342 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 5.155 4.880 -5% 4.902 -5% 4.949 -4% 4.912 -5%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 5.084 4.807 -5% 4.831 -5% 4.878 -4% 4.842 -5%
Coupled payments - €/farm 71 73 2% 71 -1% 71 -1% 71 -1%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 6.011 5.736 -5% 5.758 -4% 5.805 -3% 5.768 -4%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 155.276 155.276 0% 155.276 0% 155.276 0% 155.276 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 25.262 25.218 0% 25.211 0% 25.221 0% 25.218 0%
    External factor costs - €/farm 18.418 18.373 0% 18.393 0% 18.396 0% 18.386 0%
Own capital - €/farm 6.573 6.574 0% 6.548 0% 6.553 0% 6.561 0%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 35.078 34.803 -1% 34.825 -1% 34.872 -1% 34.835 -1%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 23.347 23.164 -1% 23.179 -1% 23.210 -1% 23.185 -1%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 9.816 9.584 -2% 9.613 -2% 9.651 -2% 9.616 -2%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 12.251 12.018 -2% 12.045 -2% 12.085 -1% 12.048 -2%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 15% 14% -5% 14% -4% 14% -3% 14% -4%
EU flat rate Min 80% MFF distribution key Min 90% and objective criteria
41 32
 
 
INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
 Mixed Base
Status quo
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 52.658 52.658 0% 52.658 0% 52.658 0% 52.658 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 7.740 7.780 1% 7.572 -2% 7.586 -2% 7.697 -1%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 7.494 7.532 1% 7.328 -2% 7.342 -2% 7.453 -1%
Coupled payments - €/farm 246 248 1% 244 -1% 244 -1% 244 -1%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 9.186 9.226 0% 9.019 -2% 9.032 -2% 9.143 0%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 42.674 42.674 0% 42.674 0% 42.674 0% 42.674 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 11.061 11.086 0% 11.042 0% 11.045 0% 11.068 0%
    External factor costs - €/farm 7.476 7.433 -1% 7.444 0% 7.447 0% 7.444 0%
Own capital - €/farm 3.598 3.666 2% 3.611 0% 3.610 0% 3.636 1%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 19.171 19.210 0% 19.003 -1% 19.017 -1% 19.127 0%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 14.909 14.940 0% 14.779 -1% 14.789 -1% 14.875 0%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 8.109 8.125 0% 7.961 -2% 7.972 -2% 8.059 -1%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 7.281 7.224 -1% 7.101 -2% 7.118 -2% 7.175 -1%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 40% 40% 0% 40% -1% 40% -1% 40% 0%
EU flat rate Min 80% MFF distribution key Min 90% and objective criteria
41 32
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Impact per LFA/non LFA zones at EU level 
Base 1 2 3 4
Status quo    € per 
AWU
EU flat rate Min 80%
MFF 
distribution 
key
Min 90% and 
objective 
criteria
(1) not in less-favo not in less-favoured areas 23.053 -2,8% -2,9% -3,0% -2,8%
(2) in less-favoure in less-favoured not mountain areas 22.972 4,4% 2,5% 2,7% 3,2%
(3) in less-favoure in less-favoured mountain areas 21.748 4,4% 7,3% 7,2% 5,8%
Change in FNVA per AWU in comparison with the status 
quo in 2020
 
 
 
INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
 not in less-favoured areas Base
Status quo
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 70.140 70.140 0% 70.140 0% 70.140 0% 70.140 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 8.340 7.437 -11% 7.405 -11% 7.394 -11% 7.433 -11%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 8.155 7.249 -11% 7.218 -11% 7.206 -12% 7.246 -11%
Coupled payments - €/farm 184 188 2% 188 2% 188 2% 187 1%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 9.032 8.129 -10% 8.097 -10% 8.086 -10% 8.125 -10%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 47.258 47.258 0% 47.258 0% 47.258 0% 47.258 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 16.090 15.928 -1% 15.920 -1% 15.918 -1% 15.926 -1%
    External factor costs - €/farm 11.614 11.497 -1% 11.505 -1% 11.506 -1% 11.505 -1%
Own capital - €/farm 4.466 4.421 -1% 4.405 -1% 4.402 -1% 4.411 -1%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 31.914 31.011 -3% 30.979 -3% 30.967 -3% 31.007 -3%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 23.053 22.402 -3% 22.379 -3% 22.370 -3% 22.398 -3%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 15.823 15.083 -5% 15.059 -5% 15.049 -5% 15.080 -5%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 15.255 14.376 -6% 14.437 -5% 14.444 -5% 14.420 -5%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 26% 24% -8% 24% -9% 24% -9% 24% -8%
EU flat rate Min 80% MFF distribution key Min 90% and objective criteria
41 32
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INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
 in less-favoured not mountain areas Base
Status quo
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 56.174 56.174 0% 56.174 0% 56.174 0% 56.174 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 9.411 10.601 13% 10.105 7% 10.143 8% 10.290 9%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 8.979 10.161 13% 9.673 8% 9.711 8% 9.857 10%
Coupled payments - €/farm 432 440 2% 432 0% 432 0% 432 0%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 12.100 13.290 10% 12.794 6% 12.832 6% 12.979 7%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 41.030 41.030 0% 41.030 0% 41.030 0% 41.030 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 12.727 12.980 2% 12.887 1% 12.894 1% 12.922 2%
    External factor costs - €/farm 7.306 7.418 2% 7.400 1% 7.404 1% 7.409 1%
Own capital - €/farm 5.426 5.569 3% 5.492 1% 5.496 1% 5.518 2%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 27.245 28.435 4% 27.940 3% 27.978 3% 28.124 3%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 22.972 23.975 4% 23.558 3% 23.590 3% 23.713 3%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 14.518 15.455 6% 15.053 4% 15.083 4% 15.202 5%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 15.126 16.020 6% 15.630 3% 15.667 4% 15.769 4%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 35% 37% 8% 36% 5% 36% 5% 37% 6%
EU flat rate Min 80% MFF distribution key Min 90% and objective criteria
41 32
 
 
INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
 in less-favoured mountain areas Base
Status quo
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 44.871 44.871 0% 44.871 0% 44.871 0% 44.871 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 6.147 7.282 18% 8.014 30% 8.011 30% 7.642 24%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 5.605 6.728 20% 7.476 33% 7.473 33% 7.104 27%
Coupled payments - €/farm 542 553 2% 538 -1% 538 -1% 538 -1%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 9.299 10.434 12% 11.166 20% 11.163 20% 10.794 16%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 28.426 28.426 0% 28.426 0% 28.426 0% 28.426 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 10.130 10.341 2% 10.476 3% 10.476 3% 10.407 3%
    External factor costs - €/farm 4.959 5.118 3% 5.164 4% 5.167 4% 5.142 4%
Own capital - €/farm 5.256 5.309 1% 5.398 3% 5.395 3% 5.351 2%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 25.744 26.879 4% 27.611 7% 27.608 7% 27.239 6%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 21.748 22.706 4% 23.325 7% 23.322 7% 23.011 6%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 15.615 16.538 6% 17.136 10% 17.132 10% 16.832 8%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 15.565 16.435 6% 17.079 10% 17.076 10% 16.754 8%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 24% 27% 13% 29% 22% 29% 22% 28% 17%
EU flat rate Min 80% MFF distribution key Min 90% and objective criteria
41 32
 
 101 
Impacts on grassland / non grassland based farming at EU level 
INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
Farms with less than 80% grassland Base
Status quo
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 66.383 66.383 0% 66.383 0% 66.383 0% 66.383 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 8.131 7.579 -7% 7.584 -7% 7.585 -7% 7.587 -7%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 7.923 7.367 -7% 7.374 -7% 7.375 -7% 7.377 -7%
Coupled payments - €/farm 208 212 2% 210 1% 210 1% 210 1%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 9.363 8.811 -6% 8.816 -6% 8.817 -6% 8.819 -6%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 44.451 44.451 0% 44.451 0% 44.451 0% 44.451 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 15.267 15.178 -1% 15.177 -1% 15.178 -1% 15.179 -1%
    External factor costs - €/farm 10.515 10.445 -1% 10.457 -1% 10.458 -1% 10.455 -1%
Own capital - €/farm 4.728 4.709 0% 4.697 -1% 4.696 -1% 4.700 -1%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 31.294 30.742 -2% 30.747 -2% 30.748 -2% 30.750 -2%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 23.854 23.434 -2% 23.438 -2% 23.438 -2% 23.440 -2%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 16.027 15.564 -3% 15.570 -3% 15.570 -3% 15.571 -3%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 15.934 15.338 -4% 15.412 -3% 15.424 -3% 15.382 -3%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 26% 25% -5% 25% -5% 25% -5% 25% -5%
41 32
EU flat rate Min 80% MFF distribution key Min 90% and objective criteria
 
 
INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
Grassland based farms Base
Status quo
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 68.628 68.628 0% 68.628 0% 68.628 0% 68.628 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 10.374 13.727 32% 13.650 32% 13.645 32% 13.631 31%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 9.405 12.743 35% 12.687 35% 12.682 35% 12.669 35%
Coupled payments - €/farm 970 984 1% 963 -1% 963 -1% 962 -1%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 14.817 18.170 23% 18.093 22% 18.088 22% 18.074 22%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 54.175 54.175 0% 54.175 0% 54.175 0% 54.175 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 15.129 15.796 4% 15.763 4% 15.763 4% 15.767 4%
    External factor costs - €/farm 8.269 8.636 4% 8.641 5% 8.644 5% 8.638 4%
Own capital - €/farm 6.982 7.282 4% 7.244 4% 7.241 4% 7.251 4%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 29.271 32.623 11% 32.547 11% 32.542 11% 32.528 11%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 23.045 25.685 11% 25.625 11% 25.621 11% 25.610 11%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 14.141 16.827 19% 16.783 19% 16.778 19% 16.760 19%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 13.721 16.238 18% 16.214 18% 16.216 18% 16.184 18%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 35% 42% 19% 42% 18% 42% 18% 42% 18%
41 32
EU flat rate Min 80% MFF distribution key Min 90% and objective criteria
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Additional income support in areas with specific natural constraints 
All comparisons are done to the redistribution option "MFF distribution key". Options for 
specific natural constraint payments are described in section 4.2 above. 
Impact per farming type 
INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
(1) Fieldcrops Base
MFF 
distribution 
key
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 57.563 57.563 0% 57.563 0% 57.563 0% 57.563 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 10.942 10.785 -1% 10.774 -2% 11.645 6% 10.837 -1%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 10.683 10.197 -5% 10.242 -4% 0 -100% 10.306 -4%
Coupled payments - €/farm 259 254 -2% 254 -2% 244 -6% 254 -2%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 333 - 278 - 277 - 277 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 12.318 12.160 -1% 12.149 -1% 13.020 6% 12.212 -1%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 927 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 40.161 40.161 0% 40.161 0% 40.161 0% 40.161 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 15.754 15.723 0% 15.721 0% 15.875 1% 15.731 0%
    External factor costs - €/farm 10.697 10.676 0% 10.675 0% 10.774 1% 10.680 0%
Own capital - €/farm 5.094 5.083 0% 5.083 0% 5.138 1% 5.088 0%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 29.719 29.562 -1% 29.551 -1% 30.422 2% 29.614 0%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 24.404 24.274 -1% 24.265 -1% 24.980 2% 24.317 0%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 13.966 13.839 -1% 13.830 -1% 14.547 4% 13.883 -1%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 14.828 14.703 -1% 14.691 -1% 15.602 5% 14.647 -1%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 37% 36% -1% 36% -1% 38% 4% 37% -1%
MFF distribution key MFF distribution key Status quo Min 90% and objective criteria
41 32
Max 5% of DP;  Max € 
100 in  LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
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INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
(2) Horticulture Base
MFF 
distribution 
key
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 186.202 186.202 0% 186.202 0% 186.202 0% 186.202 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 1.415 1.392 -2% 1.394 -1% 1.155 -18% 1.362 -4%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 1.337 1.281 -4% 1.286 -4% 0 -100% 1.254 -6%
Coupled payments - €/farm 78 77 -1% 77 -1% 70 -10% 77 -1%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 34 - 32 - 29 - 32 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 1.654 1.631 -1% 1.633 -1% 1.394 -16% 1.601 -3%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 59 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 97.907 97.907 0% 97.907 0% 97.907 0% 97.907 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 38.760 38.755 0% 38.756 0% 38.715 0% 38.750 0%
    External factor costs - €/farm 33.733 33.730 0% 33.731 0% 33.699 0% 33.727 0%
Own capital - €/farm 4.973 4.971 0% 4.971 0% 4.962 0% 4.969 0%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 89.949 89.926 0% 89.928 0% 89.689 0% 89.896 0%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 36.293 36.283 0% 36.284 0% 36.188 0% 36.271 0%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 51.189 51.171 0% 51.172 0% 50.974 0% 51.146 0%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 45.782 45.767 0% 45.768 0% 45.590 0% 45.744 0%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 2% 2% -2% 2% -1% 1% -18% 2% -4%
MFF distribution key MFF distribution key Status quo Min 90% and objective criteria
41 32
Max 5% of DP;  Max € 
100 in  LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
 
 
INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
(3) Wine Base
MFF 
distribution 
key
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 89.602 89.602 0% 89.602 0% 89.602 0% 89.602 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 4.021 3.980 -1% 3.961 -1% 2.215 -45% 3.817 -5%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 3.975 3.777 -5% 3.781 -5% 0 -100% 3.641 -8%
Coupled payments - €/farm 46 44 -5% 44 -5% 45 -4% 44 -5%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 159 - 136 - 136 - 132 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 4.606 4.565 -1% 4.546 -1% 2.799 -39% 4.401 -4%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 70 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 40.997 40.997 0% 40.997 0% 40.997 0% 40.997 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 24.292 24.285 0% 24.281 0% 23.939 -1% 24.251 0%
    External factor costs - €/farm 17.099 17.093 0% 17.093 0% 16.951 -1% 17.084 0%
Own capital - €/farm 7.481 7.479 0% 7.476 0% 7.276 -3% 7.455 0%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 53.211 53.170 0% 53.151 0% 51.404 -3% 53.006 0%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 35.023 34.996 0% 34.984 0% 33.834 -3% 34.888 0%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 28.918 28.885 0% 28.870 0% 27.465 -5% 28.755 -1%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 31.626 31.591 0% 31.575 0% 30.053 -5% 31.440 -1%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 8% 7% -1% 7% -1% 4% -43% 7% -5%
MFF distribution key MFF distribution key Status quo Min 90% and objective criteria
41 32
Max 5% of DP;  Max € 
100 in  LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
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INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
(4) Other permanent crops Base
MFF 
distribution 
key
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 34.943 34.943 0% 34.943 0% 34.943 0% 34.943 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 2.408 2.395 -1% 2.397 0% 2.512 4% 2.290 -5%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 2.359 2.242 -5% 2.244 -5% 0 -100% 2.142 -9%
Coupled payments - €/farm 49 47 -4% 47 -4% 47 -4% 47 -4%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 106 - 107 - 105 - 101 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 2.685 2.672 0% 2.674 0% 2.789 4% 2.567 -4%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 78 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 14.543 14.543 0% 14.543 0% 14.543 0% 14.543 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 8.831 8.828 0% 8.829 0% 8.845 0% 8.807 0%
    External factor costs - €/farm 5.486 5.485 0% 5.485 0% 5.480 0% 5.482 0%
Own capital - €/farm 3.294 3.292 0% 3.293 0% 3.315 1% 3.274 -1%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 23.085 23.073 0% 23.075 0% 23.189 0% 22.967 -1%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 20.896 20.885 0% 20.886 0% 20.990 0% 20.789 -1%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 14.254 14.244 0% 14.246 0% 14.344 1% 14.160 -1%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 17.186 17.175 0% 17.176 0% 17.301 1% 17.072 -1%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 10% 10% 0% 10% 0% 11% 4% 10% -4%
MFF distribution key MFF distribution key Status quo Min 90% and objective criteria
41 32
Max 5% of DP;  Max € 
100 in  LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
 
INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
(5) Milk Base
MFF 
distribution 
key
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 101.964 101.964 0% 101.964 0% 101.964 0% 101.964 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 9.752 9.879 1% 9.881 1% 10.918 12% 9.871 1%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 9.644 9.216 -4% 9.263 -4% 0 -100% 9.246 -4%
Coupled payments - €/farm 108 103 -5% 103 -5% 106 -2% 103 -5%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 560 - 515 - 513 - 522 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 12.998 13.125 1% 13.127 1% 14.164 9% 13.117 1%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 798 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 73.758 73.758 0% 73.758 0% 73.758 0% 73.758 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 19.984 20.010 0% 20.010 0% 20.168 1% 20.015 0%
    External factor costs - €/farm 12.578 12.594 0% 12.594 0% 12.668 1% 12.583 0%
Own capital - €/farm 7.155 7.165 0% 7.165 0% 7.250 1% 7.181 0%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 41.205 41.331 0% 41.334 0% 42.371 3% 41.324 0%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 29.141 29.231 0% 29.232 0% 29.966 3% 29.225 0%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 21.220 21.322 0% 21.324 0% 22.202 5% 21.308 0%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 16.990 17.054 0% 17.061 0% 17.802 5% 17.015 0%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 24% 24% 1% 24% 1% 26% 9% 24% 1%
MFF distribution key MFF distribution key Status quo Min 90% and objective criteria
41 32
Max 5% of DP;  Max € 
100 in  LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
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INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
(6) Other grazing livestock Base
MFF 
distribution 
key
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 53.067 53.067 0% 53.067 0% 53.067 0% 53.067 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 14.779 15.090 2% 15.131 2% 12.596 -15% 15.037 2%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 13.466 12.809 -5% 12.833 -5% 0 -100% 12.751 -5%
Coupled payments - €/farm 1.313 1.247 -5% 1.250 -5% 1.262 -4% 1.249 -5%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 1.034 - 1.048 - 1.057 - 1.037 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 18.957 19.268 2% 19.310 2% 16.775 -12% 19.215 1%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 868 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 42.669 42.669 0% 42.669 0% 42.669 0% 42.669 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 13.005 13.065 0% 13.072 1% 12.560 -3% 13.058 0%
    External factor costs - €/farm 6.727 6.764 1% 6.768 1% 6.466 -4% 6.755 0%
Own capital - €/farm 6.401 6.425 0% 6.427 0% 6.217 -3% 6.426 0%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 29.355 29.667 1% 29.708 1% 27.173 -7% 29.614 1%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 22.771 23.012 1% 23.044 1% 21.078 -7% 22.971 1%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 16.350 16.601 2% 16.636 2% 14.612 -11% 16.555 1%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 14.547 14.763 1% 14.793 2% 12.990 -11% 14.707 1%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 50% 51% 1% 51% 1% 46% -8% 51% 1%
MFF distribution key MFF distribution key Status quo Min 90% and objective criteria
41 32
Max 5% of DP;  Max € 
100 in  LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
 
INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
(7) Granivores Base
MFF 
distribution 
key
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 184.342 184.342 0% 184.342 0% 184.342 0% 184.342 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 4.949 4.907 -1% 4.915 -1% 5.112 3% 4.880 -1%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 4.878 4.663 -4% 4.688 -4% 0 -100% 4.649 -5%
Coupled payments - €/farm 71 67 -5% 67 -5% 68 -4% 67 -5%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 176 - 159 - 156 - 164 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 5.805 5.763 -1% 5.771 -1% 5.968 3% 5.736 -1%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 306 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 155.276 155.276 0% 155.276 0% 155.276 0% 155.276 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 25.221 25.213 0% 25.215 0% 25.254 0% 25.213 0%
    External factor costs - €/farm 18.396 18.393 0% 18.394 0% 18.414 0% 18.384 0%
Own capital - €/farm 6.553 6.549 0% 6.550 0% 6.569 0% 6.558 0%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 34.872 34.830 0% 34.838 0% 35.035 0% 34.803 0%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 23.210 23.182 0% 23.187 0% 23.318 0% 23.164 0%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 9.651 9.616 0% 9.623 0% 9.780 1% 9.590 -1%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 12.085 12.044 0% 12.053 0% 12.212 1% 12.018 -1%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 14% 14% -1% 14% -1% 15% 3% 14% -1%
MFF distribution key MFF distribution key Status quo Min 90% and objective criteria
41 32
Max 5% of DP;  Max € 
100 in  LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
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INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
(8) Mixed Base
MFF 
distribution 
key
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 52.658 52.658 0% 52.658 0% 52.658 0% 52.658 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 7.586 7.587 0% 7.577 0% 7.726 2% 7.690 1%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 7.342 6.996 -5% 7.029 -4% 0 -100% 7.136 -3%
Coupled payments - €/farm 244 232 -5% 233 -5% 235 -4% 232 -5%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 359 - 316 - 313 - 322 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 9.032 9.033 0% 9.024 0% 9.172 2% 9.136 1%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 576 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 42.674 42.674 0% 42.674 0% 42.674 0% 42.674 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 11.045 11.045 0% 11.043 0% 11.059 0% 11.067 0%
    External factor costs - €/farm 7.447 7.447 0% 7.445 0% 7.473 0% 7.442 0%
Own capital - €/farm 3.610 3.611 0% 3.611 0% 3.599 0% 3.638 1%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 19.017 19.018 0% 19.008 0% 19.156 1% 19.120 1%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 14.789 14.790 0% 14.783 0% 14.898 1% 14.870 1%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 7.972 7.973 0% 7.965 0% 8.097 2% 8.054 1%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 7.118 7.110 0% 7.107 0% 7.264 2% 7.165 1%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 40% 40% 0% 40% 0% 40% 1% 40% 1%
MFF distribution key MFF distribution key Status quo Min 90% and objective criteria
41 32
Max 5% of DP;  Max € 
100 in  LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
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Impacts on grassland / non grassland based farming 
INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
Farms with less than 80% grassland Base
MFF distribution 
key
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 66.383 66.383 0% 66.383 0% 66.383 0% 66.383 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 7.585 7.530 -1% 7.521 -1% 8.039 6% 7.525 -1%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 7.375 7.035 -5% 7.066 -4% 0 -100% 7.070 -4%
Coupled payments - €/farm 210 202 -4% 203 -3% 200 -5% 203 -4%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 292 - 252 - 251 - 253 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 8.817 8.762 -1% 8.752 -1% 9.271 5% 8.757 -1%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 592 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 44.451 44.451 0% 44.451 0% 44.451 0% 44.451 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 15.178 15.168 0% 15.166 0% 15.249 0% 15.167 0%
    External factor costs - €/farm 10.458 10.452 0% 10.450 0% 10.503 0% 10.447 0%
Own capital - €/farm 4.696 4.692 0% 4.692 0% 4.722 1% 4.696 0%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 30.748 30.693 0% 30.684 0% 31.202 1% 30.688 0%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 23.438 23.396 0% 23.389 0% 23.785 1% 23.393 0%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 15.570 15.525 0% 15.518 0% 15.953 2% 15.521 0%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 15.424 15.379 0% 15.373 0% 15.859 3% 15.333 -1%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 25% 25% -1% 25% -1% 26% 4% 25% -1%
MFF distribution key MFF distribution key Status quo Min 90% and objective criteria
41 32
Max 5% of DP;  Max € 
100 in  LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
 
 
INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
Grassland based farms Base
MFF distribution 
key
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 68.628 68.628 0% 68.628 0% 68.628 0% 68.628 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 13.645 13.991 3% 14.051 3% 10.956 -20% 14.035 3%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 12.682 12.073 -5% 12.093 -5% 0 -100% 12.086 -5%
Coupled payments - €/farm 963 914 -5% 916 -5% 923 -4% 916 -5%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 1.004 - 1.042 - 1.049 - 1.033 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 18.088 18.434 2% 18.493 2% 15.398 -15% 18.477 2%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 729 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 54.175 54.175 0% 54.175 0% 54.175 0% 54.175 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 15.763 15.830 0% 15.841 0% 15.239 -3% 15.845 1%
    External factor costs - €/farm 8.644 8.684 0% 8.692 1% 8.337 -4% 8.686 0%
Own capital - €/farm 7.241 7.268 0% 7.271 0% 7.025 -3% 7.281 1%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 32.542 32.888 1% 32.947 1% 29.852 -8% 32.931 1%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 25.621 25.893 1% 25.940 1% 23.503 -8% 25.927 1%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 16.778 17.057 2% 17.106 2% 14.613 -13% 17.086 2%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 16.216 16.477 2% 16.521 2% 14.163 -13% 16.487 2%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 42% 43% 1% 43% 2% 37% -12% 43% 2%
MFF distribution key MFF distribution key Status quo Min 90% and objective criteria
41 32
Max 5% of DP;  Max € 
100 in  LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
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Impacts in LFA/non LFA zones 
INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
(1) not in less-favoured areas Base
MFF distribution 
key
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 70.140 70.140 0% 70.140 0% 70.140 0% 70.140 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 7.394 7.066 -4% 7.104 -4% 8.004 8% 7.147 -3%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 7.206 6.884 -4% 6.922 -4% 0 -100% 6.965 -3%
Coupled payments - €/farm 188 181 -3% 182 -3% 179 -5% 181 -3%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 8.086 7.758 -4% 7.796 -4% 8.696 8% 7.839 -3%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 651 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 47.258 47.258 0% 47.258 0% 47.258 0% 47.258 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 15.918 15.855 0% 15.862 0% 16.025 1% 15.871 0%
    External factor costs - €/farm 11.506 11.468 0% 11.473 0% 11.575 1% 11.473 0%
Own capital - €/farm 4.402 4.377 -1% 4.379 -1% 4.439 1% 4.388 0%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 30.967 30.640 -1% 30.678 -1% 31.578 2% 30.721 -1%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 22.370 22.133 -1% 22.161 -1% 22.811 2% 22.192 -1%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 15.049 14.785 -2% 14.816 -2% 15.552 3% 14.850 -1%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 14.444 14.214 -2% 14.235 -1% 15.009 4% 14.215 -2%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 24% 23% -3% 23% -3% 25% 6% 23% -3%
Max 5% of DP;  Max € 
100 in  LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
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INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
(2) in less-favoured not mountain areas Base
MFF distribution 
key
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 56.174 56.174 0% 56.174 0% 56.174 0% 56.174 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 10.143 10.583 4% 10.418 3% 9.715 -4% 10.574 4%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 9.711 9.224 -5% 9.251 -5% 0 -100% 9.391 -3%
Coupled payments - €/farm 432 413 -4% 414 -4% 413 -4% 414 -4%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 946 - 753 - 743 - 769 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 12.832 13.272 3% 13.107 2% 12.404 -3% 13.263 3%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 659 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 41.030 41.030 0% 41.030 0% 41.030 0% 41.030 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 12.894 12.979 1% 12.948 0% 12.786 -1% 12.977 1%
    External factor costs - €/farm 7.404 7.456 1% 7.436 0% 7.342 -1% 7.442 1%
Own capital - €/farm 5.496 5.529 1% 5.518 0% 5.450 -1% 5.542 1%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 27.978 28.417 2% 28.252 1% 27.549 -2% 28.409 2%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 23.590 23.960 2% 23.821 1% 23.228 -2% 23.953 2%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 15.083 15.438 2% 15.304 1% 14.763 -2% 15.431 2%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 15.667 15.985 2% 15.867 1% 15.349 -2% 15.977 2%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 36% 37% 3% 37% 2% 35% -3% 37% 3%
Max 5% of DP;  Max € 
100 in  LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
41 32
MFF distribution key MFF distribution key Status quo Min 90% and objective criteria
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INCOME PROJECTIONS
Source: L3 calculations based on FADN and the AIDS7K model 
(3) in less-favoured mountain areas Base
MFF distribution 
key
2020 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base 2020 /base
MARKET
Output - €/farm 44.871 44.871 0% 44.871 0% 44.871 0% 44.871 0%
DIRECT PAYMENTS (DP) AND SUBSIDIES 
Total Pillar 1 payments - €/farm 8.011 8.313 4% 8.521 6% 6.772 -15% 8.132 2%
Basic rate / decoupled - €/farm 7.473 7.100 -5% 7.103 -5% 0 -100% 6.754 -10%
Coupled payments - €/farm 538 511 -5% 511 -5% 516 -4% 512 -5%
Greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Natural handicap - €/farm 0 703 - 907 - 926 - 867 -
Small beneficiaries - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total Pillar 1 and 2 payments - €/farm 11.163 11.466 3% 11.673 5% 9.924 -11% 11.284 1%
Amounts transfered to Pillar II or capped  - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 309 - 0 -
COSTS
Total operating costs, depreciation and taxes 28.426 28.426 0% 28.426 0% 28.426 0% 28.426 0%
Estimated costs for greening - €/farm 0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
Total external factors, own capital and investment aids 10.476 10.534 1% 10.573 1% 10.248 -2% 10.501 0%
    External factor costs - €/farm 5.167 5.198 1% 5.221 1% 5.026 -3% 5.194 1%
Own capital - €/farm 5.395 5.422 1% 5.439 1% 5.309 -2% 5.393 0%
INCOME
Farm Net Value Added - €/farm 27.608 27.911 1% 28.118 2% 26.369 -4% 27.729 0%
Farm Net Value Added per AWU - €/AWU 23.322 23.578 1% 23.753 2% 22.276 -4% 23.425 0%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/farm 17.132 17.377 1% 17.545 2% 16.121 -6% 17.229 1%
Remuneration for family labour  - €/FWU 17.076 17.296 1% 17.466 2% 16.049 -6% 17.127 0%
Share of Pillar 1 payments in FNVA 29% 30% 3% 30% 4% 26% -11% 29% 1%
Max 5% of DP;  Max € 
100 in  LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
Max 5% of DP;   € 50 
in mountain LFA; € 25 
in other LFA
41 32
MFF distribution key MFF distribution key Status quo Min 90% and objective criteria
 
 110 
SUB-ANNEX 3D: current state of play of LFA 
(5) LFA zoning 
There are three types of less favoured areas: mountain areas, intermediate areas and areas 
affected by specific handicaps. 
Currently, mountain areas cover nearly 16% of the agricultural area of the EU and are 
designated according to a limited number of physical indicators (a short growing season and 
steep slope, and in addition areas beyond the 62nd parallel).  
Approximately 31% of the agricultural land of the EU is classified as intermediate LFA (as of 
2005, they are referred to as 'areas with natural handicaps' – NHA), on the basis of a wide 
range of soil and climate criteria defined by Member States. Their diversity throughout the 
EU was spotlighted by the European Court of Auditors as a possible source of unequal 
treatment. In the light of this ECA report, and on a mandate from the Council, the 
Commission is currently carrying out an exercise together with Member States in which a 
delimitation of intermediate areas with natural handicaps based on common set of biophysical 
indicators is tested..  
Areas affected by specific handicaps, as a third category, are areas where farming should be 
continued in order to conserve or improve the environment, maintain the countryside, 
preserve the tourist potential of the areas, or protect the coastline. These areas cover 9.1% of 
the EU agricultural area.  
(6) LFA payment in Pillar 2 
About 56% of UAA in the EU27 (i.e. about 100 million ha) has been identified as naturally 
handicapped. Not all of the area is subject to specific support for LFA in pillar 2, and only 
about 13% of all farms located in LFA currently receive the LFA payments in pillar 2. The 
total indicative EAFRD budget for these measures amounts to EUR 12.6bn.   
The payments are calculated according to additional cost and loss of income related to the 
handicap, and the amounts of payments are capped by EUR 250/ha in mountain areas and 
EUR 150/ha in other areas. The minimum payment is EUR 25/ha. Farmers (who are the only 
beneficiaries) are obliged to continue farming (in LFA) for at least five years since the first 
payment and they are obliged to apply GAEC.  
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(7) Share of NHA in total UAA and percentage of farms receiving NHP from the 
total number of farms (2005) 
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SUB-ANNEX 3E: Suppression of coupled support for beef, sheep and goat sectors 
See separate document 
